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This thesis was written on the constitutional changes of contemporary China, with the 1982 
Constitution as the object of researches. This constitution is the currently valid constitution 
in China, and is expected by constitutional scholars to be put in ―juridification‖. However, 
for thirty years since its birth, this task is yet to be realized. What is more, the claim of 
―judicialization of the constitution‖ as Chinese legal constitutionalists held especially 
during the 1990s, is now contested by emergent constitutional schools as one of many 
constitutions in China. They are arguing that China‘s constitutional reality should not be 
colonized by the Western-originated constitutional science –classical constitutionalism. 
Having perceived the critical merits of China‘s new constitutional schools, this thesis is 
wary of confirming unconditionally the other end of arguments, namely, applying critical 
theories to condense into ―constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics‖. The use of 
―constitutionalism‖ to describe the Chinese model, however, should be examined against 
whether it has indeed resolved the material problems in China‘s constitutionalization, or is 
merely an inflationary application of the terminology. If China‘s legal constitutionalism is 
seen as implanting formalism of Hayekian theory in service of global capitalism, in the 
second-generation constitutional discourse, have we opted out of this mentality and 
re-constituted ourselves? 
Constitutionalization in contemporary China hence is a complex issue covering the 
grounds of institutional, political as well as conceptual controversies, more than a practical 
issue of applicable mechanisms. The conceptual arguments on ―what is constitutional‖ are 
especially challenging to classical constitutionalism, when combined with ―identity politics‖ 
and ―constitutional pluralism‖. Between the material and conceptual level, I am insisting 
that the ‗democratic deficit‘ caused by China‘s 1990s economic reforms and the market 
mentality still needs a redress, before we could render its hybrid outcomes as 
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When I became interested in constitutional law ten years ago, the people‘s 
self-determination delivered by the ‗constitutional government‘ was always an appeal. It 
still is but also a source of confusion. To establish a government of the people, by the 
people and for the people is all the constitutional politics about; but at the same time, it is 
where distortions happen to fake the people‘s will and to fill the ―empty place‖ of the 
public
1
 with private interests. While classical constitutionalism delineates the synthesis of 
constituent power and constitutional form, the first plural of ‗we‘ as constituent power is 
the most contestable point in constitutional theories, as Hans Lindahl puts it.
2
 
Self-determination, between presence and representation, hence becomes the most 
intriguing part of constitutional theories, ranging from Carl Schmitt‘s ―who decides‖ to 
Miguel Maduro‘s ―who decides who decides‖.3  
This thesis deals with China‘s constitutionalization with an essential complexity that once 
was reduced, and is now in the theoretical trend of contemporary constitutionalism,
4
 
reignited. According to assumptions of positivism and foundational constitutionalism, 
China‘s 1982 Constitution is taken as the referencing point of all researches on the 
contemporary constitutional status of China due to that it is the currently valid constitution. 
However, this validity is at the same time questioned thanks to the lack of mechanisms to 
materialize it. As the calling for ―judicialization of the constitution‖ indicates, it is the 
legality of the constitution itself that is being built in China, which means the thesis of 
positivism instead of being a presupposition, is a controversy. From this perspective, legal 
constitutionalism that was dominant in China‘s 1980s and 1990s, is not a neutral claim but 
                                                          
1
 Claude Lefort (1988) Democracy and Political Theory, (Cambridge: Polity in association with Basil 
Blackwell). 225 
2
 Hans Lindahl (2007), ‗Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of Collective 
Selfhood‘, in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds.), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power 
and Constitutional Form, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 14 
3
 Miguel Poiares Maduro (2003), ‗Europe and the Constitution: What if This is As Good as it Gets?‘ in J.H.H. 
Weiler & M Wind (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) 95 
4
 This term is borrowed from Chris Thornhill (2012a) „Contemporary constitutionalism and the dialectic of 
constituent power‟, Global Constitutionalism 1(3): 369-404 
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already laden with predetermined values of ―Rule of Law‖, especially of an American 
model. 
Positivization of law in contemporary constitutionalism is no longer taken for granted. 
Reflections on positivism and foundational constitutionalism begin to question the artificial 
separation of ‗what is constitutional‘ from de facto social orders, which separation not only 
distinguishes the political from the social fields, but also singles out a constitutional 
moment from the ongoing history. Paradoxically, as Claude Lefort comments, this 
projection of the constitutional moment as exemplified in the French Revolution rather 
means it is an event that did not happen in history.
5
 The theorization and periodization 
produces a constitutional narrative that is ahistorical. 
In China, this is protested in the second-generation constitutional discourse in the new 
century that re-explores China‘s constitutional history which dates to earlier than 1982. 
Culture, social network, and constitutional conventions
6
 such as the Party-state structure 
are all explored as potentialities to contest the positive constitution of 1982 which is 
uncertain about its own societal effects in contemporary China. The new constitutional 
schools are arguing that Chinese constitutional story should not be presumed with a legal 
constitution that fulfils the western and modern formula of ‗constitutional government‘, but 
also encompass the right to define ‗what is constitutional‘. 
Rather than merely an objective document, historical narratives are closely related to 
theoretical implications. As Michel Foucault puts it, history is never simply about ―tracing 
a line‖ but also about ―division‖, ―criteria of periodization‖ and ―series of series‖,7 just 
like in China ‗constitutionalism‘ could date back to ancient regimes, the socialist China or 
the modern one configured by law and capitalism. It is what theories are applied in 
observing and how these observations are taken that project back what is the real history. 
In this instance, Foucault asks whether a ―monumental history‖ is possible.8 This 
historical narrative, instead of documenting events that happened, also problematizes, 
                                                          
5
 Lefort (1988) 213 
6
 Shigong Jiang (2010) ‗Written and Unwritten Constitution: A New Approach to the Study of Constitutional 
Government in China‘, Modern China 36(1): 12-46. 19 and 42 
7
 Michel Foucault (2002) The Archaeology of Knowledge, (London : Routledge).11 
8
 Ibid. 8 
Derrida also borrows this word from Sollers, see Jacques Derrida, ‗Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and 
Guy Scarpetta‘, in Jacques Derrida (2004) Positions, (London: Continuum). 49 
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―how is one to specify the different concepts that enable us to conceive of 
discontinuity (threshold, rupture, break, mutation, transformation)? By what 
criteria is one to isolate the unities with which one is dealing; what is a science? 
What is an oeuvre? What is a theory? What is a concept? What is a text? How is 
one to diversify the levels at which one may place oneself, each of which 
possesses its own divisions and form of analysis? What is the legitimate level of 
formalization? What is that of interpretation? Of structural analysis? Of 
attributions of causality?‖9 
In this thesis, I will take this interplay of history and theorization into consideration, 
re-situate China‘s constitutional history in this complexity and engage with emergent 
constitutional schools in China. Despite great insights they have brought to understanding 
historical changes and limited views of legal constitutionalism in China, I am worrying it is 
too early to pronounce a paradigm shift away from the democratic ontology of classical 
constitutionalism and argue for a Chinese variant. In this thesis, by allowing for their 
constitutional re-imaginations to unpack, I will also question what constitutes an 
‗alternation‘ to the first-generation reforms in these imaginations that enable them to claim 
―the Chinese characteristics‖. 
1. The complex entanglement of several claims about ―Constitutionalism‖ in China 
In the first part, I want to unpack possible diversity and complexities concerning the use of 
‗constitutionalism‘ in China. Firstly, in Chinese, the expression of ‗constitutionalism‘ is 
‗Xianfa‘, a word that has been used since antiquity. ―Originally it simply referred to a set 
of laws and rules relevant to the government.‖10 Only by means of Meiji Japan 
(1866-1912), this term is used to translate the western sense of ―a fundamental law 
superior to all‖.11 It therefore implies a transplanted conception of ‗supremacy‘ that is 
alien to the word itself. With it, the whole system of ‗constitutional government‘ was 
cherished as superior to China‘s traditional form of law in the late Qing dynasty.  
Pre-PRC (People‘s Republic of China) constitutional history was shaped by a divided 
nation and internal conflicts. After the failure of establishing a constitutional monarchy in 
                                                          
9
 Foucault (2002) 6 
10
 Xiaohong Xiao-Plaines (2009) ‗Of Constitutions and Constitutionalism: Trying to Build a New Political 
Order in China, 1908 -1949‘, in Stephanie Balme and Michael W. Dowdle (eds.) Building Constitutionalism in 
China (New York: Palgrave Micmillian) 38 
11
 Ibid. 38 
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China‘s last imperial dynasty [in ―The Hundred Days‘ Reform (Bai Ri Wei Xin)‖ from 
June 11
th
 to September 21
st
, 1898], the first draft Constitution [―Tiantan Draft Constitution 
(Tian Tan Xian Cao)‖] was soon aborted by the president of the Republic, Yuan Shikai, 
who craved the ‗life presidency‘ with omnipotent power. China‘s constitutional history 
after that was accompanied with wars and political movements that a stable constitutional 
order was hard to take root. The destiny of a constitution was dependent upon peaceful 
intervals, and was subject to powers of cliques and warlords. This subjection of the 
constitutional fate to war and peace, for Xiao hong Xiao, prepared for a ―Nationalist‖ 
phase associated with the leader of China‘s Kuomintang Party (KMT), Sun Yat-sen. 
Sun developed his own constitutional thinking of a three-stage transition to a constitutional 
state, in which he added two stages prior to a constitutional government -- the first stage of 
―military government‖ to unify the country and the second stage of ―tutelage‖ to prepare 
the people to exercise their sovereignty rights over administrations. Hence, though Sun 
rejected Marxist ―class struggles‖, he adopted Soviet model of ―vanguard party‖ and 
moulded the party-state structure in China. 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a rival party to the KMT was inspired by the soviet 
model as well. And this party-state structure at the founding stage of PRC has shaped the 
constitutional argument suggested by Suli Zhu that the CCP‘s role in political integration 
should be perceived in comparison with the Russian counterpart, who had a bureaucratic 
state preceding the Party.
12
 It implies a combination of themes of ‗nationalism‘ and 
‗communism‘ in China‘s context, which is closely related to what model China‘s political 
constitutionalism could be perceived as (I will explain in Chapter 4). 
Secondly, since the establishment of the new state in 1949, there are also four constitutions 
and an interim constitution once in effect in PRC. And the 1982 Constitution has been 
amended four times with a collection of thirty-one articles. These constitutions and 
constitutional amendments went through China‘s founding phase (1949-1954), the 
revolutionary phase (from the mid-1950s political movements to the peak of Cultural 
Revolution) and the reform phase (after 1978 ―Reform and Opening‖ policy), in which the 
different constitutions have been tasked for different aims. If the ―Common Program‖13 of 
                                                          
12
 Suli Zhu (2009) ‗Judicial Politics as State-Building‘, in Stephanie Balme and Michael W. Dowdle Building 
Constitutionalism in China (New York: Palgrave Micmillian). 35 
13
 The Common Program of The Chinese People‘s Political Consultative Conference (Zhong Guo Ren Min 
Zheng Zhi Xie Shang Hui Yi Gong Tong Gang Ling), which came into effect on Sep 29
th
, 1949. Available at 
http://e-chaupak.net/database/chicon/1949/1949bilingual.htm (accessed on December 6th, 2014) 
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1949 still served the need to unify the country, end the military control, distribute land to 
peasants and realize universal franchisement, the 1954 Constitution professed its socialist 
aim and planned the 1950s collectivization of the means of production in agriculture, 
industry and commerce to base the socialist infrastructure. Nevertheless, this mission of 
transforming people and elements of non- and semi-socialism to socialism could hardly 
make peace with the homogeneous concept of ‗citizenship‘ in the constitution. Political 
movements went through the 1950s and peaked in China‘s Cultural Revolution. The latter 
aimed precisely against bureaucratization of state apparatuses and demanded re-ignition of 
the revolutionary spirit. In its midst, the 1975 Constitution was promulgated with only 
thirty articles, half of which stayed as guideline-natured.  
With the political trial of the ―Gang of Four‖, the 1978 Constitution initiated a 
strengthening of state apparatuses, especially the National People‘s Congress (NPC). Till 
the 1982 Constitution, a direct restoration of the structure of 1954 Constitution was 
finalized and put the emphasis on ―institutionalization‖. Since then, the theme of building 
and stabilizing a constitutional government has dominated the academic arguments, while 
orthodox socialism turned to be the undercurrent with reference mainly to the preamble of 
the constitution. 
Thirdly, besides the two themes of strengthening functions of state apparatuses and 
maintaining the leadership role of the Party in constructing socialism, there is a third theme 
underpinning China‘s Reform Period—the 1978 ―Reform and Opening‖ policy. It was put 
forward in the convention of historical importance -- 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. This policy changes explicitly Mao‘s 
rejection of the ―third way‖ and is receptive to advanced capitalist experiences. From 
mid-1980s, formulation of contract relations happened in the rural and urban places 
incipiently and the process got accelerated in the 1990s. With two main categories of 
socialist ownership preserved, rights to use were separately contractualized in China. The 
scale and significance of private ownership clearly stretched in the four amendments. It is 
named as ―socialist market economy‖. 
Since 1990s, the market mechanism began to expansively substitute the old mechanism of 
social control.
14
 And China‘s private law regime became highly developed encompassing 
contract law, property law, bankruptcy law, etc. all of which are essential for a modern 
                                                          
14
 Shaohua Zhan (2011) ‗What Determines Migrant Workers‘ Life Chances in Contemporary China? Hukou, 
Social Exclusion and the Market‘, Modern China 37(3): 243-285. 252 
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legal system. It is hard to explain this legalization as merely a transmitting form of the 
Party policies. Instead, China‘s legal system should be admitted to having its own logic, 
which could no longer be compared to a movie industry as Donald Clark mocked.
15
 Rather 
than arguing that China has no law other than policies, it is better to re-formulate the 
problematic as China‘s legalization is distinguished from the process of 
constitutionalization and study instead functions of this legal formulation. 
The constitutional order in contemporary China manifests its hybridity. Marketization goes 
along with legalization but does not shake the party-state structure, against both 
conventional thoughts of what background market economy functions in, as well as the 
implications of marketization in transforming the socialist state. How could this effective 
order be understood? Instead of one-dimensional story telling of incomplete realization of 
legal constitutionalism, my thesis concerns complexities with regard to China‘s 
constitutional future and the fusion of three orders: socialism, legalization and 
marketization. Which of them best depicts China‘s constitutional image, and on what 
basis?  
With multiplication of the meanings and orders of ‗constitution‘, it is necessary for me to 
find a threshold to start my inquiry. In the next part, I will argue why the 1982 Constitution 
still is taken as a starting point in my thesis even though other constitutional schools intend 
to suspend this positivist presumption, who I must engage with. 
2. A Methodological Delineation 
In one of the recently emergent constitutional schools in China—China‘s political 
constitutionalism, Shigong Jiang, as its representative, has argued that since the 1982 
Constitution never functions as the only normative source in China‘s society, we should 
re-consider whether researches on China‘s constitutionalism should take it as a starting 
point.
16
 In this argument, to take the written constitution as the fundamental law of the 
whole society is an ideological tool that implants and predetermines a paradigm of how 
constitutional researches should be carried on.
17
 It signifies a radical protest that diversity 
                                                          
15
 Randall Peerenboom (2003) “The X-Files: Past and Present Portrayals of China‟s Alien „Legal 
System‟”, Washington University Global Studies Law Review 2(1): 37-96, 62 
16
 Shigong Jiang (2010) 12-46, 13 
17
 Shigong Jiang (2010) 12-46, 15-16 
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not only occurs in legal sources, but also at the level of legal concepts and legal 
methodology. 
In contesting Niklas Luhmann‘s ‗sociology of law‘, Pierre Bourdieu introduced the thought 
of the judicial ―field‖18, as it sets up an artificial forum as if it could be separated from 
laypeople‘s consciousness of ―fairness‖19. Finding law only in where law formally operates 
hence is criticized by Bourdieu as ―internal‖ sociology of law and a self-referential 
conception
20. It embodies a ―structured structure‖21for sources-finding of law, and hence 
radiates a ―homologation‖ effect22. This effect becomes the judicial ―capital‖23 – a 
privilege and a tool for exclusion – that keeps the empire of law unchallengeable.   
This is a strong critique toward Luhmann‘s definition of the legal system with ―a strict 
operative approach‖.24 Legal institutions, observed by Brian Tamanaha in the case of 
transplanted law in post-colonial states, manifest a deviation from indigenous social orders. 
They are rather tools manipulated by local elites. Tamanaha thus problematizes whether 
law could be separated from its social connectedness and transplanted.
25
 Rules of conduct, 
instead of norms for decision, work as the constitutional order in these places though not 
the official ‗constitution‘. These cases contest strongly the ―recognition‖ of law as per 
Hart‘s -- law is modelled according to internal practices of the judiciary and separated from 
society-derived rules of conduct.
26
 
These fieldwork proofs have questioned a settled discipline of ‗sociology of law‘. In 
Jurgen Habermas and Luhmann‘s writings, this sociology grows out of its transitional 
background from natural law to modern law. The loss of the metasocial guarantee and 
―lifeworld‖ certainties,27 for Habermas, essentializes the building of ‗sociology of law‘ in 
a ―reconstructive‖ sense. If social rules once were embedded in how society functioned, in 
the secular society, ―communicative action‖ about ―validity‖ acts as the basis of 
                                                          
18
 Pierre Bourdieu (1986-1987) ‗The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Judicial Field‘, Hastings L. J. 
38: 805-853, 835 
19
 Ibid. 835 
20
 Ibid. 816 
21
 Ibid. 839 
22
 Ibid. 849 
23
 Ibid. 821 
24 Niklas Luhmann (2004) Law as a Social System (Oxford: Oxford University Press)73 
25
 Brian Z. Tamanaha (2011) ‗The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development‘, CORNELL 
INT‟L L.J. 44: 214 
26
 Brian Z. Tamanaha (1993) ―The Folly of the ‗Social Scientific‘ Concept of Legal Pluralism‖, Journal of Law 
and Society 20(2): 209 
27
 Jürgen Habermas (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).26 
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―integration‖. It is hence an inverse relationship between ―social integration‖ and ―law‖. 
Habermas applies Max Weber‘s ―interpretative sociology‖ which ―realizes that this second, 
more radical tension between facticity and validity inhabits its object domain. … One 
needs a reconstructive approach to explain how social integration in general can take shape 
under the conditions of such an unstable sociation, which operates with permanently 
endangered counterfactual presuppositions.‖28 
The concept of law to indicate an autonomous legal system is rather derived from this 
functional differentiation, which is a modern project. For Luhmann, his ―sociology of law‖ 
is distancing itself from ―social control‖ or ―integration‖.29 And ―(a)s a result the 
differentiation of law can be understood only at the level of professions or 
organizations.‖30The assignment of ―legality‖, in the context of modern positive law, is a 
stop-rule for Luhmann that rejects moralization. As Luhmann argues,  
―Only the concept of sources of the law defines a point at which the 
self-description of law stops and further questions are ruled out. The applicability 
of this concept has been widened so considerably that the threshold has been 
reached at which it could well be said: the legal system itself depends on the 
asymmetry, on the stop rule, on the disjunction of the symmetry which is intended 
by the metaphor of the ‗source‘, but this intention (or ‗function‘) cannot be called 
the reason or ‗proto-source‘ for law … Hence the metaphor of sources of law has, 
as far as validity is concerned, the function of a formula of contingency – just like 
the concept transforms a tautology into a sequence of arguments and makes 
something that is seen as highly artificial and contingent from the outside appear 
quite natural and necessary from the inside.‖31   
This argument about ―legality‖ shaped Habermas‘s critique of Luhmann‘s systems theory 
as ―objective‖ sociology of law as it does not pay attention to ―legitimacy‖. It, however, 
mistakes Luhmann‘s understanding of another distinction between ‗validity‘ and ‗legality‘. 
Luhmann does acknowledge that ―what is legal‖ is dependent on what is legislated, where 
the ‗legitimacy‘ claim matters. And he agrees that ―(t)he risk of the coding legal/illegal 
was accepted but the programming level was used to reintegrate law into society. The 
                                                          
28
 Ibid. 21 
29
 Luhmann (2004) 143 
30
 Ibid. 143 
31
 Ibid. 445 (emphasis added) 
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programming level thus functioned as a balancing level for any discrepancies that might 
arise between law and society.‖32 But besides coding and programming, Luhmann has also 
made a distinction between ‗self-reference‘ and ‗coding‘, as he argues that, ―invalidity‖ is 
different from ―illegality‖. The latter has negative consequences, such as penalties, liability, 
or rendering void the legal effects of certain acts. But the former only has a ―reflexive‖ 
value ―for clarifying the conditions under which validity operates, but it does not produce 
possibilities of further connections‖.33 It is the ―the metaphor of sources of law‖ which 
gives us the language to discuss what is legal or illegal. 
For Luhmann, legal pluralism shares the ―reflexive‖ value as equivocation is their essential 
mission. And legal concepts as the tool of observation, however, could not be multiplied in 
themselves. Or else, it will not be ‗legal‘ pluralism and researches will be ―drowning‖ in 
―normative pluralism‖ or ―regulatory pluralism‖, as Tamanaha himself admits.34 It is the 
unresolved ―legal status of legal concepts‖ in Luhmann‘s word.35 
The ―equivocation‖ of meanings itself could not be substituted for ―equivalences‖. Let me 
return this argument to China‘s constitutional question. When disagreements arise as how 
China‘s constitutional orders should be perceived, they are nonetheless sharing the 
symbolic language and the validity claim about China‘s constitutionalism. If emergent 
constitutional schools are contesting how and where China‘s constitutionalization should 
go, at least a common ground is preserved that ‗constitutionalism‘ for them signifies a 
fundamental order of the polity ‗China‘. Their arguments are focusing on different 
paradigms and sources. And if legal constitutionalism is wrong in depicting the 1982 
Constitution as the social order in China, at least it is a point of departure
36 
that other 
schools have to refer to in proposing alternatives. 
In this thesis, I presume that the 1982 Constitution should be treated as the fundamental 
law in China, as it is prescribed as the valid constitution in China. And all other laws 
should be legislated according to it. Toward oppositions that China is in effect having a 
societal order that is complementing or even having more importance than the 1982 
Constitution, I put it as a potentiality that has to be confirmed and conditioned on debating 
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 Tamanaha, Brian Z., ‗Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global‘, (2008) Sydney Law 
Review, 30(3): 375-411, 393-394 
35
 Niklas Luhmann (1998) Observations on Modernity, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). 15 
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 This word is borrowed from Neil Walker (2008) ‗Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the 
Global Disorder of Normative Orders‘, Int J Constitutional Law 6(3-4): 384 
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the functions of the 1982 Constitution. This temporary suspension at the start allows for 
complexities or even a change of this proposition later in this thesis, where I discuss the 
effort as well as failure of China‘s legal constitutionalism in building up constitutional 
legality in Chapter 2.  
3. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is written along two lines, the material history of China‘s constitutionalization 
and the theoretical complexities about the process. It intends to connect China‘s 
constitutional debates back to historical turns where many issues were left unresolved. 
Toward China‘s constitutional future, I am unable to propose a different resolution. This 
thesis only serves to discern gaps in the thirty-year Reform Period, examine proposals by 
China‘s Libertarian scholars and the New Left,37 and pronounce my own diagnosis. 
I divide the ten chapters of the thesis into three parts. The first two parts depict a whole 
picture of China‘s constitutionalization – the history ranging from the first constitution of 
PRC in 1954 to the constitutional amendments. Along with it are theoretical arguments 
about the nature and future of China‘s constitutionalism. To specify it, Part I contains two 
chapters. Chapter 1 poses the 1982 Constitution as the platform of investigating China‘s 
contemporary constitutional conditions. But the lack of full implementation of it directs the 
controversy from the level of ‗application‘ to debates about the ‗legal nature‘ of the 1982 
Constitution. Consequently, Chapter 2 puts these debates in the historical context of the 
1982 Constitution, and discerns three competing social orders. Instead of a fresh beginning, 
I suggest treating the 1982 Constitution in the process of transformation of China‘s 
constitutional orders from the socialist orthodoxy to a modern legal system. This 
modernization of law is accompanied with marketization and transformation of socialism 
in a ―gradualist‖ way, which forms strong hybridity of China‘s constitutional orders. 
                                                          
37
 China‘s New Left is a group of intellectuals that are critical of global capitalism and also 
some aspects of Chinese economic reforms. In asserting equality, the socialist mentality of 
Mao Zedong is claimed by them. But they also use postmodern critical theories to arm 
themselves against the hegemony of the West, which determines their views on economic 
sovereignty and globalization. They argue for a significant role of state planning and 
preservation of state capacity along with China‘s marketization. Unlike the Old Left, they 
no longer insist on the rigid separation of socialism and capitalism, but argue that China‘s 
hybrid economic reforms should be recognized with its innovative value. Re-orientation to 
social values, however, is not to return to orthodox socialism. 
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Part II focuses on especially the implications of hybridization. By tracing the establishing 
process of China‘s private law system, I correlate the small variations in constitutional 
terminology with materially great changes in society. Penetrating the phenomena of 
legalization, this historical-sociological argument also problematizes the function of law in 
the transformation of socialism, which reveals shortcomings of China‘s legal 
constitutionalism. More constitutional schools are emerging and exerting their influences 
in China‘s constitutional scene (Chapter 4). By deploying history, politics, sociology, 
political economy and cultural sources, constitutionalism is argued in an interdisciplinary 
way in China‘s second-generation constitutional discourse. Unlike the IRI theory 
(Imperfect Realization of Ideal)
38
 that assumes a convergence of China‘s legal system 
with the Western and global one, these schools are arguing divergences and Chinese 
characteristics. 
In arguing for alternative legitimacy claims to classical constitutionalism, a 
meta-constitutional discussion about the meaning of ‗constitutionalism‘ arises. Part III is 
devoted to the conceptual contestation on ‗what is constitutional‘. Chapter 5 is a bridging 
chapter, in which I discern what is challengeable in classical constitutionalism, focusing on 
the crisis of constituent power. Chapter 6, 7 and 8 separately elaborate three approaches to 
contemporary constitutionalism in accordance with their different claims. Chapter 6 is 
devoted to the proposition of ―constitutionalism-lite‖ exemplified in Neil Walker‘s 
writings. Starting from the intricate process of European integration and facing the lack of 
a political community as the referencing point of political legitimacy, Walker instead 
argues ―polity legitimation‖ in accordance with common interests. As a forward-looking 
constitutionalism, it differs from Bruce Ackerman‘s backwardly projected constitutional 
moment and indicates a new paradigm. 
Chapter 7 provides a functionalist critique of this polity legitimation as a simplification of 
the re-specification of social systems, with the heuristic framework of systems theory. 
Gunther Teubner makes crucial contributions to adapting systems theory to the 
constitutional question at the global level. ―Re-configuration‖ and ―intermediation‖ rather 
than uploading to a global polity is insisted on by the sociological approach. For Teubner, 
human rights could evolve with time to re-paradoxify into a new coupling of social 
subsystems in the world society. 
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In Chapter 8, I use Marcelo Neves‘s contestation of Luhmann‘s systems theory to point out 
that Teubner‘s fragmentation of law proposition lacks and also needs a discussion on the 
rationality of law. It is named by Neves as ―transconstitutionalism‖. The proposal of 
―transconstitutionalism‖ different from ―transnational constitutionalism‖, explores 
confrontations in legal rationalities. Instead, pluralism and rights to dissent act as the 
paradigm of ―transconstitutionalism‖ to rectify imbalances.  
In Chapter 9, I am applying Foucault‘s ―how‖ politics to emphasize a critique of these 
critical insights. The eclipse of the ‗political‘ dimension in contemporary constitutionalism 
is related by Foucault to ‗market mentality‘ and the scientific claim of political economy. 
This deeper reason also contests whether pluralism of ‗constituencies‘ is the right 
resolution for crisis of classical constitutionalism. 
In Chpater 10, I return to China‘s constitutionalization. Contemporary constitutionalism 
does provide chances to reflect an over-simplified program of legal transplantation and 
democratization, but this does not mean the ‗democratic deficit‘ in China could be 
transmitted to a conceptual question of ‗democratic variant‘. In reviewing material 
problematic in China‘s constitutionalism, I will argue that the asymmetry in rights 
protection still remains and underpins the logic of constitutionalization in China. It 
demands us to take seriously how market mentality impedes constitutionalization, not 
merely as an encroachment of the legal field, but by attaching the democratic basis of 









China’s 1982 Constitution and Its Judicialization 
 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the focus of my thesis – China‘s 1982 Constitution. It is the 
currently valid constitution and the fourth one in the history of PRC. Before it, there are 
another three constitutions in 1954, 1975 and 1978. They are deemed as four separate 
constitutions due to the ―comprehensive‖ changes. But after 1982, constitutional 
amendments are adopted as the chief means of constitutional change. It indicates the 
attempt to found and solidate the authority of the constitution in a country that does not 
have a long tradition of the Rule of Law.  
This is also understandable if we are reminded that the 1982 Constitution was promulgated 
after the end of the Cultural Revolution in China. The two constitutions (the 1975 and 1978 
Constitutions) born in the revolutionary phase seldom performed the function of legal 
mediation, but a guideline of mass movements led by the Party. This orients afterwards 
more than one-decade work of Chinese scholars to transform, if not build up from the base, 
judicial institutions to materialize legality of the constitution. The calling for judicial 
autonomy has been fused with the proposition of legal constitutionalism, and the American 
constitution model occupies the centre stage of Chinese constitutional scholarship. 
Concentrated on issues of judicialization of the constitution and constitutional review in 
China, this chapter argues how and to what extent the ‗legal‘ nature of China‘s constitution 
is understood. In practices, the court-centred strategy keeps running head to the 
constitutional principle of ―democratic centralism‖ which exempts the constitution from 
being applied in the judiciary. This problematizes whether legal constitutionalism is 
compatible with the constitutional text. But on the other hand, could we leave violation of 
rights without remedy? Instead of arguing as majority writings do on proposing 
mechanisms of application, my concern lies in structural obstacles in the rights strategy, 
which are increasingly acknowledged by human rights lawyers. 
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In the first section of this chapter, I make clear that legality of China‘s 1982 Constitution is 
built up against the background: the end of the Cultural Revolution. In the appeals for 
constitutional review, the legal nature of China‘s constitution is intensely debated. Legal 
constitutionalism in China though is the mainstream scholarship, tells only one side of the 
story. I will delineate three main schools of it in the second part. 
1. The promulgation of the 1982 Constitution 
The 1982 Constitution came into effect on December 4
th
, 1982.  As it completed a 
thorough pending to the 1978 Constitution, it was called a ―new‖ constitution. This wish to 
be a stable constitution is clear in the long preamble written into it, which recollectsall the 
modern history of China: its struggles and achievements in the past, as well as its mission 
of ―socialist modernization‖ in the future. This new term indicates that the 1982 
Constitution is still a socialist constitution. Compared with the mixed economy in the 1954 
Constitution, the 1982 Constitution prescribes two types of public ownership: ownership 
by the whole people and collective ownership by the working people (Article 6). The latter 
indicates the co-operative economy in rural and urban areas that has a collective nature. 
Private economy is not permitted, but individual economy that employs no more than 
seven people, is defined as a complement to the socialist public economy (Article 11). 
Foreign enterprises, individuals and other economic organizations are also permitted to 
invest and participate in co-operation with Chinese enterprises (Article 18). 
Concerning the political structure, the Party leadership is preserved, but intentionally 
understated compared to the emphasis on the institutionalization of state apparatuses. In 
the two constitutions during China‘s Cultural Revolution, articles regarding state 
apparatuses were reduced to a minimal degree (only comprised of Chapter 2, Article 16-25 
in the 1975 Constitution; Chapter 2, Article 20-43 in the 1978 Constitution). And it was 
done in the spirit of revolutionizing and overthrowing the bureaucratic tendency.
1
 But 
after the Cultural Revolution and the Trial of the Gang of Four, ―it was clear that the 
Party-state would have to accept some degree of responsibility for the excesses of the 
Cultural Revolution‖.2 And for Peng Zhen, who was assigned leadership over the National 
Congress,  
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 Alain Badiou (2005) ‗The Cultural Revolution: The Last Revolution?‘ Positions 13(3): 481-514  
2
 Michael W. Dowdle (2009) ―Beyond ‗Judicial Power‘: Courts and Constitutionalism in Modern China‖, in 




―(t)he only way to guard against a return to such runaway political extremes … 
was to introduce into the entity of ‗the state‘ other political structures – 
constitutional structures – that, because they were institutionally outside the party, 
could open up the state to a wider diversity of understandings and sensitivities than 
could be provided by the party alone.‖3  
Hence the organizational reestablishment is the chief achievement of the 1982 Constitution. 
And bypassing the 1975 and the 1978 Constitution, it restored the structure of the 1954 
Constitution. More than half of the constitution (Article 57-135) concerns empowerment of 
People‘s Congresses at both national and local levels, the Government, the Judiciary and 
the Procuratorate, and also with a more detailed prescription on division of labour. 
With the township being established as the basic-level government, people‘s communes‘ 
status was transformed. In the phase of China‘s Cultural Revolution, people‘s communes 
and neighbourhood organizations were the basic ‗political‘ units in urban and rural areas. 
Their political functions were stipulated in article 7, 21 and 22 of the 1975 Constitution 
that ―the local revolutionary committees at various levels are the permanent organs of the 
local people‘s congresses and at the same time the local people‘s governments at various 
levels (emphasis added).‖ In 1978 Constitution, these grass-root organizations were 
preserved (Article 34), but there was no more explicit statement about them as the 
―permanent organs‖. The 1982 Constitution removed their political functions, and they 
were no longer integrated organizations of both ―government administration and economic 
management‖ (Article 7, 1975 Constitution). Article 8 stipulated that it was an economic 
organization; in the meantime, village committees in rural places and neighbourhood 
committees in urban places were responsible for social affairs. They were self-government 
of the mass, but not a level of government subject to political election (Article 111). 
This manifests the dissolution of social, economic and political functions formerly bound 
together and has a profound effect on representative and participatory forms of socialism, 
which I will examine later. Here, what I aim to emphasize is the re-establishment of the 
local People‘s Congresses. While the 1954 Constitution only allowed them to issue 
decisions and orders, the 1982 Constitution empowers them to promulgate local 
regulations in accordance with law (Article 100). This for the first time brought about 
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conflicts of legislative powers between the national and the local levels, and consequently 
the need for constitutional review. 
Many current constitutional arguments made by legal scholars stem from this change, 
namely, the conflicts between regulations and the need for resolution. From a Luhmannian 
sociology of law perspective, internalized hierarchy of law is the preparation of 
constitutionalization.
4
 It shows a potential to be used strategically for a mechanism of 
constitutional review to be established in China: when rights claims of a lawsuit are 
prescribed differently by laws and demands for an answer about which law to be applied in 
the case. 
To call it a strategic point is because, regarding division of labour and the mechanism of 
accountability, the 1982 Constitution, as well as the 1954 Constitution, obeys the principle 
of ―democratic centralism‖.5  It is a principle intended as different from the ―separation of 
powers‖.6 It means that supremacy of the People‘s Congresses is reflected in that they 
create, supervise and hold responsible other state apparatuses of the same level, and the 
local government is under the leadership of the central. But it is not through constitutional 
review to fulfil it, nor there is provision for the review sanctioned. Instead, it is through a 
mechanism of ―Report‖ and ―Record‖ that local regulations are reviewed and repealed, and 
a concrete procedure for these practices is not made clear till the promulgation of 
Legislation Law of People‟s Republic of China in 2000.7 The second section of Article 90 
especially attracts attention as it provides that besides state organs
8
 specified in the first 
section of Article 90, a social group, enterprise, or institutional organization or a citizen 
may also send a request for review. This citizen empowerment
9
 is especially exciting for 
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 Luhmann (2004) 409 
5
 In Article 3 of the 1982 Constitution, ―Democratic Centralism‖ is explained as, ―(1) The National People‘s 
Congress and the local People‘s Congress at different levels are instituted through democratic election; (2) All 
administrative, judicial and procuratorial organs of the state are created by the People‘s Congress to which they 
are responsible and under whose supervision they operate; (3) the division of function and powers between the 
central and local state organs is guided by the principle of giving full play to the initiative and enthusiasm of the 
local authorities under the unified leadership of the central authorities. 
6
 Glenn D. Tiffert (2009) ‘Epistrophy: Chinese Constitutionalism and the 1950s‘, in Stephanie Balme and 
Michael W. Dowdle (eds.) Building Constitutionalism in China, (New York: Palgrave Micmillian).68 
7Legislation Law of People‘s Republic of China (2000), could be found at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207420.htm  
8
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People‘s Procurate, the various special committees of the Standingf Committee and the standing committee of 
the People‘s Congresses of various provinces, autonomous regions and municiples directly under the central 
government 
9
 Keith J. Hand (2009) ‗Citizens Engage the Constitution: the Sun Zhigang Incident and Constitutional Review 
Proposals in the People‘s Republic of China‘, in Stephanie Balme and Michael W. Dowdle (eds.) Building 
Constitutionalism in China, (New York: Palgrave Micmillian) 231-232 
 20 
 
the ―rights-defence movement‖ advocates.10 Following its promulgation, in 2003, a series 
of cases using this article to request constitutional review emerged in China. The most 
famous is the Sun Zhigang Incident. 
In mid-March 2003, Sun Zhigang, a 27-year old man from Hubei province, was stopped by 
policemen outside an Internet Café on the outskirts of Guangzhou. Although Sun‘s stay in 
Guangzhou was legally granted, he was not carrying his identification card. As a result, he 
was detained on the suspicion that he was an illegal migrant, held overnight, and 
transferred to Guangzhou ―Custody and Repatriation (C & R)‖ centre. He died several days 
later and his body showed signs of abuse and an autopsy found that he died of injuries. 
With reports by newspapers, public opinion was inflamed and there was demand for 
authorities to investigate. Thirteen suspects were arrested and eight of them were charged 




Legal reformers viewed this incident as a chance to challenge the C & R system and to 
establish a precedent for constitutional review of regulations in China.
12
 C & R measures 
are a form of administrative detention closely connected to the control of migration of 
peasant workers, and it gave civil affairs and public security bureaus unchecked power to 
invade civil rights prescribed in the constitution.
13
 To repeal it would mean citing the 
Constitution to examine the national law and put constitutional review into practice, even 
though not through the court. However, the result was both successful and compromised. 
Instead of declaring invalid the C & R system, the State Council replaced it with a new 
regulation named Measures on the Administration of Aid to Indigent Vagrants and Beggars, 
which required establishment of voluntary aid stations and prohibited forced repatriations. 
Cases after this incident have shown less degree of success, especially as tactical dealings 
were preferred to application of the repeal power.
14
 And the more politically oriented 
cases are, the less will they be tolerated. As advocates find about this strategy, the key flaw 
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th
, 2003, Yu Jiang, Teng Biao and Xu Zhiyong, who were doctors in law had submitted their 
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contradicting constitutional protections. After that, on May 23
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, 2003, five legal professors—He Weifang, 
Sheng Hong, Shen Kui, Xiao Han, He Haibo -- had appealed to the NPCSC for instigating the special 
investigatory committee prescribed in article 71 of the Constitution. 
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 See Hand (2009) 
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in this procedure is that it does not prescribe that the Standing Committee of National 
People‘s Congress (NPCSC) must respond to the review request, thus there are no forces to 
push through the review. One famous scholar in China, He Weifang, insists in another 
direction on a strategic use of Article 71 of the 1982 Constitution, which allows for the 
establishment of an investigatory committee by the NPCSC for particular issues when 




But all these controversies could be directed to the legal implications of China‘s 
constitution. Even it is not understood in the American model, the term of 
―constitutionality‖ implies at least some legal procedures to sanction accountability, other 
than NPC‘s voluntary responses. This is based on a functional understanding of 
constitutionalism and the study of comparative constitutions. It, nevertheless, conflicts 
with a rigid and literal reading of China‘s socialist constitutional structure borrowed from 
the 1936 USSR Constitution. 
Let me firstly distinguish several terms to clarify the extent of how ‗legal‘ China‘s 
constitution could be, such as ―constitutional review‖, ―application of constitution‖, 
―constitutional interpretation‖, ―legal review‖, ―legal interpretation‖ and ―application of 
laws‖. As I have written above, there is no special provision for constitutional review 
sanctioned.
16
 Regarding constitutional and legal interpretations, powers are entrusted to 
NPCSC [Article 67(1)]. But by means of the 1981 ―Decision‖ (Article 2),17 power of legal 
interpretation is also entrusted to the judiciary when they are applying law to adjudicate 
concrete cases. To summarize, China‘s constitution sets itself as an abstract and political 
document. It is not treated as other regulations and constitutional provisions must be 
concretized through legislation so as to be applied in the court. This abstract/concrete 
distinction decides the division of labour and the generation of law in China is best 
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understood as ―legislation in accordance with the constitution‖.18 Yet the 1981 ―Decision‖ 
creates another distinction between the abstract and the concrete based on cases. Therefore, 
the two definitions of ―the concrete‖ will have collision if a litigant cites constitutional 
rights in a concrete case adjudication, whether the courtroom has the right to interpret and 
decide. 
This is especially raised in the Qi Yuling case.
19
 It was initially a civil law case that the 
defendant had misused the litigant‘s name to enter into a college and worked for ten years 
after graduation till it was found out. The litigant sued her based on the ―right to name‖ of 
the Civil Law, and ―right to education‖ of the Constitution. The trial court supported the 
first while declined to provide remedy for the second, according to that the constitution 
should be applied only through channelling into laws. The litigant appealed. The applicant 
court filed an inquiry concerning the issue of application of constitution in this case to the 
Supreme Court, and the latter issued a reply named ―Response regarding whether one who 
violated the constitutionally protected basic right to education of the citizen should bear 
civil obligation‖ and expressed the approval. After the case, the vice president of the 
Supreme People‘s Court, Huang Songyou, published a paper to compare this case to 
―Marbury v. Madison‖, and the first case of ―Constitutional Adjudication‖ in China.20 
This advance in rights strategy is not agreed by some constitutional scholars, especially 
because it is affiliated to a private law case while constitution is categorized as public law 
and regarding state actions.
21
 So this case rather decentres the use of constitution for 
constraining state powers. This is not a fair argument though, as the issue also concerns 
whether constitutional rights should be concretized in civil laws so that public obligations 
to provide sufficient rights protection are involved. The scholars‘ doubt is rather toward 
whether Huang‘s optimism about a new constitutional mechanism is too early to lift the 
doctrinal distinction. This conflation between ―illegality‖ and ―unconstitutionality‖ is 
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opposed by Tong Zhiwei, as ―at the present time, the biggest threat to the development of 
constitutionalism in China still stems from ‗public and quasi-public bodies‘‖.22 If the 
―unconstitutional‖ encompass the behaviour of the private, he worries that it will be more 
difficult for state powers to be constrained by the constitution.
23
 In 2008 SPC‘s work 
report, since this ―response‖ was not cited again and in China‘s civil law system it does not 
have effects of precedents, it was removed from the collection of the SPC Report.
24
 
Different from the issue of ―Constitutional Review‖ as in the ―Seed Law‖ case,25 Qi‘s case 
is regarding ―judicialization of the constitution‖, especially influenced by the American 
constitutional model. Its starting point is a functional ―ought‖ that constitution is law and 
then should be put into judicialization. But it is at this point where deeper disagreements 
about the constitutional structure of China are involved. The ―democratic centralism‖ and 
its sanctioning on the constitution as abstract produces a dilemma that it is constitutionally 
prescribed immunity for the constitution from being applied. The channel of legislation as 
the only means to concretize the constitution from a political document to laws, however, 
is ineffective and unresponsive to the needs of rights protection that are on the rise. ‗Rights 
strategy‘, though could not rigidly read as part of the constitutional structure in China 
shows dissatisfaction toward the concretization-through-legislation mechanism, which is 
lagged behind remedy of rights. 
Liberal-oriented scholars argue in an opposite way to the rigid understanding of the 
constitutional structure. For them, firstly, constitution is a ‗law‘ that must be realized in 
adjudication. Then courts should have powers to interpret it in cases when litigants claim 
their constitutional rights. And thirdly, though the constitutional text explicitly entrusts 
NPC and NPCSC the interpretation power, it is not monopolized by them. But in this 
argument, the divide between the ‗constitutional‘ and the ‗legal‘ in the Chinese context is 
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from the start blurred. Now it is clear that the question concerning whether China should 
build up judicial constitutionalism is embedded in a deeper argument about what nature 
China‘s constitution has. 
Here lies the complexity of China‘s constitutional changes that have not been explored by 
these majority writings on specific mechanisms of judicial autonomy. The key question is 
in fact the ―telos‖ of constitutionalization. Is China developing for a ―socialist‖ legality 
with its own characteristics or is she just in the process of realizing the western 
constitutional model, as the IRI theory (Imperfect Realization of an Ideal) assumes? The 
evaluation of constitutional changes also depends on the projection onto China‘s 
constitutional future. Here in the following section, I explore the prevalent constitutional 
scholarship throughout China‘s 1980s and 1990s, which I call China‘s legal 
constitutionalism. 
2. Legal constitutionalism in China 
As strengthening of judiciary power is a strong theme, there are abundant empirical studies 
by Chinese or foreign researchers on autonomy of courtrooms
26
 and obstacles to it, such as 
the existence of adjudicative committees,
27
 and the individual case supervision by the 
People‘s Congress.28 The adjudicate committees are set up in every People‘s Court at 
every level of the judicial system as a consultative committee when the cases at hand are 
complex. This meeting behind the courtroom and its administrative trait has long been 
criticized as violating the rule that judges of the trial should only obey the law, and only 
judges hearing cases could decide. Individual case supervision is exemplified in the Seed 
Law case that the People‘s Congress at the same level could supervise outcomes of 
judgments and require retrial of the cases, and even remove the judges. This administrative 
and legislative interference of the trial process has long been condemned as main obstacles 
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court, procuratorate, or the people‘s congress to challenge a legally effective decision on 
their behalf. this innovative practice, though contradicts the principle of ‗separation of 
power‘, in China‘s context, should be viewed as a form to balance ‗judicial independence‘ 
with ‗judicial accountability‘, Peerenboom argues. 
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to judicial autonomy. Besides that, there are other concerns on implementation and 
enforcement,
29
 legal aid and legal profession,
30
 etc. that touch the importance as well as 
difficulties of building up a modern legal system in China. 
‗Legal constitutionalism‘ in China is indicating propositions that intend to take the 
courtroom as the chief agent for advancing constitutional reforms in China, due to the lack 
of it in China. The American model and the competence of its judiciary in dealing with 
highly political issues are admired by Chinese scholars.
31
 In Chinese context, appeal of 
constitutional adjudication has a conflation with demands of judicial autonomy, as 
grabbing power of constitutional interpretation is supposed to enable a shift in balance of 
powers between the party and the judiciary, and between the legislature and the judiciary. 
But it is to advance a more demanding goal of judicial constitutionalism when the basic 
requirement of judicial autonomy in China is not garanteed. The case of ―Marbury v. 
Madison‖ has a clear imprint in this proposition -- a belief in the miracle that the inferior 
status of the judiciary could be addressed by judicial activism. There are three schools 
discernible in putting the judiciary at the centre stage of China‘s constitutionalization. 
2.1. Three schools of legal constitutionalism  
Jiang, of China‘s political constitutionalists, summarizes there are three schools insisting 
on legal constitutionalism in China as his opponents, namely, the schools of ―constitutional 
interpretation‖, ―normative constitutionalism‖ and ―constitutional adjudication‖.32 
However, the differences among them are not dramatic, as I will explain. The first school 
proposes to deploy a purposeful interpretation in accordance with the constitutional spirit 
when ordinary courts adjudicate cases.
33
 Through this, constant constitutional changes 
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could be avoided, as amending still is a resort to politicization which is not good for 
stabilization of the constitutional authority in China. 
―Normative constitutionalism‖ criticizes the school of ―constitutional interpretation‖ as 
―legal fetishism‖. This is because China‘s social transformations have spreaded far beyond 
prescriptions in the written constitution. The term ―benign unconstitutionality‖ implies a 
dilemma that though beneficial in the long term, these social changes could not be 
contained within constitutional prescriptions. Hence a strictly interpretative model has to 
be postponed in application until new norms are promulgated, which is tasked by 
―normative constitutionalism‖. Hence this school is not opposing the interpretative 
approach but worrying this ‗fetishism‘ will be too restrictive when China‘s social changes 
are great and far from being stabilized. What is stressed here by ―normative 
constitutionalism‖ is that constitutionalization is a process of joint efforts from extra-legal 
and societal forces in forwarding reforms in private law and in building up China‘s civil 
society.
34
 What is important does not in unearthing the spirit from the written constitution 
but in forming constitutional conventions across the society. However, this school will be 
unable to distinguish what social experiments are ―normative‖ from what is not, unless in 
accordance with the spirit of constitutionalism, such as human rights. In this sense, the two 
schools are rather in a co-referential relationship. 
Ji Weidong and He Weifang are ―neo-proceduralists‖ in China. He is the main advocate of 
legal professionalism and judicial reform, and argues that the traditional role of Chinese 
judges was an office charged with comprehensive tasks of a community. In this community, 
everyone knows each other (a society with no strangers);
35
 hence there was neither 
division of labour nor needed. This resembles the Khadi Justice of Weber‘s account. But 
when China moves to a modern, differentiated society, this could no longer be sustained. 
Constitutionalization must put emphasis on autonomy of the legal profession and 
consolidate a professional community based on specificity of legal reasoning.
36
 A 
trial-flow tracer system of cases through the website is put forward by Ji, as this system 
could enhance transparency and supervision of the process of adjudication and welcome 
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 Ji claims that he is inspired by theories of Niklas Luhmann, Gunther 
Teubner and Jurgen Habermas, which in common emphasize access to court and 
communication.
38
 By submitting to the judicial procedure, a forum for social interaction 
will be opened. The ideological streak of ―socialism‖ will be de-ideologized into the 
―social‖,39 and transformed to be a ―social rechtsstaat‖40 as he calls it. 
Ji is fully aware of the shortcomings of a ―procedural‖ proposition, but he argues once the 
legal reform is finished, China‘s political reform could be put on agenda afterwards. The 
two ideas of ―thick‖ and ―thin‖ constitutionalism are in fact complementary rather than 
antagonistic. As he puts it, 
―Once judicial reform in China goes deep enough to effect the establishment of 
judicial constitutional review … even extraordinary politics can be subject to legal 
channelling, as the people will be able to reject any kind of extralegal power. Of 
course, such reforms cannot be fulfilled automatically. Social pressures are 
indispensable for inducing legal introspection into governmental 
decision-making.‖41  
Ji hence holds the belief of a court-centred social engineering. Strengthening the judiciary 
is what China needs at present, while a well-stabilized judicial system could then reach out 
to more radical changes. 
Legal constitutionalism of the three schools all make contributions to China‘s legal 
professionalization, which to some degree does construct social expectations and a forum 
for communication. However, the problem they share in common is what limits of legal 
discourses lie in the evolutionary process. For example, what constitutional spirit is 
embodied in interpretation? Could normative constitutionalism produce an accommodation 
between the full protection of property rights and the socialist principle? How to reconcile 
the legislative review of NPC and NPCSC sanctioned in the constitution, with the 
court-based neo-proceduralism? There seems always a moment that the principle of 
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‗democratic centralism‘ will have to concede its orthodox understanding to reforms based 
on rights strategy, or vice versa. 
This draws us to the default problem that China‘s constitutional prescriptions are 
channelled through concrete laws. While improving and enriching legislation could 
compensate for deficits, rights without remedy will appear when there are no or 
insufficient laws to concretize legal protection of human rights, which calls into question 
the proper guardian of China‘s constitution. This is especially the cases of political rights 
and some politically sensitive social rights in China.
42
  Gao Zhisheng, who used to be an 
exemplary lawyer, turned to the ‗Hunger protest‘ when he found that infringement of 
freedom of religion by administrative regulations  could not be heard in the court due to 
the procedural exclusion of ―abstract‖ cases (according to Article 12 of Administrative 
Litigation Law).
43
 As Fu Hualing puts it, this no-resolution forces ―human rights lawyers 
up the ladder‖.44  
2.2. Peerenboom’s “thin” Rule of Law and articulation of law 
and development 
The court-centred paradigm is also manifested in writings of Randall Peerenboom, who 
writes comprehensively on Chinese and East Asian legal systems; but in a more theoretical 
sense about ‗human rights jurisprudence‘. In opposition to Clarke, Peerenboom argues that 
the analogy of China‘s present legal system to a movie industry is undermining the 
three-decade developments in China and is an ideological thinking. Toward deficits of 
China‘s judicial reform compared to the ‗Rule of Law‘ ideal, Peerenboom suggests it as an 
―articulated‖ variant. Instead of the ―lofty‖ arguments that separate liberal views of 
individual rights on one side and emphasis on collective interests and social stability in 
Asia on the other side,
45
 a more proper resolution would be to study particular practices on 
particular occasions.
46
 This gives the ―articulation‖ thesis of rights by Peerenboom. 
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―At the heart of the argument was the claim that the interpretation and 
implementation of rights does and should depend to some degree on local 
circumstances, including not just values, but levels of economic development; 
political institutions and beliefs; legal institutions, doctrines and practices; ethnic 
diversity; the presence of terrorists and other such factors.‖47  
Therefore, a ―thin‖ rule of law to lay the common ground is adopted as the methodology of 
Peerenboom in observing China.
48
 But what constitutes the ―thin‖ one is unclear. For 
Peerenboom, this controversy is rather because it is not ―thin‖ enough but already laden 
with ―thick‖ values.49 In China, four paradigms could be discerned for possible 
articulations in the future, namely, Liberal Democratic, Statist Socialist, Neo-authoritarian, 
and Communitarian.
50
 This contingent articulation, for Peerenboom, will not affect a 
proper definition of the legal system shared universally. In this sense, Peerenboom 
professes his loyalty to legal constitutionalism that legal institutions could keep their 
minimum functions while be invested with local values and needs. 
Thirdly, with such a configuration of institutions and values in mind, Peerenboom pays 
special attention to ―law and development‖ proposition. He argues that, ―empirical studies 
have repeatedly demonstrated that wealth is more important factor than regime type even 
with respect to civil and political rights‖.51 Hence, ―tradeoffs‖ are necessary. For 
Peerenboom, ―authoritarian regimes are better suited to lower levels of development 
because they can force through tough economic decisions and maintain social stability‖,52 
and ―the human rights benefits of democracy may occur only once democracy is 
consolidated‖.53As a compromised ―Washington Consensus‖, the East Asian model proves 
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to be a better approach.
54
 Peerenboom argues that development of democracy in one 
country should be evaluated against the income class it belongs to, rather than the Western 
income class. China as a lower-middle income country has done comparatively well, and a 
socially stable and economically developed country is more inclined to pursue democracy 
sooner or later.  In this sense, Peerenboom does not agree that China is ―trapped in 
transition‖55 or shows ―more murder in the middle‖56 It has not fundamentally derailed 
from the East Asian Model as Japan and Taiwan underwent before. 
Instead of directly being involved in the heated debates on whether China has a legal 
system proper, Peerenboom‘s approach has simplified the circumstances of China‘s 
judicial system. And he has given a very vague or symbolic formula of his ‗thin‘ Rule of 
Law.
57
 For Peerenboom, this reduction enables communication across legal systems about 
human rights. But more than a methodological problem, this articulation of values already 
serves as a ―value simpliciter‖.58 For one thing, it singles out legal institutions as a 
universal good, overriding other goods in ranking; for another thing, its emptiness is 
always subject to ―tradeoffs‖ with ―development‖ logic and receptivity of social 
circumstances. This makes Peerenboom both a defender of China‘s legal constitutionalism, 
while maintaining the affinity with economic constitutionalism in China. 
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3. Summary of this chapter  
In this chapter, I have selectively chosen one side of the story about China‘s 
constitutionalization to tell, which is also the one usually narrated by constitutional 
scholars. In their writings, after the Cultural Revolution, China has realized the importance 
of constitutional government and a three-decade march to Rule of Law starts. Glenn Tiffert 
has acclaimed that, 
―Following Mao‘s death and the fall of the Gang of Four, Deng Xiaoping steered 
China away from the radical leftism that had shaped its Constitutions of 1975 and 
1978, and back to an evolutionary path that recalled the mid-1950s emphasis on 
socialist legality and modernization … The resulting 1982 Constitution, which 
remains in effect today, anchored the post-Mao transformation of China and 
provided the space for jurists…to restore the legal and legislative machinery of the 
state; to reconstitute the legal profession and rebuild legal education; and in time, 
to re-open suppressed debates on marketization, democracy, rule of law, and 
human rights.‖ 59 
Though I agree that building up the legality of the 1982 Constitution and strengthening 
judicial autonomy are needed in China, it does not mean legal constitutionalism and its 
focus on the miracle of ―Marbury v. Madison‖ is the only paradigm. Rather it is projected 
by China‘s scholars who fasten on the American constitutional model and the court-centred 
paradigm is implanted as an ideal irrespective of the ―receiving‖ constitutional structure 
and the principle of ―democratic centralism‖. This leads to a partial interpretation of the 
1982 constitution that must exclude the preamble as part of the constitution. It has a 
simplification effect on controversies about the legal nature of China‘s constitution in the 
first instance. 
It is true of course as Tong comments, legal constitutionalism has contributed to China‘s 
legal education in the past decades.
60
 Through them, China‘s constitution is discussed as a 
legal subject and put in a track of ―rights talk‖.61 From the base of their arguments, they 
are concerned with what should function as a constitution in China, than what is. Hence 
they were rightly criticized as ignorant of socialist orthodoxy and China‘s own case law.62 
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While they are right in distinguishing constitutionalism from pure politics; for their 
opponents, if the text of the 1982 Constitution does not stipulate a judicial mechanism to 
materialize the rights articles,
63
 then scholars of legal constitutionalism are equally 
fantasizing an ideology external to the constitutional text, even though not the orthodox 
one. 
This argument is no longer about values of human rights or judicial autonomy, but about 
the paradigm projected by legal constitutionalism that China‘s constitutional future 
depends solely on institutional building of the judiciary and judicial activism to effectuate 
the whole process of constitutional reforms. But seen from the other side, it rather means 
the societal effects of the 1982 Constitution itself and its taking root is uncertain. It is 
better to put China‘s constitutionalization in its context of transformation rather than 
imagine the 1982 Constitution establishes the legal tradition from a vacuum. It is also 
necessary to put the legalization phenomena along with the inquiry about the functions of 
positive law in ordering the whole society. In the next chapter I will pursue 
complexification of three orders entangled in the constitutionalization process in 
contemporary China: socialism, legalization and marketization. Through this discussion, I 
intend to explain why building up the legality of the Constitution could not be decoupled 
with social and political conditions. It also detects the flaw in Peerenboom‘s professed 
socio-legal research, where the democratic deficit in China‘s constitutionalization 
compared with the ―development‖ theme is not addressed. This calls for a sociological 
study of constitutionalization in China in lieu of a purely normative study on law and 
application. 
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This chapter proceeds with the question that is left in the first chapter. The judicialization 
of the 1982 Constitution relies on social conditions to support the institutional building and 
hold other state apparatuses accountable to Rule of Law. It reveals the deficit in legal 
constitutionalism that the court-centred paradigm could not be decoupled with changes in 
social environments, especially the transformation from orthodox socialism to a modern 
legal and political system. 
This brings the continuity and discontinuity question to the fore of constitutional debates. 
Chould promulgation of the 1982 Constitution radically convert the social and political 
bases of the embedded order? And how should we perceive the relationship between the 
1982 Constitution and its forerunners? 
On the other hand, changes are acknowledged and even actively pursued. The thirty-one 
articles in the four amendments encompass vast changes throughout the 1980s to the new 
century. To merely say that China marched from ―socialist revolution‖, to ―socialist 
construction‖ and now ―socialist modernization‖, is an ambiguous and somewhat 
unconvincing way to prove continuity of socialism. In this chapter, I take the continuity 
and discontinuity question as a hypothesis, and discern three orders entangled in 
contemporary China. 
In this sense, I suggest that the 1982 Constitution lies at a crucial standpoint. Apart from 
the first order of institutionalization of state apparatuses and building up the constitutional 
legality as I explained in the first chapter, the 1982 Constitution professes its continuity 
with socialism in preserving socialist ownerships and the Party leadership of the political 
life; while in the meantime, adjustments are made to accommodate modern legal and 
economic developments. This hybridity is condensed in the revealing terms in the 
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constitution, namely, ―socialist market economy‖ and ―socialist Rule of Law‖. In this 
chapter, I will firstly turn to the second order of socialism and then the third order of 
marketization. In the last section, I will problematize how the three orders, including 
legalization in the first chapter, are entangled in contemporary China. 
1. The socialist base of China’s constitutions – the 
second order 
As I have stated in the previous chapter, legal constitutionalism is prone to take the 1982 
Constitution as a new chapter in China‘s history. But the 1982 Constitution still claims to 
be a socialist constitution, and in emphasizing smooth succession, it also professes the start 
of ―socialist modernization‖ following socialist ―revolution‖ and ―construction‖. What is 
needed is an interpretation of how socialism and its institutional basis evolve so as to 
answer the question of continuity and discontinuity. 
1.1. The founding of the first socialist constitution in China 
The first socialist constitution in the history of PRC is the 1954 Constitution. But before it, 
there is an interim constitution – the ―Common Program‖1 – that was adopted on 
September 29
th
, 1949, right before the foundation of PRC. It was intended to work as a 
preparation program till the passage of the first constitution and worked along with the 
Organic Law of the Central People‟s Government as the effective constitution from 1949 
to 1954. This arrangement is due to the complex social and class relations at the founding 
phase of PRC. The military control was yet to be ended, and the CCP still relied on ―the 
people‘s democratic united front‖ to integrate the whole country. The ―front‖ was 
―composed of the Chinese working class, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, national 
bourgeoisie and other patriotic democratic elements, based on the alliance of workers and 
peasants and led by the working class.‖(Preamble)  
There were two tasks to be fulfilled by the ―program‖, which were prescribed in articles 3, 
26 and 14. Article 3 stipulated the transformation of feudal and semi-feudal land ownership 
to peasant land ownership.
2
 Hence it was not yet a socialist constitution. Also under 
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 In Mao‘s paper of The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, Mao 
clarifies the specific circumstances of the Chinese Revolution. China had a long period of 
feudalism, in the later period of which, a seed of capitalism had already been planted. If 
there was no invasion of foreign capitalism, China would have gradually and slowly 
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Article 26, the economic policy was to take account of ―both public and private interests, 
of benefiting labour and capital, of mutual aid between the city and countryside, and 
circulation of goods between China and abroad.‖ It was called a ―social economy‖ with all 
components playing their respective parts, which would not be changed till collectivization 
of means of production in the 1950s. Only ―(b)y the end of 1960, China had left the ‗new 
democracy‘ stage of development and entered the socialist stage.‖3  
The other main task sanctioned by Article 14 is the end of military control and the 
convening of local people‘s congresses. It was planned that when military operations and 
agrarian reform had been thoroughly completed, elections of Local People‘s Congresses 
would be held on the principle of universal franchise. Before that, the Chinese People‘s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) would act as the ―organisational form of the 
people‘s democratic united front‖ before the ―convocation of the All-China People‘s 
Congress‖ (Article 13). The ―Common Program‖ hence mainly conditioned China‘s 
transition from feudalism and semi-feudalism, which was the task of ―New Democracy‖ or 
―the People‘s Democracy‖ (preamble). The united front organized by the CPPCC should 
surrender its function when universal franchise was completed and turn into an agent to 
―submit proposals on fundamental policies‖ to the All-China People‘s Congress (Article 
13). For Chen Duanhong, the ―Common Programme‖ found the nation,4 but did not finish 
the state-building. This argument left an impact on China‘s constitutionalization and 
constitutional debates about its political nature. 
In 1952, when considering whether the CPPCC should hold its second session, a choice 
was made between the maintenance of the status quo and the option to ―supersede it by 
                                                                                                                                                                                
developed into a capitalist society. Foreign economy accelerated the disintegration of 
China‘s social economy. Chin‘a society hence was transformed into a semi-colonial and 
semi-feudal society. This twofold tasks against feudalism as well as imperialism thus 
shaped China‘s Communist Party and China‘s Revolution into a different form. Before the 
advent of Socialist revolution and democracy, China had to undergo a phase of ‗new 
democracy‘. During that, national capitalists, petty bourgeois and rich peasants are the 
revolutionary forces in alliance with proletarians; and capitalists in the imperialist 
countries and domestic landlords are its opponents. This ‗new democracy‘ would both 
cleare the ground for capitalism in China and created the foundation for socialism. And 
this Revolution were both bourgeoisie-democratic and proletarian-socialist. 
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electing the National People‘s Congress described in the Common Program.‖5 While Mao 
Zedong and Liu Shaoqi considered that the ―Common Program‖ worked well and the 
promulgation of a constitution should wait until the transition to socialism was finished, 
they were persuaded by Stalin that the Common Program lacked legitimacy compared to 
an official constitution. And ―the multiparty coalition government established by the 
Common Program presented a grave security risk to the CCP‖.6 Hence, instead of holding 
on to the Common Program till the task of transformation to socialism was completed, the 
official 1954 Constitution came into effect before the transition was finished. This 
in-progress transition was included in the guideline of the Constitution (Article 4 -10).
7
  
Besides the 1949 ―Common Program‖, the 1954 Constitution derived from the 1936 
Constitution of the USSR, ―which exemplified for the 1954 drafters distinctively ‗socialist‘ 
constitutional forms and doctrines‖.8 Compared to the ―social economy‖ in the 1949 
Common Program, the diverse categories of ownership in the Common Program (Article 
26), except for the ―state capitalist economy‖, were also preserved in Article 5 of the 1954 
Constitution. Nonetheless, what was different lies in that partial collective ownership was 
now defined as ―semi-socialist‖ and a transitional form by means of which ―advance 
towards collective ownership by the masses of working people‖ (Article 7 emphasis added) 
would be organized (Article 8-10).  
The primary achievement of the 1954 Constitution, however, is the institutional structure it 
laid down, which is characterised by Tiffert as ―tone-setting‖.9 Chapter 2 of the 1954 
Constitution stipulated the organization of state powers according to systemic division of 
labour between the legislative, executive and judiciary at both the local and the national 
levels. Additional to the constitution, there were five other regulations to specify the 
organization.
10
 Universal franchise as the mission of the ―Common Program‖ was not 
realized concerning the separate representation of rural and urban residents. The 1954 
Constitution referred to concrete regulations – such as the Law on Election -- to prescribe it. 
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Tiffert gives the 1954 Constitution high endorsement, as it ―heralded a brief surge of legal 
construction across the PRC unmatched until the reforms of the 1980s.‖11 
One term is needed to be explained here, the ―People‘s Democratic Dictatorship‖ 
preserved in the preamble. This unusual combination of dictatorship and democracy is 
derived from Mao‘s paper in 1949.12 For Mao, this combination is to contest monopoly of 
the narrative of ―democracy‖ by the bourgeoisie which they could use to appropriate who 
is practising ―dictatorship‖ and ―totalitarianism‖. But the imperialist purpose that the 
bourgeois republic serves rather reveals that the so-called ―democracy‖ is in effect 
―counter-revolutionary dictatorship‖. As Mao puts it, 
―Revolutionary dictatorship and counter-revolutionary dictatorship are by nature 
opposites, but the former was learned from the latter. Such learning is very 
important. If the revolutionary people do not master this method of ruling over the 
counter-revolutionary classes, they will not be able to maintain their state power, 
domestic and foreign reaction will overthrow that power and restore its own rule 
over China, and disaster will befall the revolutionary people.‖13 
So although People‘s Democracy promises the extinction of classes, state power and 
parties, ―(t)he leadership of the Communist Party and the state power of the people‘s 
dictatorship are such conditions‖ for their extinction.14 The vanishing point is dependent 
upon an occupation of the state powers. This dual-function of state apparatuses hence made 
it important to distinguish ―the people‖ from ―the enemy‖, as state apparatuses would work 
as an instrument of ―violence‖ for oppression of antagonistic classes, but be tasked with 
―benevolence‖ and ―propaganda and educational work‖ among the people. This internal 
distinction underpins the differentiated use of law which is incompatible with the notion of 
equality before the law. It is why scholars of legal constitutionalism try to marginalize the 
preamble as part of China‘s constitution, and emphasize rights provisions in the content.   
It is not that the 1954 Constitution did not protect rights. The whole Chapter Three was 
dedicated to political rights, civil rights and social benefits (Article 85-96). And after its 
promulgation, several of PRC‘s most famous law journals were founded, a discourse on 
                                                          
11
 Tiffert (2009) 70 
12








―socialist legality‖ was initiated, combining Soviet jurisprudence and ―translated notions of 
rule of law and constitutionalism that had entered China during the early republican 
period.‖15It rather concerns a positive rights conception that suggests a different 
relationship between rights and democracy, instead of negative liberty.
16
 
In the ―Hundred Flowers Campaign‖ of 1956 and 1957, during which the party encouraged 
citizens and especially intellectuals to openly air their opinions, some of the participants in 
the drafting of the 1954 Constitution publicly invoked constitutional principles to ―take the 
CCP to task for regulating multiparty democracy, human rights, and rule of law.‖17 Tiffert 
lamented that ―(t)he Party responded with the Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957, which 
struck the legal and intellectual communities especially hard‖.18 A series of political 
movements followed throughout the 1950s in China, and peaked in the Cultural Revolution 
starting from 1966.  
The transitional task and its distinction between socialist and non-socialist elements 
constantly kept in tension with the constitutional framework. The continuing arguments 
between the political ―people‖ and the legal ―citizenship‖,19 shows effort of scholars to 
rationalize the political definition of ―who are the people‖ within the constitutional 
framework of ―democratic dictatorship‖. 




 is called a revolutionary constitution as it was promulgated in the 
midst of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). In its preamble, the 1975 Constitution 
claims ―the victory of the new-democratic revolution and the beginning of the new 
historical period of socialist revolution‖.21 
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Resistance to bureaucratization in accordance with the spirit of China‘s Cultural 
Revolution is expressed in the 1975 Constitution.
22
 It is a short constitution with only 
thirty articles, half of which are guidelines (Article 1-15). Also after three co-operative 
movements in agriculture, handicraft, and commerce in 1950s, public ownership was 
written into the constitution. Article 5 not only confirmed the two types of ownerships as 
―socialist ownership by the whole people and socialist collective ownership by the working 
people‖, but also their organizational forms as ―neighbourhood organizations in cities and 
towns or production teams in rural people‘s communes‖. People‘s communes and 
neighbourhood organizations are the basic ―political‖ units in the urban and the rural areas. 
Their political functions were prescribed in article 7, 21 and 22, as ―the permanent organs 
of the local people‘s congresses and at the same time the local people‘s governments at 
various levels (emphasis added).‖  
The people‘s communes had brought structural changes to the constitution which was 
noticed by Mao in 1958, and he asked,  
―Has the [establishment of the rural] people‘s communes violated the constitution? 
The issue of integrating politics and the commune, for example, was not passed by 
the People‘s Congress, nor is it in the constitution. Many parts of the constitution 
are obsolete…‖23 
But at the other hand, these substantive changes could be said to realize the transitional 
mission prescribed in the constitution. With regard to rights protection, the most noticeable 
feature of the 1975 Constitution is how radically cut they were while people‘s enjoyment 
of ―Four Grand Freedoms‖ was proclaimed. Article 13 stated, ―(s)peaking out freely, airing 
views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters are new forms of 
carrying on the socialist revolution created by the masses of the people.‖ Article 28 
allowed ―freedom to strike‖ which is neither included in the 1954 nor in the 1982 
Constitution. These rights explicitly reflected the mass-line democracy. Cohen argues that 
the right to strike is a political weapon ―for mobilizing the masses to intimidate the 
bureaucracy‖, rather than as an economic weapon in the employment conditions of the 
workers. These political freedoms are ―tools of the Party which, at least in theory, can 
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never be separated from the masses.‖24 It is no wonder that the stipulation on organization 
of state apparatuses was limited, and the mass line is also extended to ―procuratorial work 
and in trying cases‖ (Article 25).  
Due to the ―political‖ nature of the 1975 Constitution, it is seldom mentioned in the 
constitutional textbooks. Where it is, is in a negative sense.
25
 It is true, the continuous 
revolutionary process could hardly be said to be mediated with the constitutional text. For 
revolutionists, democracy is rights. Compared to mediation through law, they demanded 
immediate subjectification. In this sense, the 1975 Constitution could be hardly said to be a 
synthesis between constitutional law and constituent power. 
Around 1976, China‘s Cultural Revolution came to its end. It was concluded with the 
political Trial of Gang of Four
26
 on November 20
th
, 1980, who were handed the chief 
responsibility in the Culture Revolution. At the significant trial of ―Madam Mao‖-- Jiang 
Qing, ―Jiang was not charged with conspiring against the state. Instead, the charges 
focused on her personal, spiteful persecution of the people who, for whatever reason, she 
felt threatened by.‖27 But Jiang defended herself against it by asserting that, ―she operated 
precisely as an agent of the party-state‖, and ―did not do anything that she was not 
authorized to do.‖28 She argued that ―it is she, not the alleged victims, who is persecuted. 
All those writers and party backs deserved what they got in the Cultural Revolution. They 
were bourgeois criminals‖.29 
Apparently, Jiang utilized precisely the argument of ―who is the enemy‖. Her trial is a 
―constitutional poiesis‖ for China to recognize that the party-state had to accept some 
responsibility for the excess of Cultural Revolution, Micheal Dowdle argues. And as a 
redress, the articles of the 1978 Constitution were doubled to sixty, and powers of the NPC 
and the State Council were stipulated in detail (Article 20-32). The Standing Committee of 
the NPC was for the first time empowered to ―interpret the Constitution and laws and to 
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enact decrees‖ [Article 25(3)]. Cohen defines it as ―a halfway house‖ between the 1975 
document on the left and the 1954 document on the right.
30
 
The other celebrated theme is the ―Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China‖ from December 18 to 22, 1978. From this convention, 
Deng Xiaoping as the second generation of leadership of the CCP was confirmed. ―Reform 
and Opening‖ replaces Mao‘s explicit rejection of the third way and opts for the possibility 
of borrowing Capitalist advanced techniques and experiences to construct socialism in 
China. With it, is the advent of China‘s Reform Period. The intensely ideological 
arguments were suspended and given over to more gradual reforms and practical 
improvements. It should be admitted that social order that was disrupted by China‘s 
Cultural Revolution got its restoration, but also more than ―restoration‖, as I will discuss 
whether there should be a third order discerned in this Reform Period.  
1.3. Summary on the second order – socialism and socialist 
transformation 
This part explores the second order of China‘s constitutionalization—socialism. The first 
socialist constitution was founded in 1954 with an unfinished process of state building and 
universal franchise, tasked in the 1949 ―Common Program‖. The Party-state structure was 
kept for the leadership of CCP in transition to socialism. But it was after the 1950s 
collectivization that the socialist ownership structure was completed, and admitted into the 
1975 Constitution. The semi-socialist nature of collective economy has never been 
successfully transformed till now, which causes an internal separation between the rural 
and the urban residents since 1950s and a large pool of peasant labour after China initiated 
her ―Reform and Opening‖ policy. 
From the 1954 Constitution, the Party-led transformations to socialism became dominant, 
and its distinction of the people/the enemy kept in tension with the homogeneous concept 
of citizenship. So is the case of state apparatuses against the supra-state Party. During 
China‘s Cultural Revolution, this was intensified and led to replacing government 
apparatuses with concrete mass organizations – the people‘s communes -- that played 
economic, social as well as political functions. 
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The 1982 Constitution and its restoration of political representation by People‘s 
Congresses, dissociates and removes the political function from people‘s communes and 
transforms them into economic co-operatives. Social functions, such as health care and 
education, are institutionalized separately and with the proceeding of economic reforms, 
are transformed into supply enterprises (as I will explain more in Chapter 3). Socialism 
from the 1982 Constitution is devoid of the form of direct participation and the inseparable 
functional ensemble of political, social and economic lives. 
This disaggregation of people‘s communes is fulfilled by means of law, which 
organizationally separated the infrastructure of socialism from representative forms of 
socialism. It could be said that the process of legalization is separated from 
democratization, in the sense of de-essentialization of socialist ‗democracy‘, while the 
liberal democracy did not advance with the process of legalization. Taking this into 
consideration, I argue that a distinction between legalization and constitutionalization 
allows a better understanding of China‘s constitutional discussions that I will pursue in the 
next chapter. 
2. Four amendments to the 1982 Constitution – the third 
order of marketization 
In this part, I focus on the four amendments to China‘s 1982 Constitution and examine the 
claim of a modern legal system in the building. The ―modernity‖ theme is put alongside 
with the ―institutionalization‖ theme in Tiffert‘s comment31 as if they are co-referential. 
But in this part, I want to separate them to see their differences and connections, and 
problematize how modernization of law is linked to marketization in China. 
2.1. History of four amendments to the Constitution 
The 1982 Constitution has undergone four amendments up to now in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 
2004. Of the thirty-one articles in total, fourteen have direct correlation with changes to 
China‘s economic system. To emphasize that does not mean other articles are not 
important. Revisions to Article 28 in the 1999 amendments replaced the political term of 
―counter-revolutionary activities‖ with ―other criminal activities that endanger state 
security‖, which influenced the definition of political crimes. And the two articles 
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regarding ―state emergency‖ in the fourth amendment could be attributed to the incident of 
2003 SARS (Article 67 and 80 in 2004 Amendment) that has put the government‘s duty to 
publicize information into question. The ―transparency‖ requirement promoted reforms to 
administrative laws, which are taken as semi-constitutional in China.
32
 But compared to 
economic contents, they do not occupy the centre stage of China‘s constitutional changes 
that shapes China‘s Reform Period. 
The two articles of the 1988 amendment dealt with the lease of land, as the reform process 
started from the rural areas. The Household Responsibility System put forward in 1978 
was a peasants-initiated experiment in China‘s Anhui Province when they were facing 
starvation. Household farming required a departure from rigidly-controlled collective land 
system in the constitution and an allowance for land transfer. Besides that, the distinction 
between collective economy and individual economy was also challenged by practices of 
the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) in 1980s. TVEs played a very important role 
in China‘s economic reforms, but exceeded the number of people that individual economy 
was allowed to employ. It constituted the ‗private economy‘ forbidden in the constitution. 
The 1988 Amendment took a big step to confirm the legal status of the private economy as 
a ―complement to the socialist public economy‖ as well as the individual economy. 
The 1993 amendment legally put an end to people‘s communes and the large-pot 
(Daguofan) system in rural areas, and returned peasants to household farming. The 
double-tenure land institution
33
 between collective economic organizations and 
households was fixed by the amendment (Article 6 in 1993 Amendment). Reforms in 
urban areas promoted their own contractualization and corporatization of state enterprises 
from 1985. By separating state agency from enterprises, the ―state enterprise‖ was 
re-named as ―state-owned enterprise‖ (Article 5 and 8 in 1993 Amendment). As a 
consequence, cross-ownership transactions and exchanges were formally possible which 
brought about rationalization of commercial laws across state, collective, private, foreign 
and individual economy.
34
 So is the superficial convergence with international practices 
accompanied with the formulation of legal personality. The series legislation of private law 
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makes sense of the combined terms ―socialist market economy‖ (Article 7 in 1993 
Amendment) and the ―socialist Rule of Law‖ (Article 2 in 1999 Amendment), which I will 
explain in detail in my next chapter. 
The 1999 Amendment extended degrees of protection for non-public ownership further, 
from admitting its complementary status to incorporating it as ―major components to 
socialist market economy‖ (Article 5). And new distributive approaches were enacted that 
―with the distribution according to work remaining dominant and coexistence of a variety 
of modes of distribution‖ (Article 3). Albeit dramatic changes to the socialist doctrine, both 
are assigned with ―Chinese characteristics‖ in the priliminary phase of socialism (Article 1 
of the 1999 amendment). This periodization of socialism allows for experimentation with 
capitalist advanced experiences in socialist China, and produces the ―hybridity‖ in China‘s 
legal and economic systems. 
The retreat of the socialist orthodoxy is more telling in the 2004 amendment, which 
provides explicit protection of private property (Article 6) and admission of private 
businessmen in the Communist Party (as part of ―all builders of socialism‖ in the 
amendment to the preamble). In the meanwhile, China‘s New Left also regards the 2004 
Amendment as a turning point for China‘s constitutional process, from the purely 
economic orientation in 1990s, to a ―harmonious society‖ (2004), as the constitutional 
amendment makes a commitment to human rights protection (Article 8) and establishment 
of social security system (Article 7). 
Relatively speaking, these constitutional changes to applied terminology are not dramatic. 
A shift from ―state enterprise‖ to ―state-owned enterprise‖ will not reveal its significance if 
not matched with the bigger social context. And ―Socialist market economy‖ could not be 
well understood if we do not see the full picture of its gradual tinkering with the ―third way‖ 
and revisions to Mao‘s explicit rejection. But it is in the next chapter that I will link them 
with China‘s social and economic transformations, and the establishment of the private law 
system. Here, I am confined to pointing out the general trends in China‘s constitutional 
amendments: potentialities that socialism could be combined with market instruments, and 
give property rights privileged protection among constitutional rights. This, however, 
could not be made sense as a mere ‗restoration‘ to the 1954 constitutional legality. Rather, 
I will argue, it is a combination of three orders: socialist basis, legalization and 
marketization. These three constitute the present ‗hybridity‘ of China‘s constitutionalism. 
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2.2. Summary of the third order  
In this part, I bring to the fore the economic characteristics of China‘s four constitutional 
amendments. The ―restoration‖ thesis of Tiffert, however, could not answer why in 
China‘s thirty-year reforms, property rights explode in comparison with social rights and 
political rights; namely, why institutionalization is selective and asymmetrical. It also 
could not account for why China‘s legalization did not bring democratization as a 
presumed outcome. Rather, legalization enables the opposite of its aim that the CCP‘s 
leadership is not curbed by law, but instead it acts as instigator of law-making. 
While a liberal democracy is not rooted, socialist ‗democracy‘ is vacated. If socialist 
organization relies on its collective infrastructure to concretize participation, the latter is 
under primary liquidation in the Reform Period. Instead, China‘s society is left with a 
centralist Party leadership intact while any representative form of ―the social‖ is 
individualized and privatized, if not abolished. In this sense, socialism in China is left with 
a concentrated political power in the meantime disarming social resistance.  
It is hence important to review three instead of two social orders competing on the scene of 
China‘s constitutionalization -- to consider not only a conflict between socialist party-state 
structure and constitutional government, but also the paradigm adopted. If retreat from the 
total state means primarily marketization, what effects this will leave on China‘s 
constitutionalization. To briefly summarize, my thesis, instead of inquiring into China‘s 
constitutionalization as transformed from its socialist integrity to a modern Rule of Law—a 
coupling of two relatively autonomous systems of law and politics, is to argue reasons for 
the decoupling. In this argument, marketization adopted as the chief strategy of ―Reform 
and Opening‖ should be noted about its effects. 
3. Three social orders: socialism, legalization and 
marketization 
In this chapter, the 1982 Constitution is re-situated in its historical background. By doing 
so, I intend to emphasize why a historical-sociological study of China‘s 
constitutionalization is needed, more than pure focus on legislation and judicial 
mechanisms. It is the shifts of different social orders that are neglected in legal 
constitutionalism, which starts and continues with law and legalization. 
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One of the competing social orders is the tradition of Socialist constitution, which was 
essentialized by a concrete participatory form – the people‘s communes. More than a 
simple act of entitlement of rights,
35
 this movement of generalization is related to complex 
affairs of creating legal personality and redistribution of wealth, which are dramatically 
undermined in claims of legal constitutionalism. In arguing the formulation of legal 
personality, E.B. Pashukanis has stated acutely how the ―objective‖ process of production, 
exchange and division of labour makes the ―subject‖, but in the meantime causes legal 
relations of the latter to have ―no greater significance‖ than the former. It is because, 
―value ceases to be casual appraisal, loses the quality of a phenomenon of the 
individual psyche, and acquires objective economic significance. In the same way, 
there are real conditions necessary for man to be transformed from a zoological 
individual into an abstract, impersonal legal subject, into the legal person.‖36 
In this ―socialist orthodox in retreat‖,37 a shift in jurisprudence occurs from state‘s positive 
guarantee of rights to the position where negative rights are assumed to be enjoyed by 
individuals so long as there is no interference.
38
 With this change of rights conception, 
social and political basis of it should also be greatly transformed to support such rights to 
be practised and materialized. But this ‗support‘ in China rather adopts the form of ‗retreat‘; 
and precisely in this retreat, market gets the excessive significance for constitutitionalism 
and constitutionalization. 
In examining Speenhamland Law in the nineteenth century, Karl Polanyi observes that, 
―Under Speenhamland society was rent by two opposing influences, the one 
emanating from paternalism and protecting labo(u)r from the dangers of the 
market system; the other organizing the elements of production, including land, 
under a market system, and thus divesting the common people of their former 
status, compelling them to gain a living by offering their labor for sale, while at 
the same time depriving their labo(u)r of its market value. A new class of 
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employers was being created, but no corresponding class of employees could 
constitute itself.‖39 
To ―constitute‖ is the key word here. In common with Pushukanis‘s account, the subject of 
―employee‖ is rather subject to a process of objectification. Generalization of legal 
personality from concrete social status, even in the labour law form of ―protection‖, has to 
be pursued through deprivation and commodification. This might be why Marx made the 
account that workers are generated by the capitalist class.
40
 There is not a real moment for 
their constitution. 
Polanyi has acutely pointed out ―the institutional separation of society into an economic 
and political sphere.‖41 This separation of social, political and economic systems has 
characterised the social history in the nineteenth century as ―a double movement‖. As 
Polanyi puts it, ―the extension of the market organization in respect to genuine 
commodities was accompanied by its restriction in respect to fictitious ones.‖42  Labour, 
land and money are politically constructed as ―goods‖ to be marketized. This separation is 
exactly a self-regulating market demands, and it leads to an inverse movement to adjust 
society to economic logic. This is inevitable,  
―For once the economic system is organized in separate institutions, based on 
specific motives and conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a 
manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. This is the 
meaning of the familiar assertion that a market economy can function only in a 
market society.‖43 
With this institutional renunciation of solidarity and compassion, positivism finds its 
location in legal science and utilitarianism finds its position in political economy. More 
importantly, institutionalization of law from the social embeddedness also leads in the end 
to a demise of human law by the most natural and scientific law of ―hunger‖.44 
                                                          
39
 Karl Polanyi (1957), The Great Transformation, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).80 
40
 Cited in Emilios Christodoulidis and Ruth Dukes (2007) ‗On the Unity of European Labour Law‘, in Sacha 
Prechal and Bert van Roermund (eds.) The Coherence of EU Law: The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts. 
(Oxford : Oxford University Press) 404 
41
 Polanyi (1957) 71 
42
 Polanyi (1957)76 
43
 Polanyi (1957)57 
44
 Polanyi (1957)117 
 48 
 
This depiction also could be applied to China‘s great transformations, and it is indeed used 
by China‘s New Left.45 From China‘s 1982 Constitution, legal institutions are increasingly 
important for the organization of social life. The concrete participatory form of socialism 
was dissolved. The combination of law and marketization has produced the privilege of 
private law field in the whole of China‘s constitutionalization process. The third order of 
marketization is easily confused with the individualization process (of the political and 
legal importance) in China‘s transformative context. Though they seem to be a similar 
process, I differ from Polanyi‘s theory as in China the political sphere did not get its 
autonomy spontaneously in the process, and the economic over-development rather 
impeded its emergence. I also disagree with China‘s New Left in utilizing Polanyi‘s theory 
to predict a social reaction being triggered by the economic one. My disagreement lies in 
that there is not an automatic separation between the economic sphere and the political 
sphere with the process of marketization, nor are the political and the constitutional spheres 
derived after this divide happened. The political is re-appropriated in the process instead 
of being generated. While Polanyi has made brilliant accounts on the marketization effects, 
he undermined the scope and importance of the ‗political‘ compared to the ‗social‘. 
In the next chapter, my disagreement will be made clearer. I will review historically how 
the socialist common good is appropriated by a market system gradually. In this process, 
law and market are in a co-originating and co-referential relationship. But instead of 
arguing the separation of the economic and political fields, I claim how legalization and 
democratization are flawed with a start from the economic mechanism of appropriation. 
While endorsing Polanyi‘s writings on the transformations from feudalism to capitalism 
and nation-state, my thesis insists that democratization does not spontaneously appear as a 
result of an economic separation and marketization, which structurally could not establish 
a political system, as implied in the case of China. 
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Socialist Market Economy – a Configuration of Law, 
Politics and Economy 
 
Introduction 
After unpacking the three social orders entangled in China, this chapter attempts to 
interpret the ‗hybridization‘ of the three social orders condensed in the term ―socialist 
market economy‖. I am using a historical process to describe how this ‗combination‘ was 
made possible, and what was lost from the pre-reform phase. It is a process with changes 
simultaneously happening in the social subsystems of law, politics and economy, and 
forms a configuration now professing ―Chinese characteristics‖. 
It is worth observing what role is played by legalization. Especially in the field of private 
law, modernization of the Chinese legal system is broad-ranging. But right because of that, 
a separation between the terms of ‗legalization‘ and ‗constitutionalization‘ is important, as 
legalization has engineered enormous shifts in the economic system and social 
organizations, without spillover into democratization. It is hence worthwhile to examine 
the market-freedom-first paradigm, and its effects on China‘s constitutionalization. 
I divide the three decades into three phases according to their chief features and turning 
points in policies (Part 1-3). Policies issued by the State Council and the CCP are 
influential in China‘s context, without which promulgation of laws could not be 
understood. My main emphasis lies in examining how legalization channels the Party 
policies and formulates legal concepts. The derived modern legal system, such as a proper 
divide between public and private law, will be put into question about its understatement of 
the constitutional significance in this very fragmentation (Part 4). 
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1. Reforms between 1980s and 1993 
1.1. Two ownerships and separation of the rural and urban 
Areas 
As I have stated in my previous chapters, in the 1982 Constitution, ―socialist public 
ownership‖ was established with two subcategories, which were handled by separate social 
organizations: working units in the urban areas and people‘s communes in the countryside. 
The two separate types of public ownership, namely, ownership by the whole people‖ and 
―collective ownership by the working people‖ (Article 6), were represented by state 
enterprises in the cities and collective economic organizations in rural areas, and they were 
assigned exclusive resources (Article 9 and 10). State enterprises were submitted to 
―unified leadership by the state and fulfil all their obligations under the state plan‖ (Article 
16), therefore they had an ―agency-in-charge‖. Accordingly, they were also allocated 
resources from the State to take on obligations of health and education services (Article 19 
and 21). Schools, kindergartens and hospitals were mainly held by different working units. 
Mimi Zou has well depicted Chinese socialist employment relation system as ―three old 
irons‖: ―the ‗iron rice bowl‘ of lifetime employment and ‗cradle-to-grave‘ social welfare 
provided by the state (tie fanwan), the ‗iron wage‘ of centrally administrated and fixed 
wages (tie gongzi), and the ‗iron chair‘ of state-controlled appointments and promotion of 
managers (tie jiaoyi)‖.1  
In contrast, collective economic organizations in the rural areas accepted the guidance of 
state plans while had the right to elect and remove their managers and to decide on major 
issues (Article 17). Also their medical services and education programmes had only a 
―co-operative‖ nature taken by the collective organizations (Article 19 and 21), which 
principle was also applied to the urban collective economy.  
This means, if China‘s urban social organizations were work units of State enterprises, the 
rural society depended on the land system collectively owned. Confiscation of the rich 
landowners and redistribution of land to peasants privately was achieved in the Land 
Reform Law of 1950, but after that socialist transformation of land system to collective 
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ownership started in the 1950s and by 1957, with the completion of collectivization in 
agriculture, ―private ownership of rural land had been largely abolished, with peasants 
being required to transfer their land to peasants‘ cooperatives. Thus, the system of 
collective ownership of rural land was established. The system was elaborated by the 
Regulation on Rural People‘s Communes in 1962, which introduced the principle of 
‗three-level ownership with the production team as the basis‘.‖2  
The divide in rights, welfare and obligations, as well as the privilege of the urban working 
class had to be sustained by a special system of social control. The 1958 Regulation on 
Household Registration of People‟s Republic of China provided that the population should 
be broadly registered as urban or rural. As this registration was related to grain rations, 
employment-based housing and health care services, people who attempted to work outside 
their residence had to apply for six passes at that time. This tight control aimed to 
guarantee the supply mainly for workers in the state enterprises.
3
 Such discrimination in 
registered status has been kept up to now even though migration was allowed unofficially 
soon after the economic reform.
4
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 The three levels were the people‘s communes, the production brigades and the production teams respectively.  
More details in Albert H. Y. Chen (2011)  ‗The Law of Property and the Evolving System of Property Rights 
in China‘, in Guanghua Yu (ed.), The Development of the Chinese Legal system: Change and Challenges, 
(London: Routledge) 100 
3
 Luo Ruiqing, ‗Explanations concerning the Regulation on Household Registration of People‟s Republic of 
China (Draft)‘ (Guan Yu Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Hu Kou Deng Ji Tiao Li Cao An De Shuo Ming),  
Ming),  available at: http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=1338  (accessed on December 9th, 2014) 
2014) 
4
 After the 2003 ―Sun Zhigang Incidence‖, some provinces (like Guangdong, Beijing and 
Shanghai) experimented with changes to this system; and in 2015 the abolition of the 
‗temporary residence card‘ with a ―residence card‖ in 17 provinces captured the attention 
to reforms to household registration system. But the Land issue was admitted as unsolved 
or vaguely tackled. See: Local Programs of Reforms to Household Registration Were 
Publicized in 17 Provinces, (Shi Qi Sheng Chu Di Fang Ban Hu Gai Fang An), available at 




In reforms to Law on Election of PRC, ―peasant‖ is treated as a category of constituency 
rather than an occupation. Eight peasants shared one voting right in equivalence to one 
urban resident in 1953. This ratio was 4:1 (at the county level), 5:1 (at the provincial level) 
and 8:1 (at the national level) in 1979. It was unified as 4:1 across all levels in 1995, and 
only in 2010 amendment, it is 1:1, since it was reported that the urban population was 
amount to 46.6% of the whole population. 
―New Amendment to the Law on Election‖,(Xu Ju Fa Xin Xiu), (2010) Finance and 
Economy (Cai Jing), vol. 6, available at:  
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1.2. Household Responsibility System in rural areas 
The industrialization policy and burdensome extraction from the agriculture worsened the 
situation in rural areas, and it was from the countryside that China‘s reform process started. 
In 1978, in a small village named ―Xiaogang‖ in Anhui Province, an innovative 
experiment with Chinese Land system was initiated secretly and illegally, which later 
developed into the ―Rural Household Contract Responsibility System‖ (Chengbao) in 
China. 
The new practice made it possible for peasants to sign a formal contract with their 
collective economic organizations and hence to work on the plots assigned to them. It 
meant that they could return to the ―household farming‖ from people‘s communes, and 
enjoy a personal use of land without changing the collective ownership structure. 
Therefore, the ―large pot‖ system which organized communal type of labour, was first 
smashed in China‘s rural areas. Besides that surplus labour forces were released, incentives 
for efficiency were also raised. As Albert Chen commented,  
―Under this system, the relevant authority in the rural areas enter into contracts 
with peasant households pursuant to which the households enjoy the right to 
possess, control, use and derive economic benefits from (collectively owned) land 
covered by the contract subject to payment of consideration … The system may be 
understood as partial privatization of agricultural production which had been 
collectivized since the mid-1950s‖. 6 
To avoid the issue of redistribution, this transaction of rights to use is separated from 
privatization of ownership. To unbundle rights ensemble of the people‘s communes 
implies a risk of asymmetry if co-operations other than the economic co-operative fell out 
                                                                                                                                                                                
http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/templates/inc/chargecontent2.jsp?id=110396269&time=20
10-03-15&cl=106&page=1, (accessed on December 9th, 2014) 
5
 Macleod, Calum. "China reviews ‗apartheid‘ for 900m peasants", (June 10, 2001) The Independent (last 
accessed on December 16
th
, 2010), the resource has already been removed online. 
Philip Huang argues that, this segregation has created China‘s ―informal economy‖ with such a huge resource 
of cheap labour forces with their social security absent. ―In 1978, there were only an insignificant 15,000 
employees outside the formal sector; by 2006, that figure had exploded to 168 million, out of a total labour 
force of 283 million, to make up 59.4 percent of the total‖.  
see: Philip C.C. Huang (2009) ‗China's Neglected Informal Economy: Reality and Theory‘, Modern China 
35(4): 405-438, 406 
6 Albert Chen (2011) 83 
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disproportionately. For instance, without corresponding social co-operatives, China‘s rural 
security mechanism was not established at the same speed with economic co-operatives.  
For Wang Shaoguang, a main representative of China‘s New Left, the decline of the 
collective economy was the reason for the end of once-booming co-operative medical 
services.
7
 I agree with him that it was an important factor, but there was no reason why 
co-operatives had to be so limited. Rather, there was another contributing factor that, from 
1983, people‘s communes were widely abolished and townships were re-established as the 
basic level to exercise the government power.
8
 Village committees were left responsible 
mainly for organizing land and production co-operations, while other social services were 
transferred to the township level. The all-in-one functions of peoples‘ communes hence 
were divided into elected governments, official safety net for social functions, and 
economic co-operatives. However, the construct of an official safety net was an inferior 
concern, as Wang admits that, the Communist Party at that time adopted a ―cut 
non-productive expenditures‖9 policy.  
This was reflected in the 1993 Constitutional amendment that the ―people‘s communes‖ 
were removed and replaced by the economic co-operatives between producers, supply and 
marketing, credit and consumers (the Article 6 in 1993 Amendment); in the meanwhile, 
both the lease of land and private sector of economy were permitted by the 1988 
Constitutional Amendment (Article 1 and 2). 
From 1985, peasants were allowed to provide services in urban areas though without 
shifting permanently their registered status. Most of them flew to the coastal regions in 
Eastern China, and became the first generation of China‘s migrant workers. China had 
formed three coastal regions open to foreign investments by 1985, including five Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) from 1980, fourteen Coastal Open Cities in 1984 and three 
Coastal Open Areas in 1985. Foreign investments were encouraged in these regions by 
giving them reduction of business income tax (from 30% to 15% in SEZs, and to 24% in 
Coastal Open Areas), entitling SEZs relatively independent legislating power, decreasing 
mandatory state plans for local governments, and other supra-national treatments for 
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 Shaoguang Wang (2009) ‗Adapting by Learning: the Evolution of China‘s Rural Health Care Financing‘, 
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 Zhong Fa [1983]35 (October 12
th
, 1983) A Notice by CCP & State Council Concerning the Separation of 
Government from Communes, and Establishing the Township Government (Zhong Gong Zhong Yang Guo 
Wu Yuan Guan Yu Shi Xing Zheng She Fen Kai Jian Li Xiang Zheng Fu De Tong Zhi), available at 









 With the opportunity of ―Industrial Upgrading‖ of the ―Asian Four 
Little Dragons‖, China began to develop its own labour-intensive industry and formed the 
export-oriented policy. The FDI increased slightly in 1980, but by 1993, it became the 
largest recipient in the developing countries, next to the United States.
11
 
1.3. The Factory Director Responsibility System and the 
dispatch labour 
The urban reform started around 1986 when state enterprises adopted the ―Factory Director 
Responsibility System‖. In lieu of direct leadership of CCP, a factory director was selected 
to manage the factory, though his election and removal was still decided by the 
―agency-in-charge‖. But the director was entrusted with great powers to implement the 
labour contract system and probation period, to dismiss workers and forbid insider 
employment, namely, children of the workers in the factory could no longer take positions 
from which their parents retired. At the beginning, most workers were transferred to 
fixed-term individual and collective labour contracts successfully, except for peasant 
workers who were excluded as ―temporary workers‖.12 
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, 
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The Labour Contract system and the Director Responsibility system signified a distancing 
of the relationship between workers and state enterprises. These tactical changes made 
employment no longer a membership right to state assets. And since 1994 Labour Law, 
―labour contracts in China have overwhelmingly tended to be fixed-term contracts with the 
length of contract becoming shorter and shorter‖,13 ―usually between half a year and three 
years‖.14 As Zou puts it, ―(t)his fundamental abandonment of the ‗iron rice bowl‘ has seen 
the rise and rise of temporary, contingent employment such as dispatch labour‖.15 
The reforms to wage and price system followed as the Responsibility system allowed 
factories to retain benefits and changed the ―state-monopolized revenue and 
expenditure‖.16 When in the work unit system, ―(w)ages were set according to a nationally 
standardized wage grid system, which was detached from any considerations of individual 
or danwei (work units) performance. The state administrated wage system sought to 
minimize disparities within and across enterprises through a low wage policy and very 
small wage differences between grades of employees.‖17 This rigidity had to be changed 
as competitions were encouraged across industries and enterprises, and disparities 
inevitably arose. Also, as the labour contract introduced risks of layoff, social services 
were required to be provided in a form of wage to replace material forms tune in concrete 
demands. From 1980s, work units began to distribute welfare benefits through wages, 
which for one thing caused inequality across industries and factories; for another thing, it 
transferred categorization of welfare services from supply to consumption.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
Interim Provision on Employment Issues of State Enterprises (Guo Ying Qi Ye Zhao Yong 
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, 2014)  
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, 2014)  
Interim Provision on Experimentation of the Labour Contract System by State Enterprises 
(Guo Ying Qi Ye Shi Xing Lao Dong He Tong Zan Xing Gui Ding), available at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66680/4493989.html, issued on July 12
th
, 1986, 
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At that time, China was still managing a Dual-track price system, namely, a system 
containing a fixed price and a market price for the same kind of products. Only the excess 
to state plans could be sold at a market price. Manipulation of exchanges by government 
officials between the two prices triggered dissatisfaction among the people, and resulted in 
the panic buying in 1988, followed by the 1989 political movement in the name of 
anti-corruption and democracy. 
From 1988 and especially after 1989, the ―Reform and Opening‖ policy was suspended. 
―Centralization‖ was re-emphasized in the three-year overhaul while responding to an 
economic blockade by foreign countries. Mandatory plans increased, and products were 
sold at fixed prices again; the role of the central bank was strengthened while private banks 
or societal collection of funds were forbidden; licensing for export was tightly controlled 
and migrant workers were sent back to their rural hometowns. Political conservatives 
criticized the reform policy as importing capitalism along with its ideology of democracy. 
A debate on the Socialist Road or the Capitalist Road that China took was heating up. 
1.4. A brief summary of the reforms before 1993 
In sum, reforms before 1993 took tactical but important steps both in rural and urban areas. 
Through the abolition of people‘s communes, land and productive co-operations replaced 
the membership right of communes in rural places; while later in urban areas, labour 
contract system took place of the life-long employment and welfare services based on it. It 
changed the mode and organizations of social integration in pre-Reform China, by entitling 
rights for individuals to be flexible, to contract and consume. It would not cause too much 
trouble when most workers were successfully transferred into the contract system, but a 
risk could be foreseen when these short-term benefits were no longer available.  
This mode of formal contractualization avoided the redistribution issue in socialist 
transition. This, on the other hand, means this contractualization was not made by equal 
parties, and exchanges were indeed a pure formulation. This contract hence constituted 
legal personality rather than reflected it, and the key absence from this type of contract is 
―freedom‖ of contract which is definitional to this mechanism.18 This induced the 
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 Alain Supiot has made a distinction between contractualism and contractualization in his 
book. The key difference between the two is that the latter professes the ideology of 
contract as emancipatory in opposition to ―the heavy machinery of States and the 
imperfections of the law‖ as ―rigid, unilateral and enslaving‖. (p83) In China‘s context, it 
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paradoxical result of legalizing it. As Zou has commented on China‘s labour law reform 
that, ―(i)f the primary object of labour law is to ‗counteract the inequality of bargaining 
power which is inherent and must be inherent in the employment relationship‘, then 
Chinese workers must rely on laws that are based on the status of a legal individual who is 
party to a contract‖.19 The emergent private law system and legal relations could barely be 
contained within the socialist constitutional text and socialist social contract. It was best 
captured by the term ―benign unconstitutionality‖ that legal scholars often used. 
2. Reforms between 1993 and 2003 
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping gave his Southern Tour Speech when touring around Shenzhen, 
Wuchang, Zhuhai and Shanghai, which put an end to criticisms against him and re-started 
the reform agenda. It was argued that such an impact was not produced overnight but 
because China already had a ―market-preserving federalism‖.20This ―political durability‖, 
especially manifest in the SEZs of Guangdong province, kept political conservatives, who 
were rejecting the ―third path‖, from enforcing a reversal.21  
Deng concluded the former failure and the 1989 political movement as a deficit in catching 
up with people‘s increasing demands for consumption.22 This reduced the more heated 
ideological debate and democratic implications, and also set the next step as 
productivity-centred. The crisis in 1989 hence reinforces the reform logic in economy. 
Instead of declaring to pursue the Capitalist path, China situates itself at the preliminary 
stage of Socialism (Article 1 in 1993 Amendment). Building Socialism in a poor country is 
a unique situation that could neither be learned from textbook nor from experiences of 
other countries, which shapes the Chinese characteristics. Also some deviations from a 
normal marketization process have to be noted as the powerful lesson of the 1989 
                                                                                                                                                                                
shows that the formal contract without substantive freedom to contract is rather 
enslavement itself. For Supiot, contractualization throws off the basis of contractualism 
while uses its techniques to generalize and imagine a power relation to be free of power. 
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(Summary) (Zhong Gong Zhong Yang Guan Yu Jin Yi Bu Zhi Li Zheng Dun He Shen Hua Gai Ge De Jue 
Ding), issued on November 9
th
, 1989, available at 





movement teaches that State capacity should not be undermined while marketization 
proceeds. 
2.1. Reforms to state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
China‘s SOEs continued with and stretched their reform as in the 1980s, but adopted a 
selective strategy. The State Enterprise Law of 1988 stressed the ―operational spheres of 
autonomy of SOEs‖ and set up SOEs as a legal person separated from the government 
system. The Company Law came into effect on July 1
st
, 1994 and many companies were 
set up in a mode of ―corporatization‖. Iain MacNeil commentted that, ―corporatization had 
the effect of formalizing the separation of state from SOEs, as the state became a 
shareholder rather than the direct owner of productive assets‖.23 Yet Article 4 provides 
that ―The state assets of a company belong to the state‖ which could not be made sense for 
Iain MacNeil that ―assets that belong to a company, as a separate legal person, to be owned 
by another entity at the same time‖.24 No matter whether this formulation could renovate 
property theories anew, it did not appear to have caused many practical difficulties in 
transferring direct ownership into a form of shareholding. 
Another difference concerning China‘s corporate governance lies in the marketability of 
shares. ―Chinese stock exchanges fall far short of Western ‗outsider‘-control models as 
they allow for only a small proportion of shares to be traded on the exchange.‖25 Among 
different categories, foreign investors ―cannot own A shares, which represent the majority 
of the marketable shares of listed companies‖.26 This situation did not change until China 
entered WTO and the 2002 ―Reform of Non-tradable Shares‖. MacNeil argues that the 
limits on marketability would compromise the efficiency claim; and the state as the 
controlling shareholder would limit emergence of institutional investors and possibility of 
takeovers. Hence he concludes that corporate governance in China still operates in a 
manner fundamentally different from the West, which is summarized as ―formal 
convergence‖ accompanied with ―functional diversity‖, with ―some room for adaptation at 
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 Iain MacNeil (2002) ‗Adaptation and Convergence in Corporative Governance: the Case of Chinese Listed 
Companies‘, Journal of Corporate Studies 2(2):289-344, 310 
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 Ibid. 299 
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 Roman Tomasic (2011), ‗Looking at corporate governance in China‘s large companies-Is the glass half full 
or half empty?‘ in Guanghua Yu (ed.), The Development of the Chinese Legal system: Change and Challenges. 
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the lowest level (company law), less in the intermediate level (securities law and 
regulation), and almost none at the top level (listing rules)‖.27  
This coincides with Clarke‘s characterization of China‘s corporate governance as 
―corporatization, not privatization‖.28 Corporate governance was a crucial mechanism in 
China‘s state enterprises reform and in the whole economic reform as well. As Jiangyu 
Wang puts it, 
―The major contradiction is that they (enterprises) are short of funds because the 
state is facing fiscal constraints and difficulties [and hence cannot inject more 
capital], and the banks lending cannot be so large to meet all the needs. For this 
reason, raising funds through issuing shares to the public could not only absorb the 
huge amount of unused money in the civil society, but also could convert 
consumption money into capital for production and construction…‖29  
In this sense, the channelling is ―advancing mainly the interest of the state as a shareholder 
– the biggest private interest in China. As a result of this policy, the overwhelming 
majority of the listed companies in China are state owned.‖ (my emphasis)30  It counts as 
―a broader industry policy‖ and induces the ―relative insignificance‖ of the minority 
shareholder ―in the overall structure of ownership‖.31 By this means, ―the state intends 
through State holding companies to maintain a controlling share ownership in the ‗pillar 
industries‘ and ‗key enterprises in the basic industries‖.32  
The SOEs reform was also accompanied with three regulations concerning bankruptcy. 
The 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and 1994 ―Notice‖33 regulated the SOEs bankruptcy, 
while non-public enterprises‘ bankruptcy was regulated by the 1990 Civil Procedure Law 
(Chapter 19). The ―Notice‖ gave preferential treatments to fourteen pilot cities for them to 
―optimize the capital structure‖. In fact, only small and medium-sized state enterprises 
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were encouraged to ―contract, lease, or be sold to collective organizations or 
individuals‖.34 If an enterprise was deemed improper to go bankrupt, the local government 
would subsidize it according to the ―Notice‖. These enterprises are mainly of China‘s 
―strategically important industries‖, which play the ―leading role‖ in the state economy. In 
1999, this strategy was officially named as ―grasp the large and release the small‖.35 
It is argued that, contrary to the transition orthodoxy, ―the presence of a strong State which 
is able to give priority to the overall national interest is likely to be a more effective means 
of making this transition from communism to a market-based society.‖36 And Roman 
Tomasic finds that,  
―Instead [of end of history], we have seen the persistence and indeed the 
strengthening of the nation-State in transition economies; this is especially evident 
in China itself. The recent global financial crisis seems to have seen the 
re-emergence of the State in many countries with governments becoming owners 
of large proportions of shares in major banks; this process of State expansions has 
also been evident in China. This must affect the way we look at corporate 
governance.‖37  
This comment implies that the 1990s reforms to SOEs corporate governance and the 
economic structure formed accordingly decide responses China would make in global 
financial crisis, which I will explain later in this chapter. With a separation between 
operation and ownership, ―state economy‖ was changed into ―state-owned economy‖ in the 
Article 3 of the 1993 Amendment, and ―state enterprises‖ into ―state-owned enterprises‖ in 
Articles 6 and 8. But this also created confusion in understanding the ―state economy‖ that 
was formerly specifying the economic organization of urban areas, relative to the 
―collective economy‖. In the 1999 Constitutional Amendment, Article 1 re-defined the 
ownership structure and the distribution system. Article 3 of the 1999 Amendment also 
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permits ―other non-public economies‖ developing along with individual and private 
economy. 
2.2. Reforms to the price system 
The dual-track price system faded when mandatory state plans were replaced by 
state-ordered contracts.
38
 Enterprises were required to adapt themselves to the 
―demand-oriented system of the market‖.39 Through this practice, the two prices could 
converge gradually and formally. However, the dual-track element is still preserved in 
China‘s Law on Price effective since May 1st, 1998. Article 18 of it prescribes that the 
government reserves power to give a guiding price or set the price when necessary, which 
is practised in monopoly industries of the State, like the oil industry. There remains a 
controversial concern for state monopoly in China‘s 2007 Antimonopoly Law, which 
entitles a next higher level of administrative authority to rectify abused administrative 
monopoly of the lower level.
40
  
2.3. Reforms to the taxation system 
The Tax reform in 1994 is taken by some Chinese scholars
41
 as the most important reform 
in China after 1993. Before that, China was practising a fiscal contracting scheme between 
two adjacent levels of governments. ―The basic idea is that a lower-level regional 
government contracts with the upper-level regional government on the total amount of tax 
and profit revenue to be remitted for the next several years; the lower-level government 
keeps the rest‖.42 This mode of ―soft-budget constraints‖ gave more incentives for local 
governments to protect local enterprises. But from 1994, a tax-sharing reform was 
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 It embodied four major changes: firstly, two separate systems were set up 
to collect taxes, namely, national tax system and local tax system; secondly, taxes were 
divided into three types: National, Local and Joint; thirdly, the national government relies 
on the ―transfer payment‖ to compensate for local governments and hence selectively 
implements its policies: taxes on banking, insurance, telecommunication and railway 
industries, etc. belong exclusively to the national tax system; fourthly, the power to decide 
on the divide between national tax and local tax is monopolized by the State Council. 
According to An Chen‘s research, of the total 18 types, the Consumption Tax and the 
Valued Added Tax (VAT) were biggest, and the former was exclusively earmarked for the 
centre, while the latter was shared between the central government (75%) and the local 
governments (25%). All other types were categorised as local tax, of which the biggest was 
the Business Tax levied against tertiary industries. Hence, Taxation Reform shifted the 
focus of local governments from ―industrialization‖ to ―urbanization (of land)‖ and gave 
rise to a contemporary phenomenon of ―land financing‖ in China.44 The tax reform also 
increased local NTR (non-tax revenue) in an explosive way, which burdened peasants and 
TVEs in late 1990s.  




 What is 
concerned and controversial here is the locality-centre relationship constituted and changed 
by the taxation reform compared to the pre-1993 economic reform, and preservation of 
state capacity in the central government. This economic model contributes to economic 
constitutionalism I will turn to in the next chapter. 
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2.4. Reforms to the banking system 
Yuwa Wei has argued, China‘s banking reforms underwent three stages, and the first phase 
of banking reforms started in the mid-1980s.
47
 Before the ‗Reform and Opening‘ policy, 
People‘s Bank of China (PBC) was the ‗mono-bank‘ in the city with rural credit 
co-operatives as its extension. From 1983, the PBC was organized as the central bank of 
China while four ―specialized‖ banks (Agricultural Bank of China, Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China and China Construction Bank) were 
established in 1984 under the leadership of PBC. ―The main object of the reforms during 
this period was to restructure China‘s highly centralized and unified banking system into a 
diversified banking system in order to satisfy the demand of the expanding economic 
activities. The most significant outcome of the reforms during this phase was the 
introduction of the two-tier banking system, which has since established the framework of 
China‘s banking sector.‖48  
But in 1994, three ―policy banks‖ (China Development Bank, Agricultural Development 
Bank of China, the Export-Import Bank of China) were set up to take over policy functions 
from the four specialized banks and transformed them into national commercial banks. So 
that commercialization could go along with policy functions of the banking system. From 
1992 to 1996, joint-venture banks were founded and in 1995 rural credit co-operatives 
were developed into Urban Co-operative banks and were turned into City Commercial 
Banks in 1997. Between 1992 and 1997, SOEs reform had left with a large amount of 
non-performing loans (NPLs), hence in 1999 the Ministry of Finance set up four asset 
management companies (AMC) to purchase 1.4 trillion Yuan NPLs, so that SOEs and 
state-owned Commercial Banks could be restructured and listed in the market.
49
 China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was founded in 2003 after the establishment of 
CSRC in 1992 and China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) in 1998. From 1994 
to 2003, ―(t)he banking reform at this stage aimed to introduce the concept and 
mechanisms of risk management. This was an important step towards corporatization of 
state commercial banks‖.50  
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Nicholas Howson argues that China‘s restructuring of commercial banks adopted the same 
model of SOEs corporate governance, namely, corporatization rather than fully 
privatization. They can hardly get rid of China‘s Nomenclatura and are too big to fail.51 
The case study of China‘s ―Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF)‖52 by Katharina Pistor, shows 
that China‘s banking reform took a ―learning-by-monitoring‖ track. This track has some 
features as involving minority stakes with two or more SWFs, lockup periods, or optional 
board seats for investors, etc. It increases ―the propensity of foreign investors to transfer 
knowledge and expertise in order to enhance returns on their investment‖,53 yet still 
remains a strategy of ―engagement without transference control‖.54For Pistor, this 
constitutes a unique model of political economy: ―autonomy maximization‖55 and is not 
simply available for any country to adopt. 
Yasheng Huang argues in another direction that China‘s financial system is 
underdeveloped and still, good legal and financial institutions are essential for enterprises 
to thrive. But China as he examines, is lucky to have Hong Kong as a substitute 
mechanism. Foreign companies therefore could organize all their operations as subsidiaries 
of its Hong Kong firm and are subject to laws and regulations pertaining to FDI instead of 
those far more restrictive laws pertaining to domestic private businesses. These practices 




In addition to this underdeveloped financial system, China‘s fixed exchange rate, pegging 
to the dollar at ―an unreasonably low rate‖ from 1995 to 2005, is long considered as a form 
of industrial policy. ―Unlike the Koreans and the Japanese, the Chinese are not subsidizing 
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one particular sector‖, Francis Fukuyama argues, ―(t)hey are basically giving their whole 
coastal manufacturing region a big advantage over the rest of the world.‖57 In this sense, 
―China has been in effect de-industrializing much of the rest of the world.‖58  
The combination of these elements would make sense of China‘s model of economic 
sovereignty and the limited openness to global financial risks. This controlled openness 
without undermining state capacity, technical learning, institutional experiments and 
co-existence of market mechanism and socialism are the crucial definition of the Chinese 
characteristics by Chinese economic constitutionalists, whose arguments I will engage with 
in the next chapter. 
2.5. The land reform 
Along with bankruptcy of SOEs, land as a factor of production began to be put into the 
market as well (1988 Constitutional Amendment). While the land is state-owned and 
collective-owned, right to use land could be transferred and granted, namely, a dual land 
tenure system. ―The Land Administration Law enacted in 1986 reiterated constitutional 
principles of public ownership of land, and clarified the jurisdictional arrangements for 
land administration. Revisions in 1988 to the constitution and the Land Administration 
Law of PRC permitted broader land use rights to be conveyed to private entities‖.59The 
right to land use is split into two types: non-profit use and profit-oriented use, and they are 
regulated as Grant (Churang), or Transference (Zhuanrang) with payment of consideration 
separately. 
To deal with ―jurisdictional conflicts‖ in the system of land use rights caused by separate 
implementing rules enacted by local governments since 1990s, and ―to tighten state control 
over perceived abuse‖, ―(l)and registration rules were enacted shortly thereafter‖.60 An 
administrative registration procedure unifies the two types, as they both have to be 
registered  and regulated by the county or above-county-level governments. The former 
requires no payment of consideration while also cannot be transferred, leased or mortgaged, 
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with the exception that it could be transferred with the above-ground buildings and also 
after compensating payment of consideration. In accordance with different purposes, 




As the Land Administration Department manages overall planning of land use, and has 
power to convert non-agricultural use of land under collective ownership,
62
 the State 
monopolizes the first-tier land market both in urban and rural areas in effect and could 
transact use rights in the second-tier land market. This elicited expropriation of peasants‘ 
land and land lease to foreign or private real estate developers in a massive scale.
63
  
The ‗land financing‘ and the booming real estate market caused rapid decrease of the 
cultivated land. To appease dissatisfaction of peasants, in 1997, peasants‘ contracting 
rights were re-assured and extended to thirty years,
64
 which was also admitted into Article 
4 of the 1999 Amendment. But compared to high profits of commodification, this legal 
guarantee is rather a weak resolution and could be exchanged with money. 
2.6. Reform to social security system 
This series of reforms could not be all successful without loss, but who bore it and how 
was it communicated? To answer this question, it is worth examining the transformation of 
welfare services in China from membership to legal rights. 
Social security issue in the pre-Reform China was part of China‘s economic institutions 
and was maintained by work units and in the material form of distribution according to 
demands. But after introduction of bankruptcy risks, it was no longer possible for SOEs to 
handle this function. Firstly, these services had to be specified and paid in a form of 
                                                          
61
 The Interim Regulations of the PRC concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to Use of 
State-owned Land in Urban Areas (1990) 
62
 Regulations on the Implementation of the Land Administration of the PRC (1998) 
63
 This allowance could be referred to Interim Measures for the Administration of Foreign-invested 
Development and Management of Tracts of Land, effective on May 19th, 1990, and ceased to be effective on 
March 7th, 2008. 
64
 A Notice by the General Office of CCP and State Council on the Stability and Development of 
Contracting Relations of the Rural Land (Zhong Gong Zhong Yang Ban Gong Ting Guo Wu Yuan Guan Yu 
Jin Yi Bu Wan Shan Nong Cun Tu Di Cheng Bao Guan Xi De Tong Zhi), available at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66687/4494335.html, issued on August 27
th








 and national social insurance system was established, which includes: ―retirement 
and pension benefits; worker compensation for job-related injuries and diseases; medical 
care and disability benefits for injuries or diseases that are not employment related; 
unemployment benefits; pregnancy and maternity benefits; and death benefits for 
survivors‖.66 Secondly, coverage of these insurances were extended and ―socialized‖. The 
1999 Provision on Unemployment Insurance changed the meaning of ―unemployment‖ in 
the 1986 Provision from ―waiting for employment‖ (Dai Ye) to ―losing a job‖ (Shi Ye). 
And along with that, the coverage extended from state-owned enterprises to enterprises 
under different ownerships: private, collective or foreign. Unemployment, Pension and 
Medication insurances adopt a combination of social pooling and individual savings. 
Though the 1986 Bankruptcy Law and the 1994 ―Notice‖ both gave priority to social 
security funds, from 1997 the ―Shanghai Experience‖ was promoted nationwide,67 which 
established a re-employment centre to take laid-off workers from SOEs. Workers would 
stay in this centre for three years supported by a ―laid-off workers fund‖, then receive a 
two-year unemployment insurance, before they receive a minimum social relief.
68
 This 
institutionalization of re-employment centres would make the primacy of workers‘ claims 
registered as a separate theme out of the whole bankruptcy process. And it was reported 
that the NPLs for settlement of laid-off workers were limited to 10 billion Yuan in total in 
1997 during this critical restructuring period of state-owned banks.
69
  
This process of ―socialization from the state‖ was quite problematic. The distinction of 
state/society and an independent ―social sphere‖ were created in this process. Workers 
were deprived of their working-class status so as to purchase social welfare, and in such a 
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sense they were ―socialized‖. Enterprise autonomy, social security demands and market to 
supply were produced at the same time,
70
 but this formalization concealed substantive loss, 
not to mention effects of inflation or corruption. In 2000, Premier Zhu acknowledged 
publicly that there was a huge hole in the social pooling of the Pension Insurance, which 
had added up to 37.6 billion Yuan in 1999.
71
  
The Housing reform reflected both the land reform and social security reform. ―Before 
1988, employees in urban areas all lived in houses or apartments allocated by their 
enterprises or institutions. They did not have ownership of the houses or apartments and 
only paid a symbolic rent.‖72 The housing reform was initiated in 1988, and ―(t)he legal 
regime for the acquisition of the ‗right to use‘ state-owned land by real estate developers 
was established by the State Council when it enacted in 1990 the Provisional Regulations 
on the Grant (churang) and the Transfer (zhuanrang) of the Right to Use State-Owned land 
in Cities and Towns (PRCT)‖.73 Besides that, ―the Law on the Administration of Urban 
Real Estate enacted in 1994 and amended in 2007, and the Law on Real Rights enacted in 
2007 follow that system.‖74   
As Guanghua Yu writes, while in the initial period, 
―(T)he immediate objective of the housing reform was to raise the rent, the 
long-term objective was to realize the goal of allocating houses or apartments 
through the market. In 1994, the State Council issued the Decision on Deepening 
the Reform of Urban Housing System. The gist of the Decision was to incorporate 
the housing benefits into the salary of employees so that the high-income families 
could buy commercial houses (shangpinfang) while the middle- and low-income 
families could purchase subsidized suitable economy houses (jingji shiyongfang) 
or lease low-rent apartments (lianzufang)‖.75 
An experience of ―House Accumulation Fund‖ (zhufang gongjijin) borrowed from 
Singapore was introduced by the ―Decision‖ to the housing reform. This fund was 
                                                          
70
 Perry Anderson (January-February 2010) ‗Two Revolutions‘ New Left Review 61 
71
 Zhu Rongji, Speed Up Establishing Social Security System, and Ensure Lasting Political Stability.‖ (Jia 
Kuai Wan Shan She Hui Bao Zhang Ti Xi, Qie Shi Bao Zheng Guo Jia Chang Zhi Jiu An), issued on May 
26
th





 Guanghua Yu (2011), ‗The Role of Mortgages – A Case for Formal Law‘, in Guanghua Yu (ed.), The 
Development of the Chinese Legal system: Change and Challenges. (London: Routledge) 120 
73
 Albert Chen (2011) 84 
74
 Guanghua Yu (2011)120 
75
 Guanghua Yu (2011) 120 
 70 
 
contributed by local finance, enterprises and the individual worker respectively 5% of his 
wage, and would be stored in banks until his retirement. According to different levels of 
wage, three types of houses would also be sold to workers at differently reduced prices and 
with varied marketability.
76
 Therefore, it is a system of co-existence of policy housing and 
commercial housing. ―This Decision sent out a very clear signal to the urban residents that 
buying and selling houses on the market was the future direction. … Among other things, 
the Notice also instructed commercial banks to expand the scope of home-purchasing loans 
and the local governments to improve the system of registration of mortgage loans.‖77  
Different from the long-term policy housing in Singapore, China‘s public housing project 
decreased from 1998, so as not to ―interrupt the market order‖.78  Hereafter, real estate 
transaction becomes a high-profit industry in China. The benefits from the housing reform 
are easily lost when houses and land use rights are put into market re-appreciation.  
2.7. A brief summary 
In sum, China‘s economic and social transition was mediated through a series of reforms, 
which was named by Fan Gang and Wing Thye Woo as PPP (Parallel Partial Progression) 
approach.
79
 It means that the combination of reforms was too comprehensive to resist, if 
compared to a sequencing type (354). It was impossible to complete transition quickly in 
any one area, but quickly when started almost everywhere. To some extent, we could 
define China‘s reform process as a radical one though adopted a strategy of ―gradualism‖. 
There are two points to be noticed. The first is the legalization to constitute rather than 
merely reflect the distinction between State and society, namely, the ―socialization‖ 
process in China. The implication of gaining freedom in this process was highly dependent 
upon economic transactions. China‘s contractualization was rather an enforced process and 
its delivery of individual freedom was a failure in this sense. Secondly, there is a two-tier 
market structure established in China‘s economic system, which is crucial for us to 
interpret the meaning of ―Socialist market economy‖ (Article 5 of 1993 Amendment). We 
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could observe this structure in reforms to SOEs in China‘s strategic industries; 
corporatization and non-marketability of shares in financial markets; state monopoly of the 
first-tier land market and the divide between land ownership and right to use; tax sharing 
system and transfer payments, etc. Through these practices, China produces a model that 
could be called ―state capitalism‖: market reforms are controlled and liquidating small and 
medium-sized enterprises is encouraged in the meantime with strengthening strategically 
important industries. Joseph Stiglitz compliments the Chinese path as putting emphasis on 
competition and dynamics, while privatization is taken as secondary.
80
 But apparently in 
this comment, whether it is a real competition is less concerned by Stiglitz. However, this 
state re-centralization and selective privatization could not be reconciled without costs, 
which were gradually manifested in the decline of social security and the rise of mass 
incidents. 
3. Reforms after 2003 
3.1. The rise of “Mass Incidents” and the proposal of 
“Harmonious Society” 
The 1990s reforms are crucial for China‘s economic miracle, but also dramatically root out 
security of the working class lives in China. Urban workers began to protest for their loss 
of jobs and related absence of welfare or corruption in the implementation. In the 
North-east China, where China‘s heavy industries were formerly concentrated, an entire 
family could be laid off at the same time due to the closure of state enterprises and changes 
in industry policies. The boom of real estate industry makes the one time benefits of the 
housing reform lost to market re-appreciation, and the gap between compensation and 
affordability of new residence is revealing. This gives rise to the phenomenon of ―enforced 
demolition‖ and demands for stronger protection of property rights by the relatively 
wealthy class who owns property first in the reform process. Other social services, albeit 
medication or education, which was appropriated through a formal transference from 
―status to contract‖, begin to feel the pressure of the market and the substantive loss. 
According to the report of Government Expenditures cited by Dirk Schmidt and Sebastian 
Heilmann, China‘s population‘s most pressing concern before the 2007 financial crisis was 
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still public goods and affordable houses. But the government expenditures for health and 
education only comprised 18 percent of all expenditures, much less than peer countries.
81
  
Rural areas are in a worse condition and get even less support from the State than urban 
areas. Working on household agriculture could no longer earn enough to catch up with the 
rise of education and medication fees. What is more, their land, which is their whole basis 
for living and security, is under the pressure of urban real estate industry and expropriated 
on a massive scale. Young peasants leave their homeland and migrate to coastal cities due 
to poverty on the rise. They only constitute ―semi-proletarians‖82 with a plot of land 
allotted in their hometown, while they are living in the city in a poorer situation: lack of 
social security, lagged behind in education and training, and discriminated in legal 
protection. 
Mass incidents, a term used to describe mainly that injustice caused by enforced 
demolition, lay-off from work, and confiscation of land without sufficient compensation, 
etc. could not find proper resolutions through law and judicial means, resort instead to 
mass gatherings, media reports or other extra-legal means to exert pressure. They find in 
fact extra-legal methods sometimes more efficient, which Dowdle puts as an ―informed 
disenchantment‖.83According to the research of Chinese Police Academy, mass incidents 
rose from 8,300 in 1993 to 90,000 in 2006 and went violent.
84
 In proposing ―Harmonious 
Society‖ and ―Scientific Development‖, the government declares its new attention to social 
problems alternative to the 1990s fully economic orientation. I will take up discussions of 
these terms later (3.5.), where I explain the paradoxical effects of labour law fragmentation 
in China, and whether ―harmony‖ is available. 
3.2. China’s accession to the WTO 
Another significant event in the development of China was its accession to the WTO on 
December 11
th
 2001 after a long process. As Karen Halverson argues, ―China‘s status as a 
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developing country and economic power posed a dilemma.‖85 China expressed her 
commitment clearly in this accession. Constitutional amendments were enacted to protect 
property rights and private owners (Article 3-6 of the 2004 Amendment), and the Law on 
Property, after being prepared for decades, was finally promulgated in 2007. The state 
council also published in 2004 “Several Opinions by State Council Concerning Promotion 
of the Reform and Opening, and the Stable Development of the Capital Market”86 to 
promote developments in capital market, which emphasized an important measure on 
―reform of non-tradable shares‖ as I have mentioned. In 2005, ―Several Opinions by State 
Council On Encouraging, Supporting and Guiding Individual, Private and Other 
Non-Public Economy‖87 was issued, which for the first time allowed non-public capital 
access to some monopoly industries [Article 1(2)]. It reflects significant concessions China 
has made in order to get access to WTO, such as, Transparency, Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), Nonmarket Economy Treatment in 
anti-dumping cases and Discriminatory Safeguard Rule. 
However, case studies show that many of these concessions are compromised to some 
extent in China. On December 31
st
 2001, shortly after China‘s accession, the seven-year 
transition period provided to transitional economy ended without extension available for 
China. Hence, in the case of China‘s subsidy, a ―SOE-based specificity test‖ is applied as a 
criterion, namely that, if ―disproportionately‖ a large number of state-owned enterprises 
receive such subsidy, China will be subject to countervailing actions. 
Julia Ya Qin argues that it is naïve to believe potential litigations at the WTO or 
countervailing actions of China‘s trading partners will decide policies China adopts to 
privatize its state sector; and situations involved in a pre-privatisation subsidy in China are 
far more complex and of a larger scale, such as ―policy loans, automatic rollover of unpaid 
principal and interest, foreign loans and below-market low interest loans‖,88 which are  
provided to SOEs through state-owned banks. Additionally, part of the SOEs subsidies 
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during the reform era has effects of correcting market distortions rather than creating new 
ones.  
China‘s SOEs reform and its compliance with the criteria of the WTO are also 
controversial. Take the telecommunication service industry for example, the establishment 
of Foreign-Invested Telecommunication Enterprises (FITE) has a shareholding 
requirement of 51% state equity interest, so that, ―(i)n fact, it grants China discretion in 
determining whether to allow a given foreign supplier to establish an FITE because the 
state owns potential Chinese partners.‖89 Independence from government hence would 
have ambiguous meaning. 51% state equity requirement also means ownership by another 
member is impossible and few are likely to be controlled. Therefore, national treatment is 
not to be applied. Tania Voon concludes that ―China tends to treat its GATS (General 
Agreement on Trade in Services) commitments as imposing maximum rather than 
minimum requirements.‖90  
A case study on China‘s banking sector also shows a ―Same Bed, Different 
Dreams‖91tendency, Daniel Crosby argues. Controversy arises concerning that China 
allows qualified foreign financial institutions ―to establish‖ wholly owned subsidies, 
branches and joint venture Banks. Does it mean the establishment of a commercial 
presence through the ―acquisition‖ of existing Chinese banks, or only through the 
―constitution‖ of new banks? This concerns especially Chinese commercial banks and city 
banks as they are not controlled by the central government.  
Howson, nevertheless, holds a positive view toward China‘s liberalization of the securities 
industry. He observes a wonderfully open-ended stipulation of foreign ownership that ―a 
requirement that one shareholder in the firm holds at least 25% of the equity‖, in the newly 
promulgated Securities Investment Fund Law in 2004.
92
  Howson predicts that after 
domestic development and corporatization, China‘s ―Going Out Strategy‖ will finally force 
China to be shaped by a completely different legal, contractual and regulatory context and 
rules.
93
 But Clarke disagrees and argues that reforms simply imposed from outside are 
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unlikely to go beyond surface compliance.
94
 The requirement in TRIPS and GATS are 
limited only to specific sectors rather than a systematic reform. 
These case studies are meant to understand the complex and compromised effects related 
to China‘s 1990s reform and the economic structure it left. As the study of Wsping 
Andersen‘s fourfold typology of welfare regimes shows, the Eastern Asian model could be 
counted as quite different in the market-government configuration.
95
 This also 
problematizes whether and how marketization will influence China‘s constitutional 
reforms from the private law system. I will elaborate more later. 
3.3. The 2007 global financial crisis and the staging of 
China’s New Left 
Based on complexities in China‘s accession to WTO, the impact of ―Global financial crisis‖ 
on China also has to be re-evaluated. According to the research by Schmidt and Heilmann 
China had a comparative minimum exposure to the most risky financial products. Before 
the financial crisis, China‘s financial system was primarily bank-based. Bank lending was 
the dominant source (85%) for external funding while bonds (10%) and stocks (4%) only 
played a minor role. China‘s financial system has often been characterized as 
underdeveloped and ―repressed‖, with most of investment coming from saving not 
borrowing.
96
 The effects of the financial crisis on China concerned indeed real economy. 
In the first half of year 2009, exports sank 21.8% and imports 25.4%. And in the spring of 
2009, China‘s Ministry of Agriculture reported that 20 million recently laid-off migrant 
workers returned to the countryside.
97
  
Confronting this, China‘s State Council announced its 4-trillion-Yuan Stimulation Plan and 
changed its monetary policy from ―moderately tight‖ to ―moderately loose‖.98 This is 
meant to activate consumption, especially consumption by rural residents and low-income 
class in urban areas, according to the report of Premier Wen.
99
 From 2008 to 2009, the 
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State Council issued four decrees
100
 to tackle the rural pension insurance, which was 
formerly handled in the unit of households; to upgrade the level of rural and urban 
consumptions; and to address unemployment. Reforms to the health and medication system 
are also included. Jane Duckett argues that it was actually initiated in 2005 related to the 
―colour revolutions‖ in Eastern Europe and criticism of marketization and 
neo-liberalism,
101




With regard to contents of the stimulation programme, Schmidt and Heilmann praise 
China‘s using the ―window of opportunity‖ to put forward reforms in health care and solve 
unemployment, so as to preserve overall social stability. But this plan lacks support for 
small- and medium-sized enterprises and is lagged markedly behind in terms of ―green 
technology‖ promotion.103 With massive investment in the infrastructure, China‘s SOEs 
will benefit most from the plan, which even provokes a trend named as ―the state sector 
steps forward while the private sector retreats‖.104 In 2009, the merger of small mining 
enterprises in Shanxi Province, which measure reduced the total of 2200 to 100 in name of 
regulating ―bloody GDP‖, was selected by legal scholars one of the top ten constitutional 
incidents.
105
 It expressed their worry about a return to state regulations, not only in 
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economy, but also in politics. The ―developmental state‖ named by Philip Huang requires 
―a service-oriented state, with perhaps also some measures of active involvement in 
development‖, and the state works ―in conjunction with private sectors to ensure the 
provision of public services and social welfare.‖106   
China‘s model became popular for its advantages in resisting economic risks in the context 
of globalization. It is especially appreciated by China‘s New Left. Heilmann defines it as 
an ―unusual combination of extensive policy experimentation with long-term policy 
prioritization – in a short formula: foresighted tinkering – that has been practised under the 
shadow of hierarchical authority structure‖.107 Similarly, Wang characterises it as 
―one-size-does-not-fit-all pragmatism‖ and the ―learning/adaptive capacity‖ of China‘s 
political systems.
108
 For Zhou Xueguang, China‘s model is characterized as ―collusion 
between local governments acts as a corrective and countervailing force to the 
centralization of decision-making authority in China.‖109 Hence he holds a similar view on 
the local/central relationship with Barry Weingast‘s ―market-preserving federalism‖.110    
Sun Liping, calles forth a ―theory of transition‖ for former Socialist countries, different 
from the ―theory of modernity‖ in developed countries and the ―theory of development‖ in 
Africa and Latin America, as it is very difficult for post-Communist countries to 
thoroughly change their pre-existing mechanisms for distributing political powers and 
resources. Instead, he proposes neo-institutionalism, which stresses that practices have a 
generating mechanism and the theoretical focus should be given to how people strategize 
and act in practices.
111
  
It is hard to predict whether the stimulation plan will really benefit China in the long run. If 
China was de-industrialized, how would it sustain high costs of the social welfare project? 
Or could it become consumption-driven without initiating financial reforms? This is how 
Fukuyama predicts with confidence that an economic downturn may bring challenges to 
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the fragile legitimacy of China‘s politics.112 In contrast, China‘s New Left detect from the 
global financial crisis a chance to develop China‘s own model of ―economic 
constitutionalism‖ and ―political constitutionalism‖. The first State Plan of Action for 
Human Rights (2009-2010) was promulgated on April 13
th
, 2009, which puts economic, 
social and cultural rights (including rights to employment, social security and health, etc.) 
prior to political rights in the structure.
113
 And the Twelfth Five-year Plan was published 
in 2011 which announced completion of the ―Socialist Legal System‖.114 It promises never 
to practise separation of power, Bicameralism, Federalism, Multi-party System and 
Privatization, but a substantial definition of ―what is‖ is lacking. 
This reflects the influence of China‘s New Left in theoretical examination of the Chinese 
model, who provide new perspectives extending from political economy to political and 
constitutional theories. There is an apparent advantage in China‘s restricted submission to 
the global market that could count as an ―institutional innovation‖.115 The 1990s reforms 
and the combination of Socialism and the market mechanism do not undermine China‘s 
state capacity to meet with financial crisis. This study on China‘s governance model will 
be influential to China‘s constitutional re-imaginations, to some extent an inverse trend to 
legal constitutionalism in the 1980s, which is my concern in the next chapter. 
3.4. The promulgation of Law on Property in China 
Both the outcomes of the 1990s reforms and the globalization imperative call for the 
promulgation of a property law in China, so as to resolve internal conflicts of the property 
issues. The difficulty, for Pitman Potter, is to deal with the orthodoxy of public ownership 
while to recognize private property relations. ―The 2004 constitutional developments in 
turn paved the way for completion of a draft law, work on which had begun in the early 
1990s.‖116 The Law on property, however, does not revolutionize the existing law and 
property relations. Its ―main significance and contribution lies in providing a conceptual 
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framework for the purpose of organizing, consolidating and systematizing the existing law 
relating to property rights in movable and immovable property.‖117   
To deal with the orthodoxy, the Law on Property is said to make its innovations. As Chen 
argues, in the draft process, 
―One view was that the threefold classification was applicable only to systems of 
ownership (suoyou zhi) and need not be provided for in the LP, which should 
make provisions for ownership of property rather than systems of ownership 
which concern the ‗economic base‘ of society (according to Marxist theory) and 
which belong to the province of constitutional law rather than civil law.‖118  
But could they be separated? This suspension in discussing the more politically and 
constitutionally sensitive question and reducing it to a specification question of civil law, is 
based on unbundling conceptions of ownership and right to use as in the 1980s and 1990s 
reforms. This divide deviates from both the continental civil law system and the 
Communist legal system, and at the same time constitutes a combination of both, as Chen 
puts it, 
―In non-communist civil law jurisdictions where private ownership of property is 
the dominant form of ownership, property ownership rather than yongyi wuquan 
(Nutzungsrechte) is the central concept in property practice. The peculiarity of 
‗socialism with Chinese characteristics‘ or the ‗Socialist market economy‘ in 
China is such that ownership in land cannot be privately held and cannot enter the 
market, but yongyi wuquan can‖.119  
This distinguishes China‘s property relations from other jurisdictions. Take the collectively 
owned land for example. The LP seeks to protect the rights of members of the collective by 
requiring release of the information on chengbao plans or the use and distribution of land 
compensation. Apart from ―the rights of participation in decision-making and of taking 
court actions‖, members of the collective also ―enjoy the rights to share in the income or 
benefits derived from the use (e.g. leasing of chengbao operation) of the collectively 
owned land…‖120 In this sense, ―(i)t may thus be argued that ownership is in official 
                                                          
117
 Albert Chen (2011) 102 
118
 Albert Chen (2011) 91 
119
 Albert Chen (2011) 92 
120
 Albert Chen (2011) 102 
 80 
 
theory a form of socialist public ownership, there are elements of private property in it 
insofar as members of the collective as private individuals may enjoy certain private rights 
(including income) and assert certain private claims relating to the use of collectively 
owned property‖.121This private element embodied in public ownership, and the right to 
use in the LP ―is largely a response to indigenous circumstances and needs. It also testifies 
to the unique combination of socialist and private property rights that is a product of the 
era of ‗reform and opening‘ in China that began 30 years ago.‖122  
The Draft has undergone seven hearings before coming into effect. And in 2005, during the 
nationwide discussion of the draft, Gong Xiantian, a professor of Jurisprudence at the 
Beijing University published a letter on the internet, named ―An Unconstitutional Draft of 
Law on Property in Violation of the Principle of Socialism: A Public Letter Written for the 
Abolition of Article 12 of the Constitution and Article 73 of 1986 ‗The General Principle 
of Civil Law‘‖.123 In this letter, Gong made explicit the incompatibility of the Socialist 
structure of 1982 Constitution and the property relations that have evolved in China, 
especially privileges gained by a minority of the population in liquidating state assets. In 
contrast, the working class, who have already been left with no property to own, only 
gained a formal entitlement. This Law on Property legislation hence was to enact 
substantive inequality into a form of law. Gong thus called forth a straightforward 
discussion on the fundamental principle, the direction of socialism, and the relationship 
between public property and private property. Potter observes as well,  
―To the extent that enjoying the benefits of property rights protection requires 
compliance with formal regulatory models, this privileges people already adept at 
communicating and acting in the formal regulatory world, while excludes and 
marginalizes those who are not so adept. In the short term, this has the potential to 
aggravate rather than relieve socio-economic tensions, while in the longer term 
may undermine traditional patterns of socio-economic and political relations.‖124  
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This letter provoked many criticisms from the Civil Law professorship. They insisted that 
all properties transferring in the marketplace deserve recognition of the same status and 
equal protection. This is the ―spirit‖ of property law as a subcategory of civil law, and if 
the Law on Property was suspended, it would further block the promulgation of a Civil 
Code in China. At a civil law conference at the end of 2005, scholars on property law 
decided to appeal for re-start of the legislating process. But the passage of Law on Property 
was postponed in December 2005 and March 2006, and finally got through in 2007 after 
seven hearings.
125
 A well-known civil law professor Jiang Ping commented on Gong‘s 
protest that, ―he no longer opposed Law on Property only, actually he questioned the whole 
‗Reform and Opening‘‖. Toward this, Gong replied, ―I oppose both‖.126 
3.5. The fragmentation of labour law and the promulgation 
of Labour Contract Law  
What is distinct about China‘s labour law is that this law was born out of a transformation 
of the socialist structure of ownership and membership, and developed along with the 
economic transformation. In a sense, it is a byproduct of the private law regime China 
established after the 1978 Reform and Opening. This gives Chinese labour law a perplexity 
since as law, it depends on its relative autonomy from political discretions; while this law 
does not guarantee the same level of protection as workers enjoyed before the Reform; 
rather it is a degradation from workers‘ mastery of state assets. This calls for a deeper 
inquiry into the phenomenon of legalization. Labour law in China embodies internal 
tension between its form (as appropriation of legal personality) and substance (of labour 
protection). This binary effect of legalization of labour relation and fragmentation of 
labour law in contemporary China hence reminds us of what problem was lost from sight 
in this legalization and whether the compensation program (I will explain in Chapter 4) is 
enough. 
In the pre-reform era, labour relation was embedded in the general social structure and was 
rigid and not commodified. ―Young workers would be assigned to a danwei by the local 
administration department, which would also form the basis of their social and individual 
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life‖.127 Also, with a ―dual system‖ of Party and management control as the basis of 
enterprise leadership, the trade union functioned as the ―transmission belt‖ between the 
Party-state and workers, and was ―responsible for educating workers and dealing with their 
grievances‖.128 All unions belonged to ―the sole state-sanctioned union body‖, the 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU).  
The rigidity of labour relation began to change with the adoption of two contract systems 
in rural communes and state enterprises. Contract responsibility system released labour 
forces from people‘s communes and ―peasant workers‖ began to move to Chinese newly 
established SEZs. They comprise groups of workers concentrated in the exploitative 
factories of the ―sunbelt‖.129 The other group was from the declining ―rustbelt‖ – the urban 
working class that once enjoyed lifetime job securities in the state enterprises as ―masters 
of the factory‖.130 With the removal of the ―cradle-to-grave‖ social welfare of the danwei 
system, social services had to be transmitted to wages and in 1990s, the national social 
insurance system was established. The wage reform in China enabled the generalization of 
labour relation apart from its enterprise basis, and made labour law conceivable than 
separate labour regulations regarding different ownerships as in the 1980s
131
 – the start of 
Reform.  
This gave birth to the 1994 Labour Law, which ―formally‖ established the system of labour 
contract as the primary means for regulating employment relations. But as other reform 
processes were also in progress, the 1994 Labour law had a ―disorderly internal 
structure‖132 and it ―left out much of the details—for example, the law largely focuses on 
termination of employment yet does not address contract formation in any detail‖.133 As 
Mary Gallagher and Baohua Dong comment,  
―The problems presented by the labour contract system are indicative of the 
difficulty legislating employment laws that have two different, even opposing, 
functions. The 1994 Labour Law was designed to both end the entitlements of 
socialism and ensure increased protection and rights under the market economy. 
                                                          
127
 Zou (2009) 
128
 Zou (2009). 
129
 Cynthia Estlund and Seth Gurgel, (2012) A New Deal for China‘s Workers? Labor Law Reform in the 





 Supra at n. 11 
132
 Zou (2009) 
133
 Zou (2009) 
 83 
 
Combined with the realities of a large labour surplus, these legal developments 
were more effective in ending socialist employment than protecting workers in the 
new market economy‖.134  
Zou also points out the mismatch of China‘s labour relation with the presumption about the 
labour law that, ―(t)he Labour Law 1994, in its presumption that employers and individual 
workers are equal in a contractual relationship (for example, art.17 stipulates that 
‗Conclusion and alteration of labour contracts shall follow the principle of equality, 
voluntariness, and agreement through consultation‘), is still based on a pre-reform 
workplace mentality of Chinese enterprises that espoused common interests between 
management, workers and the Party‖.135 But there are more contrasts throughout the 
reform process between the Chinese labour law and the Western counterpart, which I try to 
unfold here based on discussions of several scholars. 
The first issue is the corporatist paradigm in legalizing labour relation. Whether 1994 
Labour Law could found a ―state corporatist‖ paradigm depends on the relationship 
between the Party and the Trade Union. With the Party in law withdrawing its direct 
guidance in state enterprises, do trade unions represent workers instead? It is very 
controversial in the nature and structure of ACFTU. Many labour law scholars have raised 
questions concerning whether the unified representation of ACFTU has been outdated and 
ignorant of the notion of ―contradictions‖. As Cybthia Estlund and Seth Gurgel comment,  
―Still, the notion of explicitly recognizing conflicting interests among workers or 
between workers and managers—either through a redefinition of the ‗employees‘ 
who are covered by collective bargaining at all or by something like separate 
‗bargaining units‘ within the enterprise—has gained little traction even among 
forward-looking Chinese policymakers and scholars in the labour field‖.136  
The monopoly of representation of ACFTU preserves the socialist presumption of trade 
unions that they are ―on behalf of ‗the worker state‘, not shareholders‖.137 After such great 
transformations in China‘s industry, labour and social structure, the official mission and 
limited constituency of ACFTU are kept untouched. If during China‘s planned economy 
phase, the working unit as the employer shared common interests with individual worker, 
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so the ACFTU could function as the ―transmission belt‖ or consultation, the increasing 
conflicts between employers and employees are not sufficiently recognized in this outdated 
institutional basis. This limits the function of collective bargaining of trade unions in China, 
as ―conflicts‖ inherent in the employment relation are not recognized as normal; rather 
―stability‖ is what ACFTU‘s official mission. It prevents emergence of employer‘s union 
and stresses ―collective negotiations‖ in lieu of ―collective bargaining‖. 
It also prevents the enterprise-based trade unions from having real power. ―The ACFTU‘s 
official monopoly status represents a frontal rejection of the principle of ‗freedom of 
association‘, a core international labour right and a central organizing principle of the 
International Labour Organization‖.138 This ―explicit prohibition of any trade union 
organization other than the one designated by the one-party-state‖ makes it suspicious that 
ACFTU could represent genuinely the workers‘ demands instead of balancing with other 
governance requirements, such as attracting investments. Cooperative paradigm is not an 
accurate description of China‘s labour legislations since the representation of workers by 
ACFTU is far from effective. 
The second issue lies in the absence of a ‗right to strike‘. Though there is a great deal of 
attention regarding strikes and collective bargaining, ―what is still largely missing is any 
direct link between collective bargaining and strikes‖.139 But ―what will impel employers 
to agree to, or even consider, a union‘s collective bargaining demands?‖140 In the West, ―it 
is not legal compulsion but economic pressure, primarily based on the capacity to interrupt 
production, that historically has been the linchpin of workers‘ bargaining power through 
the history of organized labo(u)r. Without a right to strike, what clout does the union have 
behind its economic demands?‖141 That is to say, legalization is the basis for trade union 
to function in collective bargaining, but without this bargaining performance of 
interruption, the representation would be void. To make it clear, this concerns whether 
entitlements of right to strike will conflict with China‘s other means of social control. 
Right to strike and bargaining depends on other political and institutional guarantees to 
allow for this disruption of the enterprise order, which are a precondition of the Labour 
Law, rather than what are prescribed only in and by the Labour law. Legalization of ―right 
to strike‖ in China hence has paradoxical effects. For Chang Kai, a leading labour scholar 











in China, legal recognition of strikes is ―the inevitable result of market economy and 
something society would have to learn to accept‖.142 While, for some other scholars, ―they 
worry that a ‗right to strike‘ in China would inevitably come with sharp-edged limitations 
that would define most actual strikes and strike activity as illegal, and would do more to 
embolden their repression than legitimate them‖.143 In fact, ―(W)orkers in China have 
gotten much of what they have gotten precisely by making trouble on the streets, and that 
the current legal ambiguity surrounding the strike has perhaps allowed them to do with less 
police and regulatory intervention than they are likely to get with a legally defined and 
circumscribed ‗right to strike‘‖.144 The labour-law defined ―strike‖ in this sense is 
conditioned by a public law guarantee on the circumscription of ―what is a strike‖ that 
allowed for immunity from police intervention. But scholars are worried that this immunity 
is lacking in China‘s legal system. 
The third issue concerns fragmentation of labour relation from other social transformations. 
Legalization of labour itself could not deal with codification of labour forces in labour law 
itself but merely recognition of labour. Labour forces in China‘s ―sunbelt‖ and ―rustbelt‖ 
were formed differently and treated differently. The majority of the ―sunbelt‖ labour is 
composed of migrant workers who are registered as members of rural collective 
community and consequently inaccessible to social welfare in the urban residence. They 
are vulnerable to discrimination, low wage, poor working conditions and delay in getting 
paid. Implementation of labour law facilitates them in getting a better working condition 
and fair treatment. However, this legalization of labour relation does not concern their 
social status in the whole. It only corresponds to their commodification as ―labour‖ but is 
ignorant of the commodification logic and incentives. It does not address to the 
discriminating framework that programs commodification. Labour law legislation could 
really protect migrant workers so long as they sell themselves into employment relation 
and become recognized as labour forces, but the deep-rooted question of rural/urban divide 
is unanswered. Consequently, ―informal labour‖ as a prime feature of China‘s labour 
condition, Huang asserts, has no register in academic discourses about labour conditions. 
Huang hence disagrees on this projection of labour conditions in China argued in a model 
and definition of industrialization.
145
 For migrant workers in China, they do not have a 
right not to sell themselves while being protected as labourer. They are certainly more 
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willing to get involved in the network of social securities in urban places, but it also 
implies as urban residents they should lose their land-related rights in rural collectives. 
However, there is no reassurance of decent work for them in the cities, since they already 
are lagged in education and trainings. 
―Rustbelt‖ workers are not in the same situation with their rural peers. They are labour 
forces degraded from their mastery of state assets. They made a labour contract with the 
state but contracted for nothing in return. Administrating labour law will not influence 
them as much as welcomed by peasant workers in the ―sunbelt‖, as it is the distribution 
problem involved in their becoming employees. It is far complex than implementing what 
labour law prescribed. Rather it concerns that they were and continue to be a member of 
state enterprises of socialist ownership but are left with only low wage payments. Their 
share in public property was simply lost to unequal appropriation by certain industries and 
certain workers. This question is beyond the control of labour law, as employment relation 
is derived not prior to the separation. In this case, strengthening state enterprises compared 
to private or foreign enterprises will benefit this group of workers while recognizing labour 
flexibility is precisely what migrant labour forces desire. 
This dilemma was caused by China‘s duality of public ownership existent before the 
reform and was not solved but complicated by the process of commodification and 
generalization. It not only created confrontation between labour and capital, but also 
contradictory demands internal to the division. It is hence questionable whether mere 
flexibility is capable of handling different demands altogether. The two groups of labourers 
will compete with each other, one for flexibility and taking chances to be an urban citizen, 
the other for stability and retaining the privilege in appropriating state assets. Legalization 
of labour relation could strengthen the current outcomes, but is incapable of solving all 
problems when definition of labour-related issues is related to the whole social structure. 
China‘s accession to WTO accelerates the pace of economic reform and makes the 
segmented labour market highly problematic. Also social disquiet rises rapidly showing 
that re-distribution of benefits of growth is much required by a ―harmonious society‖. For 
Zou, it is in this context that the national government adopted three major pieces of 
regulations in 2007: the Labour Contract Law, Employment Promotion Law and the 
Labour Mediation and Arbitration Law. The most important of them is the Labour 
Contract Law, whose provisions try to ―strengthen employment contracts, impose broad 
obligations on employers to prevent the underpayment of wages, increase the rights of 
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unions and workers representatives at the enterprise, provide for the transmission of 
employee entitlements when a firm restructures, and regulate the use of dispatch 
labour‖.146 The Labour Contract Law has addressed some gaps in the 1994 labour Law 
such as detailed regulation of the formation of labour contracts and the regulation of 
dispatch labour according to experiments first starting in Shanghai in 1994. It sets ―two 
years as the minimum employment period with a labour dispatching agency, and 
introduces a system of licensing and registration of such agencies‖.147  
However, comments were varied towards the legislation of Labour Contract Law, and 
several parties were involved in the process of its two readings. Collective labour contract 
was emphasized in these laws, but it was also seen as a measure of industry policy. 
According to Liisi Karinidi‘s research, in the consultation of comments from foreign 
enterprises, the EUCCC (the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China) and the 
USCBC (the US-China Business Council) both pointed out the negative impact for foreign 
investment by limiting the employee‘s flexibility. Other organizations such as the Shanghai 
Association of Human Resources management in Multinational Companies and some 
Taiwanese and Hong Kong businesses with investments in mainland China even 
threatened to withdraw investments once this kind of law was going to be implemented.
148
  
The promotion of trade union status becomes quite controversial in the process of 
legislating Labour Contract Law, when the first reading required a strong role played by 
trade unions in approving collective contracts. The EU and US Union all published their 
comments and their worry in fact lay in the correlation of trade union organization with the 
Party. It easily becomes a policy instrument to impose economic nationalism on private 
and foreign enterprises. In Zimmerman‘s account,149 while trade unions in state enterprises 
are absent or ineffective, trade unions in the multinational companies almost set an 
example for establishing enterprise trade unions in China, than assumed oppositely. After 
the Labour Contract Law, it is Wal-mart firstly set up the trade union in enterprises. In this 
case, trade unions required to be set up in foreign enterprises would cause discrimination in 
policy implementing, for which reason they were making effort to remove these 
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requirements from the second reading. In the end, representation of labour in the trade 
union was less concerned than legalization of labour protection.
150
 
The difficulty of establishing modern employment relations in China unpacks the 
complexities in the ‗socialist modernization‘ in the constitution. It is never an easy 
combination, but an entangled interplay of law, politics and economy. In this entanglement, 
even the function of law will be changed. As Cynthia and Seth have put the controversy,  
―The paradoxical toleration of management domination of the ACFTU‘s enterprise 
union chapters is emblematic of the paradoxical nature of Communist China‘s 
embrace of capitalist-led development‖. While ―the relatively egalitarian character 
of the pre-1978 Chinese economy may render comprehensible the notion that the 
participants of an enterprise were all in it together and required no separate 
representation. The question, though, is how that notion has managed to survive in 
the decades since the advent of the ‗labour contract system‘ and the 
commodification of labour, the introduction and growth of private profit-making 
enterprises, and the spectacular economic inequalities that have followed.‖151  
3.6. A brief summary 
Reforms after 2003 begin to reflect a stabilized structure as a result of the 1990s reforms 
outcome. For one thing, the two-tiered frame prevents China from full-scale privatization 
and in the 2007 financial crisis China gained the advantage of having been lagged behind. 
For another thing, fragments occur not only between the property owners and labour forces, 
but also internal to labour forces, which makes the proposition of ―harmonization‖ less 
possible. If we simplify the social transformation as only entitling rights and making law, 
as Potter‘s account of ―a legitimacy claim about the tension between property rights and 
rights to development‖,152 the constitutional issues concerned will be reduced. This 
balancing and reconfiguration among categories of ‗rights‘ does not answer whether the 
‗rights‘ claim is in effect void and law is separated from its functions to protect. 
Constitutionalization is not a unitary metaphor of fragmented responses, I argue; it is a 
defragmentation and exposure of the gaps. It rather necessitates a distinction between 
―legalization‖ and ―constitutionalization‖ in China‘s context.  
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Toward ―hybridity‖ of China‘s private law system, different focus will generate different 
theorization about China‘s institutional achievements in the past three decades. While 
Chinese libertarians tend to see the formalization of legal system as a great step to the ideal 
of ―Rule of Law‖, the New Left compliments the Chinese model against the ―Washington 
Consensus‖ -- a Western-imposed legal science and state/market divide. But how could 
there be so radical and opposing views on the Reform process? This excess from economic 
field to constitutional theories will be touched in the next chapter. 
4. Summary of this chapter 
In this chapter, I reviewed the process of China‘s economic reform and the establishment 
of China‘s private law system. Through it, I highlighted how law serves the formulation of 
legal personality from the socialist institutions and facilitates the economic reform. 
Correspondingly, the economy-centred reform also gives private law priorities in the whole 
process of legal reform in China. 
The reform history shows the initiation, acceleration and discontinuity during the process, 
in which I put more emphasis on the 1990s reforms. It is an intensified period of the 1980s 
reforms and comprehensively shaped the economic structure of contemporary China. The 
third phase of the reform from 2003 has a characteristic of generalizing the 
already-in-shape property relations and labour relations into legal form and civil code, and 
communicating them with the world society in a formally shared language of ‗law‘. But 
the compromised effects of globalization in China reveal that there is substantive 
divergence beneath superficial convergence, which also blurs the prospect of China‘s 
future reforms. 
This entanglement of law, politics and economy is condensed in its outcomes: the 
―socialist market economy‖ and the ―socialist rule of law‖. However, there is no sufficient 
explanation for how this combination is possible. By unpacking the historical process, I 
intend to point out how legal formulation has contributed to the economic reform while for 
another thing, how this building of ―Rule of Law‖ is biased with a market orientation.  
As I have repeated in this chapter, it is important to understand the movement ―from status 
to contract‖ in China. The ―Socialist public ownership‖ relies on working units and 
people‘s communes to be substantial. People benefited from state assets and collective 
organizations by means of concrete membership, which also determined a strict control on 
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migration. This makes the adoption of two contract responsibility systems in urban and 
rural areas significant for the reform process. By gaining this personality, movements 
across regions, industries and enterprises become possible. This might be the reason for 
applying ―contract theory‖ in conceiving constitutionalism, and the individual liberty that 
libertarians seek from it. 
But we should notice there were no equal parties before the contract, and there was no 
alternative of not contracting. This contract without freedom means an imposition of the 
effects of the contract instead of the will of making contracts. It hence betrays the freedom 
of contract as its spirit, and problematizes the autonomy thesis of legal subjects that 
libertarians wish to get from this contract process. And if flexibility of movements is 
indeed a gain from this process, as these scholars take defence, then at least it assumes that 
flexibility and market freedom are privileged over other human rights such as workers‘ 
securities. 
Hence apart from the phenomenon of legalization, the function of legalization and entitling 
of rights are questioned. What is the implication when we give primary consideration to 
contract and market freedom as the very definition of human rights and gist of legalization? 
Legal constitutionalism could not explain the selective protection of human rights by law 
during China‘s transition, and degradation of the working class by law when they only 
exchange their life-long membership for a formal right to be employed. 
China‘s New Left acknowledges well that many reforms were initiated by the Party and 
government policies, which were the ―soft norms‖ in China. These experiments were 
illegal if rigid understanding of the Socialist ownership was applied. Hence unlike 
normative assumptions, the New Left contributes to the facticity of the reform process. It is 
the governance model that played a more important role in the reform process and 
continues to do so in converting future reforms from ―state capitalism‖ to ―socialist market 
economy‖.153 They are right in detecting instrumental use of law in China‘s Reform 
Period and instead proposing a social use of ―law‖. But in the meantime, this ―use‖ rather 
implies that ―law‖ for them is rather lacking functional specificity of law. They are in 
effect sharing with libertarians in reading law technical; though the former insists on 
instrumentalism while the latter formalism. 
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Kerry Rittich‘s comments on the post-Washington Consensus programme to re-orient to 
―the social‖ could be borrowed here to ask the New Left, ―in what ways and to what extent 
do second generation reforms represent‖ a rupture or continuation, an overlap or 
conflict.
154
 Without returning to the ―constitutive‖ function of China‘s private law reform, 
fragmentation of law will always follow the fragmented rationality to solve problems of a 
constitutional nature. And the ―harmonization‖ thesis is not different from this co-option. 
The deficit caused by the first-round deprivation of socialist welfare now turns to be the 
second-round dependence on state capacity to compensate, which justifies the importance 
of economic growth and economic sovereignty. The pie has to be created bigger in order to 
give equity a share.  
But in this chapter, I confine myself to making sense of the institutional changes and the 
structure of ―socialist market economy‖, before justifying this governance model 
immediately as ―constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics‖. Yet it is important to 
reveal the instrumental use of law in the reform process, and consequently the insufficient 
problematization of legal fragments. 
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“Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics”: 
Many Constitutions in China 
 
Introduction 
After three-decade reforms, a relatively modern legal system is developing in China. But 
criticisms toward the lack of judicial autonomy continue to shadow China‘s legal reform. 
This puts the phenomenon of legalization under examination. While Stanley Lubman 
doubts whether China has a legal system due to inconsistency of concepts, Donald Clarke 
problematizes whether China has a legal system functioning equivalently to the Western 
institutions. Rather, Thomas Stephens suggests, it might be more precisely described as a 
disciplinarian system.
1
 Randall Peerenboom contends that these arguments ignored 
China‘s great effort in rationalizing its legal institutions and increasing involvement in the 
international society. Instead, keeping a ―thin‖ rule of law as the common ground for 
discourses is more productive than sacrificing piecemeal improvements totally. His views 
are shared by most Chinese scholars who work on the legal ―reforms‖. A ―thick‖ rule of 
law will immediately invite socio-political and cultural-traditional debates, as the 
propositions of indigenization of law and Left Confucianism in China show. 
But in fact, except for scholars who insist on legal constitutionalism, there has been a 
marked shift away from treating China‘s case as a ―corruption‖ of the Rule of Law ideal, to 
a position of questioning the universal ―truth‖ of what is transplanted from the West. Legal 
formalism with a special affinity to the American model, which was a theme throughout 
the 1980s to 1990s, is now under attack, both as an ideological imposition and as 
empirically imprecise. Critiques vary from fieldwork practices; to even a cultural war on 
modernity. This chapter hence is dedicated to exploring the other level of the story of 
China‘s constitutionalization: constitutional re-imaginations. 
In China, it means that by arguing ―constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics‖, we 
could turn a deficit of the ideal type to a reflection on China‘s own constitutional orders. 
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The hybrid process of institutional changes hence no longer implies a certain ―telos‖, but 
instead opens multiple potentials. So different from the ―constitution‖, this chapter is 
devoted to ―constitutionalism‖, or more precisely speaking, to the ―legitimacy claims‖ 
underlying it, as Kaarlo Tuori puts it.
2
 It is meant to argue that, besides the institutional 
and material changes as I examined, there is also a battlefield on what counts as 
―constitutional‖ at the conceptual level. 
This chapter delineates three new conceptions as political constitutionalism, economic 
constitutionalism and social constitutionalism in accordance with their main claims and 
their intended departure from classical constitutionalism applied in China. At the end of 
this chapter, I argue that these re-imaginations could be linked to shifts of constitutional 
theories in a bigger map. 
1. Political constitutionalism in China 
China‘s political constitutionalism is a recent body of scholarship that recognizes the limits 
of legal constitutionalism. As Stephanie Balme and Micheal Dowdle correlate the move to 
political jurisprudence with ―the Chinese leadership‘s infamous resistance to 
democratization that the real motor for China‘s present-day constitutionalization seems to 
lie. Chinese resistance to democratization appears to have encouraged authorities to 
advance ‗rule of law‘ (and associated law reform) as political legitimacy substitutes for 
democratization.‖3 The lesson from Anglo-American constitutionalism increasingly turns 
to be presented as ―an alternative to democracy, rather than an articulation of democracy.‖ 
4
 
It also stems from an attempt to put constitutionalism in an interdisciplinary perspective. 
As Chen Duanhong, a professor of constitutional law in Peking University, argues, 
―studying constitutionalism in a country that has a master-text but lacks mechanisms of 
constitutional review, and in a country where the text could only reflect limited political 
facts, constitutionalism with such a quality (namely, legal constitutionalism) is not only 
unable to be founded, nor is it useful even if there is possibilities.‖5Instead, political 
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constitutionalists propose to extend the constitutional inquiry into real political existence. 
The normative question, for them, is not law in the books, but what functions as the 
effective order in China. 
1.1. Constituent power and fundamental laws in China 
Chen indeed brings an important concept back to constitutional discussions in China. 
Though being a familiar concept in classical constitutionalism, constituent power is a 
stranger for most Chinese legal reformers, who try to establish a purely legal discipline. It 
could be said that Chen starts from a Western theoretical tradition before moving back to 
China‘s context step by step. 
Chen‘s arguments on constituent power has undergone three stages, namely,  
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emmanuel Sieyes, and China‘s Party-state, separately reflected in 
three papers collected in his book Constituent power and the Fundamental Law. Chen 
firstly uses Rousseau for his resolution of the representation question in modern democracy, 
which is best put in the title of the paper: ―the people must be present‖.6 To solve the 
dilemma of popular sovereignty, the resort to ―constituent power‖ other than 
―constitutional law‖ is needed, so that the people are not only governed by government but 
also set it up and decide its continuity. This doctrine of constant revolutions is Rousseau‘s 
great contribution. Different from legislative power, constituent power ‗decides‘ the 
political existence of the whole community, which is a sovereign decision.
7
 Chen hence 
introduces an important concept to interpret what legal constitutionalism could not, namely, 
what makes law law? 
After bringing the duality of law and politics back into sight around constitutionalism, 
Chen makes his second move to the specific question of ―constitution-founding moment‖, 
about which he argues that Sieyes completes Rousseau with the intermediate of 
―extraordinary representatives‖. While constituent power is conceivable in theory, 
constitution making is a represented act by representatives, than pure presence of the 
people. Chen hence turns to emphasize a division between extraordinary representatives 
and ordinary representatives, and accordingly develops four epochs from the three in 
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Sieyes‘s delineation of the constitution-making process.8 By dissolving the dichotomy of 
constituent power and constituted government, presence and representation, and the 
exceptional and the normal, Chen adds a chronological element of ―extraordinary 
representation‖ and connects the two sides. And now Chen converts his argument to one 
that suggests that ―the people are neither present nor absent‖.9  
From this step, Chen could fully concentrate on the ―extraordinary representatives‖ in 
China‘s history, which is the third stage. Notably, as the ―extraordinary representatives‖ 
are closely related to the constitution-founding moment, there is a strong historical 
dimension to Chen‘s theory. He asks then what is the first constitution in China? Instead of 
that of the 1954, Chen argues that the 1949 Common Program was what lay the foundation 
for the political community and the nation state of China.
10
 But if we were to concentrate 
on the rare moment of exerting constituent power in history, how could Chen explain 
China‘s constant even discontinuous constitutional changes that followed? 
Facing the question of continuous attribution, Chen finally argues that the continuity lies in 
a reflection of what indeed functions as a constitution in China. Equivalent to limitation of 
state power and protection of rights as in the Capitalist constitution, Socialist China has 
five fundamental laws: the leadership of the CCP, Socialism, democratic centralism, 
Socialist construction and fundamental rights.
11
 By coupling these five laws and defining 
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anew ―the constitution‖, however, the problematization of discontinuity almost could find 
nowhere to register. Chen in fact internalizes the discontinuity as the series of constant 
revolutions he borrows from Rousseau, and CCP in this sense as constituent power 
co-exists with the constituted power of the NPC.
12
 When legal constitutionalists face the 
difficulty to explain ―benign unconstitutionality‖, Chen treats it precisely in terms of the 
characteristics of the reform-era China: the self-transformation of the socialist party-state. 
It is interesting to observe how Chen starts from classical constitutionalism and reverses it 
to a constitution with Chinese characteristics. By inserting extraordinary representatives 
between constituent power and constituted government, Chen‘s key argument is that the 
people are neither present nor lost in parliamentary representation. And in different 
countries, these representatives could be played by different actors, such as the Party in 
China. By surrendering the constitutional paradox to an argument about sequence, 
historical facts of who formed the nation and community surrender classical 
constitutionalism to plural equivalences, such as a Party-state constitution. 
1.2. Jiang Shigong’s “unwritten constitution” in China 
Jiang derives his theory from careful studies of Carl Schmitt and Michel Foucault,
13
 as 
they both provide critical insights on formalism of law. Jiang diagnoses the mainstream 
scholarly discourse in China is preoccupied with legal formalism ―in order to adapt to 
international standard‖, which he criticizes as in fact an ―end-of-history-esque‖ ideology.14 
What‘s more, to examine whether legal constitutionalism is an applicable solution in China, 
we also have to examine the Western ideal in its own context. Jiang argues that Chinese 
legal constitutionalists rather misunderstand complexities of the Western tradition, accept 
the American model unconditionally and contrast its written form with the British 
unwritten constitution. In such a case, amending the written constitution and effectuating 
judicial implementation of the text becomes the monopolistic theme for Chinese scholars.  
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But it is an illusion that Jiang will deconstruct. The American model is rather an 
exceptional case while the British one is the norm. Jiang uses K. C. Wheare‘s 
reconstruction of the concepts to mean that ―written constitution‖ is but a part of 
―unwritten constitution‖. Jiang devotes great effort to studying the functioning logic of 
American legal system and its evolution to conclude that it is the constitutional convention 
that matters more than the dictation of the constitutional text. By converting the paradigm 
to ―unwritten constitution‖, Jiang aims to replace the normative base of constitutionalism 
and overrule the legal tradition of positivism, which Larry Cata Backer characterises as an 
adoption of Foucault‘s critical point of law as a disciplinary instrument.15 And he intends 
to negate the positivist rationality of law in service of equivalent proposals that China‘s 
experience could provide. 
So after deconstructing of the western ideal type, Jiang turns to systematically explore 
China‘s constitutional resources as they are expressed in real practices. He states his 
intention and methodology as being, ―to examine ‗what the real constitution is in political 
life,‘ or ‗what the effective constitution is‘ by adhering to a value-free stance in historical 
and empirical research‖;16 and ―to restore the prestige and status of constitutional 
jurisprudence as a political and social science.‖17 Jiang calls it ―effective constitution (19)‖ 
or ―substantive law‖ approach. Four constitutional norms, if not laws, are explored as: the 
Party‘s Constitution playing the substantive role and the NPC as ―Rubber Stamp‖; the 
Trinity system
18
 unified by the chairman of the PRC; the local-central doctrine of 
―initiatives from two sources‖; the Hong Kong Basic Law as constitutional statutes. For 
Jiang, the Party constitution is essentially one part of China‘s political existence in the 
form of a constitutional convention. 
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But then, what is the relationship between this constitutional convention and the written 
constitution of 1982? This leads to his fourth point that China‘s 1982 Constitution, 
different from its precedents, signifies an achievement of institutionalization, and this 
institutionalization confirms rather than undermines the constitutional status of CCP, 
which could be compared to a ―constitutional monarchy‖.19 For Jiang, the future 
constitutional reforms lie in the inception of the Party Constitution as integral to 
constitutional norms, but apparently, the institutionalization of the Party under the 
constitution does not mean more than reference to it.
20
  
Unlike Backer, Jiang insists that China‘s party-state system is neither the Western nor the 
Soviet Union versions. The two are both part of a Judeo-Christian tradition
21
 that does not 
follow the organic development of China‘s society. This is why China, especially after 
1982, pursues a quite different track from Russia.
22
 ―Chinese culture and theology tend to 
embrace a more cyclical temporality‖,23 and this is the reason why ―Communist ideology 
ultimately failed to integrate into the Chinese ethos, and cannot be used as a spiritual pillar 
supporting the Chinese people.‖24 With this Jiang is denouncing the incorporation of 
China‘s case into the orthodox Marxist paradigm. Rather, the ―Two Bodies of the King‖ 
might best capture Jiang‘s proposal for the Party-state. 
Jiang‘s writing does succeed in extending the horizon of constitutional discussions in 
China to real practices. In China‘s reform period, party policies dramatically transformed 
the society ahead of law. Instead of using the paradoxical term ―benign 
unconstitutionality‖, Jiang insists on putting the Party constitution as one source alongside, 
and with reference to, by the written Constitution. This constitutionalization of party 
discipline, however, does not mean there is any mechanism to hold the Party accountable. 
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1.3. Larry Cata Backer’s political/administrative distinction for 
China’s Party-state 
In Backer‘s writings, a genealogical and typological mapping of constitutionalism is placed 
first. ―Since 1945 three values variants have emerged within constitutionalism. The oldest 
is nationalist constitutionalism,‖ and American and French constitutions are exemplary. 
Since 1945 transnational constitutionalism has emerged as a powerful force, which is 
―grounded in a constitutional value system derived from the common constitutional 
traditions of the community of states evidenced either in shared practices and values, 
customary international law norms or memorialized international rules in the form of 
treaties and conventions.‖ Since the 1970s, ―(t)heocratic constitutionalism is grounded in 
the embrace of the rule of law principle of state construction, but implemented on the basis 
of and through the rule systems of a single religion‖.25  
From the start, Backer treats classical constitutionalism as one variant based on the 
Western tradition and under certain historical conditions. This spares Backer from arguing 
negation of classical constitutionalism, as Jiang and Chen had to do; and his mission is 
rather to choose a coherent model to apply to China‘s practices. As he argues, classical 
constitutionalism ―is best understood as a system of classification for the purpose of 
judging the legitimacy of state governance systems as conceived and as applied, grounded 
in the fundamental postulate of law governance.‖26 It is a self-referential narrative;27 and 
its status as ―the privileged template for legitimate constitutional expression‖ has 
―burdened the scientific development of Chinese constitutionalism‖.28 Being grounded in 
its Marxist-Leninist framework, China‘s Party-State constitutionalism has more similarity 
with the theocratic constitutionalism of Iran. And it should be examined how and whether 
it is workable. 
Backer understands the division of labour between the Party and the state in the familiar 
sense of the political/administrative distinction, famously developed in Alexis de 
Tocqueville‘s theory. The political role is assigned to the Party, as China‘s ―integration‖ is 
made possible through the Party. This especially concerns the understanding of the 
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function of the ―vanguard party‖. Backer contends that Party membership is functionally 
equivalent to political citizenship in the West. ―The holders of political citizenship – Party 
members – then serve within the party as the forces for social cohesion…and outside the 
Party in a fiduciary capacity to all people in the political community who are holders of 
social and economic rights, but who lack political rights.‖29 The CCP hence could not be 
interpreted as a western party competing in elections and representing interest groups, but 
an all-people party – a party that is responsible for state integration. Backer argues that, it 
is clearly manifested in the new-era guideline of ―Three Represents‖30 that transgresses 
class sectors. 
Hence ―the political‖ means for Backer not antagonism and party competition, but ―party 
as polity‖. The state, on the other hand, is responsible for administration and management 
of government, and citizens outside the Party are participating through economic and 
social rights. Backer describes it as ―a division of the character of citizenship between 
economic and social citizenship, claimed by all persons, and political citizenship, which 
can be exercised through the Party‖.31 The CCP‘s obligations to the people concern 
―knowledge‖ rather than ―engagement‖.32 Backer hence leaves a chasm regarding the 
understanding of ―the political‖, between the over-political sense of integration and 
under-political enjoying of social benefits.  
In interpreting the party-state, Backer differs from Jiang, as he understands China as 
remaining in the track of socialism, and the Party‘s function in civic education is the 
justification of its leadership and supra-state status. The constitutional mechanism hence 
should be embodied within the Party, instead of the opposite. But this for Jiang, means 
―unconstitutionality‖ of the party could never arise. No matter whether this disagreement is 
only about the use of terms, their critical difference lies in Backer‘s emphasis on the 
hegemonic function of the Party over the state and the constitution compared with Jiang‘s 
emphasis on voluntary self-discipline of the Party under the constitution. 
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1.4. Corrupted people and the constitutional moment 
Gao Quanxi represents a ‗school‘ of Chinese scholars who have been insisting on a 
Hayekian-model of legal constitutionalism for a long time. And following Chen‘s political 
constitutionalism, Gao proposes his own as a response and redress. He defines ―political 
constitutionalism‖ as a sub-category of constitutionalism which is applied only in 
exceptional times, namely, the founding moment and the declining moment. 
In effect, Gao has limited political constitutionalism to the genesis of a legal constitution 
rather than the kind of substitution of legal constitutionalism that Chen conceives. The 
moment of political constitutionalism is the re-presence of the people. But where should 
we find ―the people‖? Gao discerns the use of ―the people‖ at four levels: as political 
community, as the sovereign, as extraordinary representatives for the constitution making, 
and as ordinary citizens. The third level is especially tailored to the debate with Chen. And 
Gao further categorises it into three forms in history: the form adopted by French 
revolution, the British-American counter-revolution, and the Socialist revolution. Gao 
describes the British-American one as the paradigm of ―counter-revolutionary revolution‖. 
By using the term, Gao is embracing the paradigm of civic republicanism of Bruce 
Ackerman.
33
 It means that China is at a critical phase of founding constitutionalism, which 
demands presence of the people; yet ―the people‖ is corrupted as they are living as private 
individuals who only mind pursuing their own interests. Henceforth, at this disjunction 
between constitutional emergency and the decline of the constitutional spirit, it is the 
Hegelian dialectic about ―the people‖ themselves that is vital, which is to say, a move from 
revolutionizing (the old constitution) to counter-revolution (in the new constitution).  
It is the citizens‘ self-revolution that bridges the two ends. Against Chen, Gao deems 
constant revolutions of the Party as signs of absence of the constituent power. And to opt 
out of this logic necessitates a ―passive revolution‖ of citizens. Formerly a legal 
constitutionalist, Gao interprets political constitutionalism only in a perspective of genesis. 
Different from Chen‘s treatment of political constitutionalism as a normal model, Gao puts 
it in the exception. While it is a valuable insight to distinguish the normal from the 
exceptional, law and pure politics, Gao‘s ―counter-revolutionary revolution‖ treats passive 
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self-education of citizens as the only alternative to the revolutionary tradition of the Party. 
Presence of ―the People‖, hence for Gao, is the education of citizenship and civic virtue. 
This makes his political constitutionalism left with a thin layer as the ―presupposition‖ than 
the genuine ―presence‖ of the people. 
1.5. Summary of political constitutionalism in China 
Political constitutionalism in China is indeed a new attempt to broaden the study of 
China‘s constitution in an interdisciplinary approach and to initiate a realistic observation 
on how China‘s political life works. These authors are criticizing legal constitutionalists as 
deeply ignorant of the framework of China‘s constitution. Advocating constitutional 
adjudication in this context by legal constitutionalists marks a paradigmatic shift though in 
the name of the neutrality of legal formalism.  
The Party-state is brought to the fore of discussions and produces different interpretations. 
While Backer is arguing that China is developing in the track of Marxism-Leninism, with 
the Party educating while being fiduciary to the people, Jiang is distancing China‘s case 
from Russia by insisting on the mass line against bureaucratization, and hence we could 
say, against a fully formed duality of politics/administration that Backer conceives. For 
Jiang the reform period is a revision to Communism after the Cultural Revolution and a 
return to ―Chinese characteristics‖, namely Confucianism ―Tianxia Weigong (The world is 
held in common)‖ as its organic source34. Confucianism differs from communism in 
denouncing the teleology of history, which means Jiang rather prefers a picture of 
dynamics between the Party (also representing the mass) and state, to the ―social cohesion‖ 
of Backer. However, we should keep in mind that the 1982 Constitution does matter to the 
divide within political constitutionalism, as institutionalization of the Party status in the 
constitution concerns whether the party leadership is either a reference point by Jiang, or 
Supra-state by Backer.  
By borrowing constituent power from classical constitutionalism, political 
constitutionalists in China undermine the normative forces of the constitutional text and 
human rights prescriptions, and opt instead for re-discovery of functional equivalences in 
indigenous social orders. Yet, this critical streak of ―constituent power‖ quickly fades and 
surrenders itself to uncritical acceptance of state ideology and political culture.  
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2. China’s economic constitutionalism 
I use the term of ―economic constitutionalism‖ to indicate studies on China‘s political 
economy initiated by scholars who attempt to make sense of China‘s ―miracle‖ in recent 
decades and against the overwhelming pressure of economic globalization. By pursuing a 
path different from complete privatization, China‘s state capacity is said to be preserved in 
terms of crisis prevention, and manifested in dealing with poverty, labour protection and 
economic sovereignty against full-scale financialization. This makes China‘s governance 
increasingly studied as an innovative experiment. While liberal economists persistently 
criticize it as ―state capitalism‖ or ―crony capitalism‖,35 Left-wing economists are 
claiming China‘s economic practices in fact enrich knowledge of economics with the 
theory of ―bundle of rights‖, and separation between ownership and rights to use.   
2.1. “Crony capitalism” or preservation of “state capacity”? 
The 1982 Constitution and its amendments show a strong concern with regard to economic 
reforms. Market freedom for a state transitioning from planned economy is appealing and 
correlated with many conceptions, such as ―from status to contract‖, ―from 
obligation-oriented to rights-oriented‖. These phrases are constantly cited and asserted by 
economists and private law professors. Though Deng Zhenglai, the main advocate of 
Hayek‘s theory in China, is meant to promote cultural evolution and methodological 
individualism,
36the increased interest is closely related to Hayek‘s criticism of planned 
economy. The most manifest evidence for economic centrality lies in the constitutional 
changes themselves and the official ideology that compromised egalitarianism and 
replaced it with Deng Xiaoping‘s advocating ―to get wealthy is glorious (Zhi Fu Guang 
Rong)‖.37 The Socialist ―social contract‖ was broken for the sake of mobility and the 
liquidation of state assets. The Iron Rice Bowl was smashed to explore potentials for 
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competition and efficiency. Critics only worry about the ―cronyism‖ of the market 
economy, and hence express demands for greater market openness and transparency.
38
  
Till the staging of China‘s New Left in the late 1990s, there were no other explanations 
offered for the Chinese model of economic reforms. It was said that Wang Shaoguang in 
the early 1990s had already realized the necessity of ―state‖ functioning in the process of 
establishing market economy. He drafted a report with another scholar (Hu Angang) on the 
issue of state capacity and submitted it to the central government. China‘s subsequent 
reforms witnessed its effect and Wang‘s emphasis on the preservation of state capacity.39   
Wang rejects being seen as a New Left scholar, but rather a liberal Left.
40
 His idea is to 
detach political arguments from debates about regime types, and re-connect to state 
capacity. And the most important state capacity is the capacity of accumulation,
41
 which is 
especially reflected in the success of China‘s 1994 Tax-Sharing Reform. This reform 
fundamentally changed deficits in the central government and its heavy reliance on local 
governments. From then on it gained more power to tackle with local protectionism, 
maintain strong economic sovereignty and arrange economic planning through transfer 
payments. Wang proposes a constitutional model based on tax sharing that participation of 
local governments in deciding transfer payments should be constitutionalized.
42
 Huang has 
elaborated that Wang ―called for China‘s moving from a premodern ‗tax state‘ to a modern 
‗budget state‘ for the purpose of establishing legislative oversight of the state budget.‖43  
Therefore, corresponding to the ―dual tracks‖ of plan and market in economics, Wang 
focuses on ―a state system of divided power between the centre and localities‖ in political 
theory. The tax reform signifies re-centralization and re-regulation against unregulated 
marketization, which makes Wang Left-oriented. And the economic sovereignty China 
preserves enables it to respond to the call for social equity in the new century. As Wang 
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argues in one paper of his book that, ―while capital could employ labour, labour could also 
employ capital‖.44  
In this sense, adaptive capacity
45
 in the process of agenda setting is more important than 
election politics, Wang deems political legitimacy should be discussed as ―to what extent 
do the policy priorities of the public and of the government correspond across time?‖46 Six 
models
47
 have existed and shifted their importance in contemporary China. The public 
pressure model is increasingly significant, while the closed-door one is hardly ever applied.  
Wang‘s proposal hence is similar to post-democracy in discussing responsive government, 
which does expand the field of political theories, such as taking economic democracy
48
 
into consideration. In this theory, what the government could do is more important than 
who comprise the government, which is also closely connected to the state capacity in his 
economic theory. 
2.2. Philip C. C. Huang: “informal economy” and 
“service-oriented state” 
As a sociologist, Huang prefers detailed and scientific studies, and he has done important 
research on informal labour
49
 in China. He finds that official statistics is unreliable, as the 
foundational categories of ―employee-workers‖ are flawed by outdated ideology and 
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 There are two main points to be noted, ―first is the focus on a 
minority of relatively high status group of formal (white collar) employees and (blue collar) 
workers along with state officials, to the neglect of the majority of the workforce; second is 
the mistaken equation of the self-employed among China‘s labouring peasants and workers 
with ‗private entrepreneurs‘ and ‗private enterprises‘‖.51 By taking the self-employed 
labourers and semi-proletarian migrant workers into consideration, Huang converts the 
image to ―the realistic comprehension of China‘s labouring people‖ that in fact informal 
labour is the majority of China‘s labour force. ―The rise and spread of that informal 
economy is the truly big social story of China‘s economic development in the Reform 
period.‖52  
The exploration of ―informal labour‖ has theoretical importance for founding a whole set 
of theories to study China compared to the overreliance on western categories. From 
economics to sociology, there is a revealing trend of ―Americanization‖. For instance, 
China‘s right-wing economists adopted W. Arthur Lewis‘s model of ―economic dualism‖53 
to argue that the resolution to ―China‘s rural problems can be found only in urbanization 
and vigorous development of the modern urban sector to draw away rural labour‖.54 In 
correspondence, sociologists states that China is on the path of transitioning from ―a 
pyramid society‖ to ―an olive society‖ with a ―new middle class‖.55   
To the contrary, Huang depicts the reality as ―the persistence of peasants, and hence also of 
peasant-workers and the petty bourgeoisie‖ comprising the majority of workforce, which 
implies that actually ―a flask shape‖ social structure. And the danger is that ―such a 
flask-shaped social structure would become a long-term feature of society, with a minority 
high-income modern formal economy sitting atop a majority base of low-income informal 
workers and peasants‖.56   
As a social scientist, Huang is arguing that an integrated labour market and a legal 
definition of formal labour is not the reality of China, but a theoretical projection imported 
from the West. The Chinese pattern of agricultural development is not a model of 
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urbanization, but ―capitalization without proletarianization‖.57 By rooting out theoretical 
commonality, Huang indeed challenges the telos of legal, economic and social studies in 
China and the applicability of Western social sciences as an analytical tool. He argues that 
China is pursuing a third path, neither neo-institutional economics nor orthodox Marxism. 
Rather, it is a ―third hand‖ experiment that uses the appreciation of public property in the 
marketplace to establish a social fund, and challenges the state/market division that has 
been prevalent in market economy. This hybrid and service-oriented state shows ―an 
appropriate balance between the market for creativity, dynamism, and competition and the 
state for oversight, support, and social equity.‖58  
Again, it is not clear how to make sense of this appropriate balancing. While in the past 
decades, ―informal labour‖ in China under discrimination and least protection sustained 
China‘s economic miracle based on ―state capitalism‖, Huang holds the belief that we 
could convert it to ―socialist market economy‖. Experiments have already been carried on 
in Chongqing, one of China‘s four municipalities but in poorer conditions economically 
and geographically. It deploys China‘s unique land system to develop 
public-private-partnership, according to a design of Cui Zhiyuan. 
2.3. Cui Zhiyuan and “petty bougeousie socialism” 
Like his mentor Roberto Unger, Cui also puts experimentation as a central feature of his 
writings, and he demands a conceptual recognition of China‘s ‗gradualism‘ in contrast to 
Russian ―shock therapy‖ in the arrangement of market, democracy and society. 
―Institutional fetishism animates and vitiates the terminology of gradualism and shock 
therapy: the false belief that abstract institutional conceptions, like the market economy 
and representative democracy, have a natural and necessary form, namely the form 
established in the rich industrial countries. In fact, there are different ways of organizing 
market economies and representative democracies.‖59  
For developing countries, democratic experimentalism is better to take a step-by-step than 
a comprehensive form in order to explore broadened potentials, which he describes as ―the 
functional equivalents to the prefordist conditions of postfordism.‖60 What China could 
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provide is its ―disintegrated‖ property rights in opposition to the Western ―consolidated‖ 
rights. This innovation assumes a ―bundle of rights‖ view of property which can be 
distributed between different holders rather than concentrated in one single entity. This 
hence reconstitutes property rights and also the social space. It substitutes the question of 
―who is the owner‖ for ―how to disintegrate and recombine the bundle‖. In this sense, 
property re-emerges as ―an important category in legal and political theory‖.   
With such a bridge, Cui steps from pure economics into social and political dimensions. 
Borrowing the ―liberal socialism‖61 of James Meade -- a Nobel Prize winner in economics 
in 1977 -- which is used in international transactions, Cui adapts it to the public/private 
property relation in China, and designs a program of market appreciation of public 
property used for building up an All-China social fund. As he puts it, 
―What is meant by ‗with Chinese characteristics‘? I maintain that it is the 
existence in China of a combination of socialized assets and a market economy. 
Because of this characteristic [the system] is not social democratic; it is not simply 
a matter of talking about equity and conducting secondary distribution but 
concerns the basic system of primary distribution, which is different from 
capitalism.‖62  
Instead of being a governmental issue of public distribution separated from the market 
mechanism, Cui argues that the market could also be used as a natural mechanism of 
appreciating public property, which is so scarce and consequently well appreciated. His 
resolution considers market as a free sphere instrumental for property transferrals, while at 
the same time public property would be competitive in the market, such as land resources. 
But why will public property always be highly appreciated than liquidated as in the 1990s? 
Is it a natural tendency devoid of governmental dimension? 
2.4. Summary of economic constitutionalism in China 
When talking about economic constitutionalism, the link that connects economics with 
constitutionalism is not immediate. However, with the global economy growing into a 
                                                          
61
 Cui argues it as a ―topsy-turvy nationalization‖ that gives ―residual claims‖ rights to the state as 
shareholder without granting control rights. See: Zhiyuan Cui (2006a), Liberal Socialism and the Future of 
China, available at: http://www.networkideas.org/featart/jan2006/Liberal_Socialism.pdf 
62
 Zhiyuan Cui (2006b) ―How to comprehend Today‘s China: an Interpretation of the ―‘Comparatively 
Well-Off Society‘‖. Contemporary Chinese Thought 37(4): X-XX. 
 109 
 
strong challenge to state regulatory capacity, responses to compelling market forces 
comprise legitimacy claim of government. How to resist marketization that turns all human 
rights into ―a phenomenal republic of interests‖63 and constantly pushes the dividing line 
of the public-private has touched the core of constitutionalism. 
But a deeper connection lies in how these scholars step from pure economics to political 
and legal theories. It is through the adaptive capacity for Wang, institutional 
experimentation for Cui, partnership between economic efficiency and social equity for 
Huang, and technocratic upgrading for Heilmann. In Clarke‘s terms, their proposals of 
―governance‖ build a ―flexibility constant‖64 within. This ―pragmatism‖ diffuses the 
polarity of market and state, contract and planning. Also in a sense of locality-centrality, 
the state re-regulation of local governments is the flipside of state de-regulation for the 
market to function well. State now acts as the guarantor of a well-functioning market 
economy, and economic sovereignty becomes the guarantor of democratization, in a 
―constitutional‖ sense. But I will argue, it is an excess of meaning of the ―constitution‖ 
made possible by ‗market mentality‘ (Chapter 9-10). 
3. Social Constitutionalism and Indigenization of Law in 
China 
When applying the term ―social constitutionalism‖ here, I intend to delineate constitutional 
proposals focusing on social networks, culture and traditions, different from institutional 
terms. Hence some of them appear to have no direct legal relevance. But allow me not to 
dispose of them too early. In respect of ―social constitutionalism‖ there are four main 
arguments concerning the uniqueness of Chinese society: informal social network, 
indigenization of law, Eastern Asian model and Confucianism respectively. 
3.1. China’s social network  
Among Chinese scholars, Liang Zhiping is said to be the first to become interested in 
comparative legal cultures. In his early writings, he mapped Chinese legal culture in a 
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linear progression toward the modern Western legal culture.
65
 As the legal reform ―rests 
on the outcome of cultural construction‖, in the 1980s he writes, ―a new civilization…is 
exactly our hope.‖66 But soon he began to stress that Eastern and Western legal cultures 
are different in paradigms but should enjoy equal recognition, and started to explore 
indigenous social conditions in China. 
He finds that in China a certain type of society has survived several political events and 
historical ruptures,
67
 which could not be conceived in a sense of State (government) and 
civil society. It could be equivalent to Peerenboom‘s term of ―social network‖.68 This 
society is non-political compared to the meaning of civil society. In contrast, it functions as 
a bridge between state and individuals. An example at hand will be the Household Contract 
Responsibility system in China.
69
 This opinion is echoed by Huang that it is a ―grey zone 
between formal state and informal society‖.70 The seeking of harmony is also found in 
unique practices of ―judicial mediation‖71 in China‘s system of adjudication. It 
exemplifies a kind of adjudication prioritizing resolution of conflicts through mediation 
and in consistency with requirements of harmony. 
In 1997 Liang writes that,  
―If we break away from the dichotomy of tradition and modernity, and abandon 
the practice of observing and criticizing with an arrogant attitude the ideas, 
behaviour and life-style of the peasantry, then we must admit that formal law, 
although often regarded as progressive, is not necessarily rational. Relatively 
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speaking, the normative knowledge of the peasantry is not necessarily less 
advanced or more irrational [simply] because of its traditional characteristics.‖72 
However, the approach taken by Huang and Liang concentrates too much on finding 
China‘s innovations and continuity of tradition in the present that sometimes they distort 
the similarity. For example, Huang compares a ―Dian‖ system in China‘s feudal period 
with the Household Responsibility System, as they both separate right to use from 
ownership of land.
73
 But as Huang himself puts it, the ―Dian‖ right is similar to a right to 
mortgage, deployed by poor peasants when they were in need of money that they could 
temporarily lease their private land for exchange. The Household Responsibility system 
came under the collective ownership of land after the completion of China‘s land reform. 
Against the bigger social context and structure, this equivalence building is too selective 




3.2. Zhu Suli: Indigenization of Law 
Zhu Suli is an important advocate of indigenization of law, but his argument is less 
culture-oriented than ―utilitarian‖,75 and more emphasis is put on China as a rural society. 
The modern, industrialized legal system is hence less related to the countryside and its 
unique ethics. This discrepancy has been long ignored in Chinese sociology of law and it 
produces a society having law, especially in the sense of state law, but without order. Zhu 
argues, legal system is less about legal dogmas,
76
 and should pay more attention to 
practical reasoning, namely, to ―link theory with practice‖ rather than ―develop theory 
from practice‖.77 Zhu indeed initiates a powerful ―constitutional‖ attack that ―(t)he modern 
rule of law as an institution cannot be built up by ‗legal transformation‘ or by 
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transplantation. It must be built from the indigenous resources of China. The reasons for 
this are found in the locality of knowledge and in limited rationality.‖78 
In the second volume of his book (Sending Law to the Countryside) on the People‘s Court 
at the basic level, Zhu carried out an empirical investigation against He‘s legal 
professionalism. Zhu contends that law is about dispute solving, and in the lower-level 
courts that deal with everyday life, a formalistic legal system is not competent enough to 
respond to people‘s needs. During great social transformations, it is better to keep a 
dual-track system, so to speak, with the basic level courtrooms focusing more on problem 
solving, while the appellant level for application of state rules.
79
 By gradually extending 
state laws to the countryside, people will be educated while needs of the weak will not be 
totally neglected. Zhu claims that he holds no value presumptions other than being 
pragmatic
80
 in his empirical studies, and he does not oppose a Party-led constitution as he 
deems that the CCP is the only power to overcome all the difficulties in further 
development and has proved itself throughout past tests. 
Zhu hence is a sympathizer of political constitutionalism. This is based on his realistic 
observation of CCP‘s political function of social integration and representation. The 
―system of party-state cross fertilization‖ has caused an intermingling of ―almost all of 
China‘s social, industrial, and educational organizations‖. And ―(t)his presumption of the 
bureaucratic state innately preceding the party is not applicable to modern China. As we 
saw, in modern China, the party preceded the bureaucratic state.‖81 The localized, 
premodern agricultural society like China is unlikely to evolve ―spontaneously‖ in such a 
direction to the modern Rule of Law. 
Zhu‘s point of view is valuable for a detailed analysis of China‘s judicial reforms against 
legal formalism. But Zhu has from the beginning treated law as merely problem solving 
rather than providing a framework and structuring function as in the modern state. It 
corresponds to Bourdieu‘s deconstruction of the distinction between legal profession and 
people‘s consciousness of fairness. Institutionalized law does not have a monopoly of what 
is the best way to solve problems, and ―social order‖ as he cites could be a better candidate. 
But this vague meaning of ―social order‖ is better described as equilibrium rather than 
substantive values such as human rights. Finally, Zhu applies social Darwinism and 
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subjects this equilibrium to factual effectiveness. Through the bridge of ‗equilibrium‘, 
normative implications refer to evolutionary proofs. Though Zhu is right to argue against 
an exaggeration of universal normative models, it is problematic to assume all social orders 
are fair and obeyed willingly. 
3.3. Han Dayuan: the Eastern Asian Model 
As I have mentioned in the section of legal constitutionalism, Peerenboom has written 
much on the Eastern Asian Model of constitutionalization -- a family resemblance among 
East Asian countries that could be used as a path of China‘s reform.82 East Asian values 
were expressed in the 1993 Bangkok declaration that prioritizes economic and social rights 
over civil and political rights, and adopts a two-track reform that both accepts the 
suggestion of Washington Consensus on macroeconomics and compromises pragmatically. 
This model is also seen by Han Dayuan as a more adaptable one for transition from 
Communism as it contains a strategy of ―administrative absorption of politics‖, which 
ensures a more stable and controlled process.  
Peerenboom‘s advocate for the East Asian model is said to be related less to cultural 
similarities. He opposes categorizing the Eastern Asian Model as influenced by 
Confucianism. Asia is too broad a region with diverse traditions to be united under one title; 
and insisting on Confucianism could not deny that we all need human rights. This makes 
Yu‘s critique valid that, if Asian constitutionalism is distinct by attaching to ―the roles of 
economic development, state building and community values‖ operative in the 
constitutional framework, then ―these roles can also be seen as complements to liberal 
constitutionalism, rather than a brand new version of constitutionalism‖.83 
3.4. The turn to Confucianism: imaginations and the retrieval of 
traditions 
With the call for re-establishing public consensus as the cultural basis of constitutionalism, 
as Habermas ―constitutional patriotism‖ implies, the Confucian tradition is also taken as a 
proper candidate for constitutional re-imaginations, especially Left Confucianism. 
Confucianism was at the beginning a philosophical and ethical theory documenting 
Confucius‘s dialogues with his students in the Analects. In the Qin Dynasty, it developed 
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into state ideology and around 605 AD was used for the standard of national examination 
for bureaucracy. In general, Confucianism is not a religion with a personal God, but a 
moral philosophy with Confucius as an exemplary man which also encourages taking 
political responsibility for ordinary people. Throughout two millennia it contains other 
theoretical influences from Chinese Legalism, Daoism and Buddhism. But in China‘s New 
Culture Movement (from Mid-1910s to 1920s), Confucianism was scorned as ―a feudal 
ritual that eats humanity (Chi Ren De Feng Jian Li Jiao)‖. A more fierce attack was in 
China‘s Cultural Revolution, and after the Revolution seldom could we still discern the 
influence of Confucianism as intact. The turn to Confucianism in China hence signifies 
effort to explore the continuous influence of Confucianism in contemporary China. 
Daniel Bell‘s project is both political and ―thick‖. He develops a theory of ―illiberal 
democracy‖84 based on Confucianism and its practices in East Asia. While social contract 
in the West is only a metaphor, family-state model could be seen as its equivalence in Asia. 
More than what the West assumes, familism and filial piety has a more important effect in 
China. Family is the first and most important school of virtue, contributes to forming a 
good community, and even justifies breaking the law. Bell in another book
85
 also predicts 
that China might pursue a Leftist Confucianism in the future, and treats Jiang Qing‘s 
Political Confucianism seriously. Jiang had devised a project of Tricameral Legislature in 
China, with different Houses representing separately the sacred sources, Common People‘s 
endorsement and historical legacy.
86
 However, as Bell predicts, it is at the collision 
moments that we still have to figure out the priority of people‘s democracy in relation to 
traditional values, or vice versa. 
Responding to the call for ―correlating three traditions‖87 by Gan Yang, who is an 
important figure of China‘s New Left working on the culture field, Wang Hui wrote a big 
book to trace the rise of Chinese thought,
88
 the theme of which is the evolution of 
Confucius thinking. Wang poses Confucianism in opposition to the Western paradigm of 
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foundational epistemology. He insists on several concepts that could not be contained by 
the terms imported from the West, such as China‘s empire as a gift-giving community 
different both from imperialism and nation state; or ―rites‖ as an emotional and social bond 
against institutions.
89
 Finally, in Wang‘s ―war of cultures‖, western concepts could never 
catch the genuine Confucianism teaching; there is always already ―alienation in the very 
first communication‖.90 Wang advocates ―politics for recognition‖ but we are left 
uncertain about what is the alternative teaching he suggests. 
In contrast to Wang‘s rejection of communication, David Hall and Roger Ames make their 
important contributions in comparative philosophy.
91
 They resort directly back to the text 
of Analects. Acknowledging the distinctiveness of Confucianism, they give it a polar 
explanation for social relationships compared to dualist relationships in the West.
92
 Hall 
and Ames argue that ‗dualism‘ in philosophical vocabulary is influenced by ex nihilo 
doctrines, which has a radical separation between the determinate and the dependent. 
‗Polarity‘ on the other hand indicates ―a relationship of two events of which requires the 
other as a necessary condition for being what it is … each pole can only be explained by 
reference to the other.‖93  Confucianism, in their arguments, is an aesthetic philosophy 
and repeats a process of learning-creation-communication-attunement. And this process 
structurally occurs in different spheres, as in thinking, politics, relation with nature, and 
language. Learning ensures the teaching of traditions; creation promises the new; 
communication is channelling the possible conflicts between the two; while attunement 
guarantees harmonization. It provides an immanent cosmos,
94
 without transcendence or 
separation between knowledge and action. But this for Hall and Ames, does not make 
Confucianism an existential philosophy, since its concern still lies with interdependence 
rather than the independent realization of excellence.
95
 Hall and Ames conclusively define 
Confucianism as person-in-context philosophy, and as a process-in-flux, with the sage king 
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as a living model to be imitated,
96
 whose mastership is appreciated in communication and 
harmonization. 
However, their book does not explain whether this self-sufficient system could be 
accommodated in modern life, or so to speak, whether a polar relationship could be re-cast 
in perspectives shaped by the modern dualist relationship, such as the conception of 
―rights‖. An effort by Tu Weiming is made to combine historical transformations and 
philosophical strength in propagating ―the third wave of Confucianism‖.97 Tu depicts the 
influence of Confucianism as ―already functioning in life yet to be found (Bai Xing Ri 
Yong Er Bu Zi Zhi)‖98as inspired by Soren Kierkegaard.99 This ―living order‖ assures 
historical continuity enduring throughout changes and ruptures. Hence, in contrast to Hall 
and Ames, Tu emphasizes Confucianism as an individual and existential philosophy that 
could be compatible with liberal values. Tu rejects politicising Confucianism as it was in 
history, and insists on Confucianism‘s ethical function and capacity to co-exist with 
feminism, environmentalism and other theories. This tolerance and accommodation 
capacity is the virtue of Confucianism, but at the same time makes it harder to define the 
―what is‖. If Confucianism could be accommodating to any modern philosophy, what is its 
uniqueness? If we are already living this tradition, what dictates our special loyalty in this 
retrieval? 
The turning to Confucianism as a resource for depicting society and politics is to challenge 
the social-contract origin of State, democracy and political rights, and enlightenment 
epistemology. While Wang, Hall and Ames are right to point out the unique quality of 
Confucianism, they find it hard to state this philosophy in an affirmative and general way 
except for a concrete description. Generalization will bring forth the concern about the 
political face of Confucianism – elite politics and its historical role as official ideology. 
But for another thing, the non-institution makes it harder to replace liberalism and a whole 
set of theories on State, law, or democracy. No matter whether it is the analogy to 
existential philosophy that Tu makes, or the focus on interpersonal communication of 
Confucianism, the key question lies in whether Confucianism is capable of depicting a 
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relationship between society and individuals as a learning-adaptation process free of 
organizational powers. 
3.5. Summary of Social Constitutionalism in China 
Proposals of social constitutionalism arise from scholars that treat social orders more 
important than positive law and state organizations. It makes social constitutionalism 
connect to the wider background of culture or philosophy. And this non-law background is 
taken as a virtue rather than a vice. 
Significantly, China‘s social constitutionalism intends to argue for an alternative to social 
contract theory and the state/society distinction. For its theorists, the social and cultural 
identity organized in the form of social network is different from the civil society 
assumption that has a close correlation with the positivization of law. Resorting to 
Confucianism is the cultural resources for Chinese constitutionalists to reject the Western 
dualist depiction of the individual-society relations. 
Whether Confucianism could be an alternative imagination about social relations is 
connected to the function of Confucianism historically. And it is a debate about 
Confucianism as an ethical teaching or a politically dominant ideology. Apparently, Bell 
opts for a ‗thick‘ meaning of Confucianism which emphasises the importance of filial piety, 
a paternalistic tradition that prioritizes State and the collectivity. In this sense, they mean to 
say that Confucianism has played its role in forming the political tradition and continuing 
its influence in contemporary China. This replacement of modern liberal culture, however, 
demands a strong identity of Confucianism. It is also unavoidable in this case to account 
for the political face of Confucianism in history. Opposite to them, is the assertion of 
Confucianism as an ethical theory by Tu, Ames and Hall, who try to separate the historical 
evil associated with politicising Confucianism from its adaptation to values of ―toleration‖ 
of modern liberalism. But as an ethical principle, it supplements liberal philosophy rather 
than projects a thick patriotism as ―Confucian constitutionalism‖. 
4. Summary of this chapter 
This chapter links back to chapter 1 and the proposal of legal constitutionalism in China. In 
China, more schools are arising to interpret China‘s constitutional orders different from a 
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future shaped by judicial constitutionalism. They are invoking old and new resources to 
view China‘s constitutionalism in a new light. 
Also related to the three social orders in chapter 2, new constitutional schools have 
conceptualized different images about China‘s constitutional order. China‘s political 
constitutionalism is a combination of China‘s socialist tradition against legal 
institutionalization. It on one hand puts the Party-state structure in analogy to the 
constitutional convention in China, while on the other hand it stresses the convention as 
more important than constitutional laws. Economic constitutionalism aims to connect the 
socialist infrastructure with China‘s market reform to configure a socialist market system. 
The vicious ―state capitalism‖ in the 1990s is expected to convert to a positive use of 
market in service of public interest. Social constitutionalism tends to imagine beneath legal 
institutions a social order that is a-political, and society generating its own norms via 
culture, social cooperations and teaching. This social network treats the political generation 
of law implied in positivism as its chief opponent.  
In common, these propositions coincide with theoretical changes that demand a reflection 
on the tradition of positivism. Positivism highly simplifies the relationship between law 
and society, especially for China, who in history does not have the tradition of ―Rule of 
Law‖ in the Western sense. The legal culture, as Law and Development explores, is a 
necessary support for the ideal to take root; but at the same time, could not be simply 
instrumentalized.
100
 This is especially the case with Confucianism in China. Confucianism 
as an existential constitution of life contradicts the normative meaning of classical 
constitutionalism; and this in turn generates anxiety about how to justify it before modern 
liberalism. Either that or it is simply not needed, as Wang argues. This reconciliation and 
justification is an imposed requirement that uses constitutionalism as an ideological tool to 
measure social norms that are not all one-sized. And why should liberal constitutionalism 
be used as a standard of projection rather than the opposite that it should respect China‘s 
effective social order? 
Here lies the inversion thesis of China‘s second-round constitutional discourses. 
Formalism and positive law, confronting their failure in implementation, turn to be a 
paradigm crisis. If constitutionalism has to reflect the people‘s political existence as its aim, 
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is it not the case that the classical constitutional model should concede what is de facto 
existence rather than the opposite – the construction of a universal political existence? 
But on the other hand, who could define and have knowledge of what is the political 
existence in China that reflects the essential needs of Chinese people other than what is 
real and what keeps certain equilibrium? Or how could we understand the disequilibrium – 
the substantive loss of the working class, the migrant workers deprived rights to choose 
their lifestyles otherwise? While it may be right to contest who has a final say on 
constitutionalism, it may be also contestable who has a final say about the identity, 
especially when there is no democratic channel to speak? 
While Carl Schmitt puts substantive equality as the basis of a political community, he 
argues for constituent power as the people‘s will rather than the people‘s identity, as the 
identity is a given requisite for the will which itself could not be disaggregated and 
upgraded. But this is precisely what he is condemned and not the case for contemporary 
constitutionalism which rises from the margin of classical constitutionalism but turns the 
table against it. For contemporary constitutionalism, the people‘s will has to be qualified 
with the integrative capacity, and democracy has to be evaluated against who enjoys the 
democratic outputs.  
The shortcomings of democracy hence bring forth the crisis of constituent power of the 
constitutional paradigm. As China‘s ―illiberal democracy‖ shows, this new paradigm is not 
going to be attributed to a political will expressed by the people but an existential status 
that relies on history, culture, regime performances and equilibrium. To say it is a new type 
of democracy, is to displace democracy that links the subject of democracy with his 
capacity to express his will. Hence I discern in this second-round of China‘s constitutional 
discourses a turn that democracy and constitutionalism are disconnected with political 
rights and reconnected to identity that has a higher-than-political meaning. Identity in 
contemporary constitutionalism is treated as a higher value than the political exertion of 
constituent power, namely, constituencies without constituent power. This will enable 
constitutional re-imaginations. 
The national identity of China is strengthened in this negation of liberal constitutionalism, 
which however, does not mean China has its own answer to its ―constitutionalism‖ proper. 
In this chapter, I mapped their different legitimacy claims, which are largely understood as 
meta-democratic values, whether in regard to integration, responsiveness or social 
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harmonization. And in the next part, I focus my attention on the general paradigm shift that 
























Contemporary Constitutional Re-imaginations 
 
Introduction 
After reviewing China‘s constitutional changes and the turn of the second-generation 
constitutional discourses, this chapter provides an understanding of essential complexities 
in these discourses, namely, an increasing loss of the shared meaning of 
―constitutionalism‖. In China, a three-decade reform influences both the material 
appropriation of the socialist constitutional structure, and also how this newly-formed 
hybridity is interpreted. And China‘s second-generation constitutional discourse on ―with 
Chinese characteristics‖ calls for constitutional re-imaginations, namely, a redefinition 
about the monological understanding of constitutionalism. It examines the ―point of 
departure‖ that contemporary constitutionalism claims. 
This chapter reviews classical constitutionalism and discovers ambiguities in the 
constitutional paradox that lead to the contemporary renovations. In the first section, I put 
forward the constitutional paradox as it emerges from the intense Kelsen-Schmitt debates. 
Then I point out what gaps can be discerned in Schmittian arguments that lead to 
contestations and revisions, especially to the pole of constituent power. Despite the crisis 
of constituent power and the nation-state constitutional model, in the final section, I pose 
the question as whether the constitutional paradox could be rethought in terms of critical 
constitutional theories.  
1. The Constitutional Paradox – the Kelsen-Schmitt 
debate 
While in China constitutionalism is mainly imported as a legal concept, in classical 
constitutionalism the word ―constitutionalism‖ is never a purely legal themeatic as the 
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school of legal constitutionalism assumes. Shaped by the French Revolution
1
 and 
indicated in the term ―fundamental law‖, aspects of ―foundation‖ have always implied 
more than a collection of laws. The paradox of constitutionalism is composed of two poles 
as constitutional form and constituent power. The intriguing issue of self-government and 
the compromise of sovereignty before the law has been under interpretation ever since 
social contract theories.
2
 In a key contribution to the constitutional paradox, Martin 
Loughlin and Neil Walker have put the paradox in a concise way. As they write,  
―Modern constitutionalism is underpinned by two fundamental though antagonistic 
imperatives: that governmental power ultimately is generated from the ‗consent of 
the people‘ and that, to be sustained and effective, such power must be divided, 
constrained, and exercised through distinctive institutional forms. The people, in 
Maistre‘s words, ‗are a sovereign that cannot exercise sovereignty‘; the power they 
possess, it would appear, can only be exercised through constitutional forms 
already established or in the process of being established. This indicates what, in 
its most elementary formulation, might be called the paradox of 
constitutionalism.‖3 
The divide between legal constitutionalism in an American model and political 
constitutionalism in a British model,
4
 or between the continental and common law 
jurisprudence, does not override constitutionalism as a coupling between law and politics 
in the cores of both Rechtsstaat and ―Rule of Law‖.5  
It is mainly in the influential pure theory of law of Hans Kelsen that constitutionalism is 
portrayed as a purified legal system, which concerns the ―particularity of law to regulate its 
own creation‖ that professes to be ―value free‖. This approach to ―validity‖ makes the 
multiplicity of legal norms united through a hierarchy of legal authorization, and at the 
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apex of which there is a ―historically first‖ constitution. This constitution, however, must 
also refer to a Grundnorm to base the validity of the original constitution, which for Kelsen 
is a logical presupposition that demands no further explanation.
6
 If this indeed establishes 
a basis for review of ―constitutionality‖, it yet has difficulty in understanding attribution of 
constitutional changes to the original text in a purely procedural sense. Carl Schmitt, while 
admiring this legal science of Kelsen‘s, tries to bring the extra-legal dimension back to 
discussions of constitutionalism. ―State of exception‖, dangerously utilized by him, is a 
strong case to reveal when all valid legal norms are suspended and dependent upon a 
power of decision to retain their application.
7
 
This Kelsen-Schmitt debate intensifies the paradox of constitutionalism to a great extent. 
Rather than use attribution and presupposition to contain decisions within normativism, 
Schmitt juxtaposes the two as separate, and decisionism implies an extra-legal and 
pre-legal dimension to law.
8
 It pierces Kelsen‘s system of law in a strategically acute way, 
but in the meantime the question of ―who decides‖ becomes the label of Schmitt‘s theory 
of ―decisionism‖. And the ―commisional decision‖ of the president is easily fused with the 
―sovereign decision‖9 of the constituent power of the people, which makes Schmitt often 
characterized as an apologist for the Nazi Regime. 
It is in his Constitutional Theory that Schmitt intended to provide a more normative and 
republican theory of constitutionalism, but in no way less critical towards reduction of 
constitutionalism to constitutional laws. According to Chris Thornhill, it is a ―more 
complete and subtler‖ approach that ―signals a limited though significant reapproachment 
with liberalism‖.10 In this book, Schmitt puts forward two oppositions to Kelsen‘s pure 
law. Firstly, he argues the purity of Kelsen‘s legal system concerns merely ―functions‖ 
rather than ―substantial being and legal functioning‖,11 which questions the material 
establishment of Kelsen‘s system of law. And secondly, Schmitt argues that positivism 
                                                          
6
 Scott Veitch, Emilios Christodoulidis and Lindsay Farmer (eds.) (2012) Jurisprudence: Themes and 
Concepts (London : Routledge) 38-44 
7
 Schmitt (2008)157 
8
 Carl Schmitt (2004) On the Three Types of Juristic Thought (Westport, Conn.; London: Praeger) 68 
9
 Carl Schmitt (2008)109-110 
In arguing the role of ―constitution-making‖ assembly, Schmitt calls it ―sovereign dictator‖. Because there is 
no constitutional norms, this dictatorship is not commissarial. But it also acts ―in the name of and under 
commission from the people, which can at any time decommission its agents through a political act.‖ 
10
 Schmitt (2008)2 
11
 Schmitt (2008)64 
 125 
 
only takes those actually valid to be valid, hence ―(i)n its place appears the tautology of a 
raw factualness.‖ 12 
These two critiques imply two sides of positivism, one is materialization of normativism, 
and the other is factuality in the place of normativity. I want to explain more about the 
second critique. It implies that Schmitt was aware of the ―absolute‖ constitutionalism 
which takes substantive ―order‖ as constitutionalism,13 which he is always accused of. But 
what Schmitt intended to reveal is that Kelsen wanted to complete an incompatible 
merging of the factualness of positive law with normativism derived only by virtue of 
reason and justice. But 
―A norm can be valid because it is correct. The logical conclusion, reached 
systematically, is natural law not the positive constitution. The alternative is that a 
norm is valid because it is positively established, in other words, by virtue of an 
existing will. A norm never establishes itself.‖14 
A norm could only be recognized than positively established.
15
 This also corresponds to 
the first critique of materialization. Schmitt‘s key refutation to Kelsen‘s theory, I argue, is 
not decisionism versus normativism, but he contributes to a juxtaposition of two ―sources‖ 
of law. The Grundnorm is impossible to establish itself while claiming to be a pure norm. 
And instead, Schmitt contrasts a natural law notion of normativism with a positive law 
thinking that is based on the will of law-making, as he calls them ―alternatives‖. It implies 
a distinction ―between efficacy as condition for validity, and the reason for the validity of a 
legal norm. The former is a fact, but as a fact it cannot be the reason for validity of legal 
norms.‖16 
People‘s will that authorizes law hence also implies an artificial disconnection of law from 
natural reason. This reveals a modern basis of legal science and centrality of positivism, 
which is described by Habermas as a ―reconstructive‖ relationship between validity and 
facticity.
17
 Just as Thornhill calls for a re-consideration of positivism,
18
 it contextualizes 
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the supremacy of ―constituent power‖ and the people‘s ―will‖ in historical circumstances 
of modernity, replacing ―reason‖ in natural law. But right because of this, the people‘s will 
becomes the ultimate end of legitimation, from which modern democracy stems. As 
Schmitt claims, 
―The fact is a constitution is valid because it derives from a constitution-making 
capacity (power or authority) and is established by the will of this 
constitution-making power. In contrast to mere norms, the word ‗will‘ denotes an 
actually existing power as the origin of a command. The will is existentially 
present; its power or authority lies in its being.‖19(my emphasis) 
Restoring constituent power to constitutionalism does not mean that Schmitt essentializes 
all laws as political or that there is no ―law‖ properly called. He was rather meant to point 
out that modern law derives all its legitimacy from democracy and the people‘s will – the 
democratic ontology of modern constitutionalism. Nevertheless, his argument is 
ambiguous enough that for Hans Lindahl, Schmitt‘s takes the ―existing will‖ to be the 
existential being of constituent power commits what he accuses Kelsen of and celebrates 
ontology of substances.
20
 Schmitt is the positivist rather than Kelsen,
21
 Lindahl objects, 
especially concerning the naturalness of ―we‖ in Schmittian theory. Though Schmitt is 
right to see the ―we‖ as irreducible to an aggregation of ―I‖s, ―the first-person plural 
perspective is rendered synonymous to a substantive equality between the members of a 
polity.‖22 
Theoretically, constituent power is rather indefinable for Schmitt. It could only reappear as 
a fact. It is a constitution-making fact, but itself is not a normative fact and does not 
contain normativity. Hence as a ―stop rule‖23 for normative inquiry, it always falls short 
and is always in contrast to normativism. But then why do we give it such a high status? 
Cutting from Schmitt‘s historical analysis of how the people‘s will becomes 
God,
24
positivism increasingly is dissociated from its democratic implications initially as a 
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liberation movement from religion.
25
 But also due to this turn to ―immanence‖,26 Antonio 
Negri argues, Schmittian ―constituent power‖ loses its connection with democracy, and has 
affinity with the implication of ―sovereignty‖. 
The crucial point I want to make here is that while Schmitt has brought the paradox back to 
a pure theory of constitutional law, constituent power itself is under dispute. The first 
argument concerns its naturalness and condensation in nation States. Secondly, as in 
Claude Lefort‘s accounts, it is problematized with regard to the understanding of 
continuity and discontinuity of its exertion.
27
 Negri also argues for a ―temporary 
singularity‖ of constituent power as an objection to Schmitt‘s.28 He argues that ―the 
immanence [of Schmittian theory] is so profound that at first sight the distinction between 
constituent and constituted power fades‖. It implies that constituent power though is 
supreme legitimacy, is nonetheless subject to continuous process of self-transformation. 
Thirdly and more radically, is constituent power not a political construct that is used for 
purposes of exclusion of the ―alter‖, whose humanity could not be denied in the ambit of 
citizenship? In the next section, I will unpack these diverse attacks on the understanding of 
constituent power in Schmittian theory. 
2. Complexities of Constituent Power 
In the book The Concept of The Political, Schmitt acknowledges how hard it is to get a 
clear definition of the political as it is used relatively in contrast to other spheres.
29
 In 
order to get more than the ―obvious‖ answer of politics – liberal culture30that privatizes 
politics into individual rights, turns public foes into private enemy, and reduces democracy 
to party coalition based on interests – Schmitt moves to the ―sovereign‖ position, which is 
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discerned by Heinrich Meier as shifting from ―defensive‖ (of ―the political‖) to 
―offensive‖.31 When confronting the state of war which necessitates the sovereign decision 
of normalcy and exception, political existence is trans-domained and intensified across 
other autonomous distinctions. For Meier this means that ―(t)he conception of domains is 
replaced by a model of intensity.‖32 
State sovereignty serves the purpose of intensification to make ―the political‖ appear, but 
becomes the curse of Schmittian theory. The terrible crimes committed to human rights by 
the Nazi Regime cause people to question that, will state always act as facilitator of rights 
protection? If state turns to be the chief persecutor of human rights, where should we turn 
to? With deep reflections on positivism, international law regimes start to develop after 
World War II . The United Nations is founded along with its charter systems concretizing 
human rights norms, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR).
33
 In 
transitional justice cases of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunals 
set up by the Security Council enable individuals to directly emerge as the subject of 
international law rather than by means of state action, which indicates that state consensus 
no longer could be seen as the only validation and root of international law. This break 
from constitutional ratification brings a quality shift to the international legal regime 
toward its ―global‖ nature. In Anne-Marie Slaughter‘s account, horizontally close 
cooperations between political institutions disaggregates state sovereignty as an entity and 
forms ―a new world order‖.34 Accordingly in the theoretical level, liberal international 
relations theory should replace those realistic assumptions. International law not merely 




International law‘s tremendous developments problematize the constructed entity of State 
and its separation of humanity according to territory and citizenship. What if State is just 
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an ―imagined community‖ as famously put by Benedict Anderson?36 The proliferation of 
legal regimes goes along with the decline of states as ―attribution‖ points.37 As Thornhill 
argues, ―(i)n society marked by a post-constituent constitution, law‘s authority is left to 
repose on inner-juridical principles, and its final point of constituent regress vanishes.‖38 
This brings the ―legitimacy‖ crisis of State. And the state ―theory‖ is investigated rather 
than taken for granted. Constitutionalism in history as a power-limiting device is a 
misleading notion, Preuss argues.
39
 The territoriality, sovereignty and the constitutional 
order were combined together to constitute a national and political community and keep 
other plural orders from emerging as competitors. State territory imposes a generalization 
of sociality on a space accompanied with an exercise of impersonal authoritative power. In 
this sense, ―(t)he state does not have a territory, it is a territory‖.40 So to speak, 




By problematizing organization of the ―multitude‖ into a collective polity, Preuss poses 
question over ―constituent power‖, which acts as the fundamental legitimacy of 
constitutionalism.  Factually it never exists as such an entity, which could always be 
problematized against this conception of ―an appropriate self-organization of the people‖,42 
and enables a permanent questionability about inclusion.   
For Preuss, it is not legal rigidity preventing self-constitution that induces the crisis of 
classical constitutionalism, but the homology of a community taken for granted that 
prevents constitutive potentials in the multitude being heard. Compared to ―constituent 
power‖, Preuss is less critical towards the ―constitutional form‖. For him, law is rather 
neutral for use and is an effective register for pluralism against any given community. 
Since every ―constituent power‖ is an attribution, the use of constitutional form anew could 
a posteriori relate back. By this means, political self-constitution could immediately be 
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located in legal experiments, though this correspondence between law and politics is 
nowhere to be touched in Preuss‘s theory. 
But I want to insist here that Preuss‘s critique is not a simple denunciation of constituent 
power. For Preuss, it raises the constitutional paradox to a higher level of 
community–multitude relationship, expressed by Lindahl as ―sameness and selfhood‖.43 
While interpreting the Kelsen-Schmitt debate, Lindahl expands it,  
―A collective can only act by re-acting to what, preceding it at every step, never 
ceases to confront it with the question, ‗Who are we?‘. Constituent power comes 
second, not first: from the very beginning, and as its beginning, collective selfhood 
is eccentric, decentred with respect to the other as well as to the strange. Here, then, 
is the main contribution of the paradox of constituent power to an ontology of 
collective selfhood: the collective self exists in the modes of questionability and, 
by way of its acts, of responsiveness.‖44 (my emphasis) 
By exploring the presumption of the constitutional ―impasse‖, Lindahl rather develops and 
converts it into a legitimating meta-code, namely, ―the problem of justifying the inclusion 
and exclusion required for political unity.‖45 
Here we could see clearly a series of shifts that change the status of constituent power in 
classical constitutionalism. The critiques of positivism and developments in international 
law challenge State as the guarantor of human rights. State as the supreme legal 
personality
46
 is increasingly seen as a contingent and historical construct that serves the 
political exploitation of law
47
 rather than the validation of law, and needs to be rethought 
with internationalization. This ―temporalizes‖ constituent power and explores the 
expansion and formation of community via a meta-code of inclusion and exclusion. If 
Schmittian political community explains constituent power on the basis of ―who decides‖, 
it is now problematized as ―who decides who decides?‖48 or else, people outside the 
community will never have a say in the deciding process. As Chantel Mouffe comments, 
―(t)he unity of the state must, for him [Schmitt], be a concrete unity, already given and 
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therefore stable. … Because of that, his distinction between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ is not really 
politically non-constructed, it is merely a recognition of already-existing borders.‖49 
These indeed constitute compelling challenges to the indefinable but supreme existence of 
constituent power in Schmittian theory that even he could not well respond to. Richard 
Bernstein hence argues, Schmitt‘s homogeneity is both real and reflective, both concrete 
and existential.
50
 Schmitt admits that, ―(w)here the constitution-making power exists, 
there is also always a constitutional minimum, … the revolutionary elimination of a 
constitution can even be designated somewhat rightly as mere constitutional change, but 
naturally only when one presupposes this permanence of the subject of the 
constitution-making power.‖51(my emphasis) 
Here, apparently, Schmitt has to deviate from his ―intensity‖ claim to accommodate with 
the ―permanence‖ claim of constituent power. This temporalization, as correctly 
recognized by Negri and Lefort, will question the supremacy of constituent power as 
residing in merely a revolutionary act. Lindahl argues that there is an ―inverted symmetry‖ 
in the synthesis that ―if the activity of constituent power discloses an irreducible passivity 
in political unity, a no less irreducible passivity is embedded in constituent power‘s 
activity.‖52 By putting it like this, Lindahl supposes that every constitutional law embodies 
a certain constituent element inside it in the form of ―inaction‖. And in this sense, the stake 
holder definition could express the constituent power, namely, an 
―identification/empowerment‖ function.53 Otto Kirchheimer also points out in the context 
of a decrease in homogeneity, more attention should be paid to the legal basis for 
democracy that Schmitt should acknowledge.
54
  
Toward Bernstein‘s critique of the ―existential‖ sense of constituent power in his theory, 
Schmitt yet argues the Bourgeois Rechtsstaat is dissolution of democracy and freedom in a 
legal and institutional manner from their political principles of identity and representation. 
―The equality of everything that bears a human face is incapable of providing a foundation 
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for a state, a state form or a form of government. No distinctive differentiations and 
delimitations may be derived from it; only the elimination of distinctions and boundaries 
may be.‖55 This shapes Schmittian constituent power in fact is a re-presence56 rather than 
a pure presence of constituent power that will never be materialized in politics. 
This highlights Schmitt‘s insistence on the ―politicality‖ of constituent power and his 
denunciation of expansive developments of international law. In the depoliticization of 
international law, Schmitt predicts a spread of humanitarianism to acclaim the end of war. 
But for Schmitt, it will generate absolute enmity and be the cruellest as a war to end all 
wars. ―If and when this condition (a world state) will appear, I do not know. At the 
moment it is not the case.‖57For Leo Strauss, this account constitutes an admission of 
possibilities. And if international law could eliminate the distinction of ―politicality‖, all 
Schmittian political and constitutional theories will collapse, as the concept of the ―enemy‖ 
is directly challenged. As Maier unpacks it, 
―If the enemy attacks, the will to ward him off is fully self-evident. The enemy 
defines him as enemy by means of the attack; … The rhetoric of the defensive, 
however, not only helps Schmitt conceal the theoretical difficulties in his concept 
of the political. As a rhetoric of ‗pure politics‘, his defensive rhetoric gives him the 
double political advantage of shielding his own purely political position against all 
normative criticism and of simultaneously enabling him to attack … the enemy 
who engages in politics in an unpolitical and even anti-political guise violates the 
honesty and visibility of pure politics.‖58 
A similar critique is also made by Derrida.
59
 Both focus their fire on the ontology of ―the 
political‖, the ground of all Schmitt‘s theory. To this, Schmitt could hardly pronounce a 
defence except that current circumstances are political. And to transform the situation is 
still political in nature, and maybe forever so. This, I will argue, is adopted by Michel 
Foucault in his critical theories and ―how‖ politics that liberation in and through history is 
a complex political process. 
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Here before going deeper into separate challenges, I roughly point out three challenges to 
different degrees that are intrinsically connected. The decline of positivism and sovereignty 
claims in the post-WWII background gives birth to an expansion of international law 
regimes which dissociate recognition of human rights from state rectification. The State is 
problematized regarding its ultimate legitimacy as the political community, which is never 
united and whose homogeneity is superficial rather than substantive as Schmitt supposed. 
By problematizing who is included in and excluded from the community without a proper 
means of deciding so, constituent power instead of being the locus of people‘s will, is 
revealed instead as a construct without a will and a given fact without decisions. This 
necessitates the expansion of the community by means of right to dissent and to be heard. 
To the extreme, radical pluralism will render the political framework of constitutionalism 
redundant in the end. To summarize, the internationalization, inclusion and exclusion 
through time and claims of pluralism are challenging constituent power of Schmittian 
theory in various aspects. 
3. Defending the constitutional paradox with critical 
constitutional theories? 
Thornhill in discerning this development of human rights jurisprudence via judicial comity, 
argues for the recognition of the dialectic relationship between the constituent and the 
constituted in human rights jurisprudence, which comprises ―classical constitutionalism‖ 
as well as ―contemporary constitutionalism‖.60 As he puts it, 
―Indeed, rights and constituent power are often allowed to appear as antinomies. If 
approached in a functionalist perspective, however, constituent power and rights 
always acted as inextricably linked dimensions of classical constitutionalism: 
rights meant that constituent power could be fully internalized in the political 
system, and they enabled the political system to exploit such power as an element 
of its inner abstraction.‖61 
Thornhill‘s functional re-interpretation of the constitutional paradox serves to rescue the 
paradox from a substitution claim made by contemporary constitutionalism, which has a 
potential to reduce political meaning of constitutionalism fully to judicial constitutionalism. 
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For this jurisprudence, ―the objective presumption of external (national) constituent power 
(always inherently counterfactual) is approaching final redundancy.‖62 Without 
recognition of ―the inner adaptive‖ function of rights, the constituted agent of the judiciary 
and their human rights jurisprudence is trapped in the ―auto-constituent logic‖.63 
This is also the worry of Dieter Grimm when faced with global legalization and European 
integration immediately taken as constitutionalization.
64
 It propels Grimm to consider 
providing a checklist that remains neutral vis-à-vis specific instantiations of 
constitutionalism (in its state form). He argues that constitutionalism must contain five 
characteristics as necessary and sufficient requirement.
65
 These five characteristics make 
constitutionalism ―a special and particularly ambitious form of legalisation‖.66 A mere 
collection of human rights cases and legislations for Grimm is not yet ―constitutionalism‖, 
as historically ―constitutionalism‖ signifies a transformation from medieval plural orders to 
an absolute state where this term was first applied. It symbolizes the foundational meaning 
of constitutionalism rather than merely its function of limiting power. 
Grimm hence distinguishes between the founding and functioning of ―constitutionalism‖. 
The naming of ―constitutionalism‖ indicates systematization of plural orders, while rights 
and democracy are only secondary values of constitutionalism. Observing the five 
characteristics at the global level, four of them changed except for the first criterion that 
―the constitution remains as set of legal norms which owe their validity to a political 
decision‖.67 To let law be law is always a precondition demanding a democratic decision 
before any co-originality could be instigated. Public endorsement of rights protection by 
law is not reducible to an attribution of effects of rights protection as law; to put it 
succinctly, what is law is never self-authorized by its product. This presupposition holds 
against the disaggregation and mobilization of legal systems. For Grimm, as soon as there 
is no global legislator, and the duality of ―what makes law law‖ is still lacking,68 ―the 
                                                          
62
 Ibid. 398 
63
 Ibid. 375 
64
 Dieter Grimm(May 2005) ‗Integration by constitution‘, I.Con 3(2&3): 193-208 
65
 The five are: a) it is a set of legal norms; b) it regulates the establishment of public power than a mere 
modification; c) the regulation is comprehensive; d) the distinction between pouvoir constituent and pouvoir 
constitue is essential to the constitution; e) Constitutional law is higher law  






 Ming-Sung Kuo (2009) ‗Between Fragmentation and Unity: The Uneasy Relationship Between Global 
Administrative Law and Global Constitutionalism‘. SAN DIEGO INT‟L L.J. Vol. 10: 439-467 
 135 
 
limitation by societal constitutions will always be self-limitation guided by the actors‘ 
interests, not the common interest‖.69 
This difference between processing and integration indicates a democratic/political 
surplus.
70
 Emilios Christodoulidis interprets classical constitutionalism especially in a 
relational perspective, as he writes, 
―Our theorists appear to have hit a theoretical impasse here – the notion of a 
structure-defying event that somehow implausibly registers as ‗constitutional‘ 
despite the conditions of its individuation – and have assumed it an insight.‖71 
This leads Christodoulidis to a different understanding from Lindahl‘s constructive 
understanding of the Kelsen-Schmitt‘s debate. For Lindahl, the formula of the Rechtsstaat 
has to be preserved as ―the manner in which modern democracy deals with this aporia‖72 
that ―spells out the institutional conditions for ‗political action of the subject‘‖.73 
Christodoulidis acknowledges this ―after-the-event‖ stake-holding concept of 
constitutionalism, however, argues for intensification and a severance – an impasse that 
stays as an impasse that defies being reconciled. ―The reflexivity – ‗am I really represented 
in the ‗we‘? – becomes one that is impossible to be pre-contained at either level. Consent 
to inclusion can only be certified after the event, that is, after the invocation of the ‗we‘ has 
been effected. It is this temporal economy that makes it ‗impossible for a we to say ‗we‘. If 
this is the case, it is a fortiori so when the invocation relies on a priori institutionalization 
of a relationship, and it is at this point that the logic of substitution kicks in.‖74 
For Christodoulidis, constituting is at the same time subjectification; while for Lindahl, 
subjectification is forever an impasse but in the meantime needs a minimum categorisation 
provided by the constitution. While Lindahl is right to criticise the lack of any element that 
could be attributed to the constitutional naming in Christodoulidis‘s argument, the latter is 
also questioning whether the attribution has already passed over the ―constituent‖ moment. 
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Here lies the value of critical theories which have put a focus on the constitutional moment, 
rather than on the homogeneity of political systems before and after it. They focus on the 
ground-shifting moment of ―what is politicizable‖, namely, how to invoke ―the political‖. 
This is especially important in the vanishing of constituent power as ultimate political 
legitimacy, which implies an absence of the generic category of ―the political‖. 
Contemporary constitutionalism is one attempt to upload this lack of constituent power to a 
new level concerning the ―subject‖ issue, while I will argue in chapter 9, critical theories 
are problematizing complexities in the modalities of the representation of the subject.  
4. Summary of this chapter 
In this chapter, I have argued why conceptual re-imaginations on constitutionalism become 
so central to the material process of ―constitutionalization‖. Through the inflationary 
channel of human rights, synthesis between constituent power and constitutional law as 
condensed in nation states is destabilized. But more importantly, this denaturalization of 
political community has brought forth the ―subject‖ issue of constituent power. The 
meta-code of inclusion and exclusion, questionability and responsiveness of political 
community turns to be the chief concern of contemporary constitutionalism as I will 
further explore. 
―Contemporary constitutionalism‖ though has a stronger reliance on judicial comity, is not 
merely a retreat to Kelsen‘s pure legal system. It is a re-investment in and re-generation of 
the constitutional paradox. Three oppositions are discerned in their battles with Schmitt – 
who is the chief advocate of constituent power: the internationalization of human rights, 
inclusion and exclusion through time, and radical pluralism defying ―the political‖.  
Reinterpretations of the ―paradox‖ have divided arguments between using and admitting 
the impasse. In Christodoulidis and Lindahl‘s disagreements on the Kelsen-Schmitt 
debates, they are emphasizing, however, not the two poles of classical constitutionalism, 
but their relationship and the ―how‖ question about (re)presence of the constituent subject. 
This is in fact the core of contemporary constitutionalism. As Loughlin and Walker put it, 
―By establishing a unity of a people and by expressing the purposes of this 
association in universal and aspirational terms, is it not possible that the 
constitution acquires its mature meaning not at the foundational moment but only 
in its aftermath, through continuous deliberation within the institutions of the 
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polity about the import of the event and the (evolving) character of the association? 
The constitution is, on this interpretation, to be treated not simply as a ‗segment of 
being‘ but a ‗process of becoming‘.‖75 
The notion of ―inclusion‖ and this ―aftermath‖ have re-shaped the paradigm of 
constitutionalization so that constituent power comes second.
76
 But to what extent is the 
―fidelity‖ maintained in this ―becoming‖? It is the key question asked by critical 
constitutional theories while admitting the ―becoming‖. In the next part, I will discern three 
approaches to contemporary constitutionalism more clearly, while in this chapter, I stop at 
this summary depiction of their problematization while also hinting at the value of critical 
constitutional theories. 
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This chapter focuses on the first approach to contemporary constitutionalism, which relies 
on a continuity of constitutional semantics, constitutionalism-lite. Using a historiography 
of jurisprudence, this school opts for a perception of the incremental developments of 
human rights, and the renovations of conceptions of democracy. European integration is 
cited as a salutary experience to develop a new constitutional thinking for the post-national 
constellation. 
This model of ―common law constitutionalism‖ has for one thing dissolved the paradox of 
classical constitutionalism and proposed a ‗jurisgenetic‘ framework of constitutionalization; 
while for another thing, ‗constitutionalism‘ is preserved for expressing ―political prudence‖ 
in general. It implies that ‗constitutionalism‘ could be translated and deployed in a broader 
use. This translation must proceed with justice done to the methodology itself -- a 
disaggregation of the holistic myth of nation state constitutionalism and a reconfiguration 
according to the abstract ―common interest‖. The question that must be asked of this 
approach is whether it is not an over-stretching of the specific meaning of 
‗constitutionalism‘? 
In this chapter, I firstly explore the perceptions of Joseph Weiler and Mattias Kumm on the 
issue of European integration. Human rights jurisprudence and developments of 
international laws are their key re-investments in the constitutional paradox in a manner 
that finally change it. In the third part, I review arguments made by the chief advocate of 
the ―new constitutionalism‖ – Neil Walker, and decode the implications of 
―constitutionalism-lite‖. 
                                                          
1
 Borrowed from Krisch (2010) 
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1. Internationalization and Europeanization: the 
disarming of democracy with constitutional tolerance and 
incrementalism 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, international law regimes have brought great 
changes to jurisprudence derived from a positivist model of state laws. The Lauchpacht 
school‘s understanding of international law as a technical gesture away from the political 
in the post-World War I background has now generated a new human rights jurisprudence 
that is undermining the political dimension of states.
2
 Ius cogens was introduced through 
article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, which though is made 
through treaties, has a ―quasi-constitutional nature‖ for the international society.3 As Erika 
De Wet introduces it, it is at present primarily focused on cases of ―the out-lawing of 
unilateral use of force, genocide and the prohibition of slavery and racial discrimination‖.4 
But the Barcelona Traction decision of the ICJ provides a bridge that ius cogens would 
have erga omnes effect. This gives the hope that if in the international society there is an 
increasing convergence on ―values‖, constitutionalization of international law is possible. 
It is the ―values system‖ that matters for De Wet. To constitutionalize ―the rudimentary 
international value system‖5 is accompanied with ―the view that human rights have 
developed into the core of international value systems‖.6 Though it is still subject to that 
more human rights would gain ―customary international law status‖,7 such conditionality 
of enforcement, for De Wet, can benefit particularly from a potential spill-over effect of 
well-developed regional values systems. The European Convention for Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (ECHR) sets an exemplary role in 
forming intermediary-level and regional human rights systems.  
It would follow that for De Wet Europeanization should not conflict with 
internationalization, and yet a doctrinal study of European cases rather suggests otherwise. 
                                                          
2
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By selectively approving of Rukund rather than Yusuf and Kadi,
8
 De Wet avoids 
accounting for the divergent practices in her experimental field of EU, and appropriates 
hierarchical tensions as ―functional biases‖. These ―biases‖ distort ―values‖ and thus are in 
greater need of redress by values system, rather than a proof of an absence of a congruent 
values system, even in a relatively homogeneous region like the EU. 
―What would be the relevant international values?‖ asked Martti Koskenniemi. In the 
international world, there is no semblance of values as the common good defined by 
domestic constitutional laws ―beyond the languages of diplomacy and positive law whose 
very fragmentation and indeterminancy provided the starting point for the search for an 
(implicit) constitution‖.9 In Bruno Simma‘s and Dirk Pulkowski‘s accounts, 
deformalization in hierarchy is the essential problematic for international law in the 
globalization process. The self-contained regime of international law presents itself as 
functional lex specialis against lex generalis, especially manifested in four regimes: the EU, 
international human rights regimes, WTO and diplomatic law.
10
 International rapporteurs 
are in disagreement over what qualifies the ―specific‖ nature, whether it is an exception to 
or an application of the general international law. 
It is a downside trend if international law is subject to technocratic splits between these lex 
specialis, Koskenniemi argues. It collapses the vertical and systematic feature that any law 
including the international law needs, ―in such (and other) ways, traditional international 
law is pushed aside by a mosaic of particular rules and institutions, each following its 
embedded preference‖.11 It makes the controversy between WTO and WHO, or between 
investment rights and environmental rights subject to specific expert reasoning and forum 
shopping. And in disagreement with De Wet, he argues, ―if deformali(z)ation has set the 
house of international law on fire, to grasp at values is to throw gas on the flames.‖12 
Instead, for Koskenniemi it is time to re-politicize the international law regime through 
contestations against its dark side as managerialism and a technique of governance.  
                                                          
8
 Aware that European constitutionalization does have a tension with the international level, such as in the 
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It is the systemic question of human rights jurisprudence inspired by international law 
developments that is concerned here. While De Wet‘s ―values system‖ translates juridical 
rights into moral commitment, Koskenniemi is concerned with moral responsibility to 
commit to Rule of Law ideal. Jan Klabbers is right to mediate between the two and argue 
that, though Ius cogens is still based on treaties rather than universally shared values, 
sticking to ―virtue ethics‖ could bridge constitutionalization and internationalization.13 In 
common with De Wet, this calls for doctrinal studies to be strengthened so as to clarify 
trends of value convergence or divergence, while this is done also with a faith that 
Koskenniemi holds in human rights and justice. Contestations and values consensus are 
rather co-referential; and in the absence of laws, values and principles will bring the 
overlapping jurisdictions
14
 from disorder to order. 
No matter whether it is value-congruence or the contestation of international law, the 
shared resolution is not to return to nation state constitutions. Values and principles express 
―constitutionalism‖ in isolation from a statal frame of the ―constitution‖, which should not 
be too hastily passed as irrelevant. Protection of rights is certainly a superior value to the 
integrity of a legal system for its own sake. Mattias Kumm has suggested a historiographic 
reading of jurisprudence, which argues that the legal ‗big bang‘ theory and revolutionary 
origin of law are undermined in jurisprudence after the ―total constitution‖,15 and the end 
of Cold War. We are passing through Classical Legal Liberalism and Liberal-Democratic 
Constitutionalism, and now we are ―all Political Liberals‖16 and commit to human rights, 
democracy and Rule of Law. This should drive us away from high positivism and develop 
―law in context‖ jurisprudence instead.17 Joseph Weiler also reminds us of a receptive 
attitude that, if this process of internationalization is understood in a ―geological‖ sense 
rather than as a pathology,
18
 we could get a fresh lesson not only on law and jurisprudence, 
but also on democracy and constitutionalism. 
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 Weiler explains his intention to deploy the metaphor of ―geology‖, which is ―a serious 
methodological commitment‖ to ―dealing with time, with history‖ (548-549). Firstly, this 
approach to the past is ―instrumental‖ in the sense that ―it can illuminate the present‖. 
Secondly, different from historical approach that emphasizes change, Weiler argues that 
―geology stratifies‖. ―By stratifying geology folds the whole of the past into any given 
moment in time … [which] turns to be crucial for the particular understanding of the 
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European integration stands right in such a controversial position. Starting from its treaty 
basis, European integration has deepened after a 50-year evolution. In the foundational 
phase from 1958 to mid-1970s, the adoption of ―the doctrine of Supremacy‖ helped to 
constitute the architecture of ―Higher Law‖ rather than merely an order of federate states. 
In the second phase from 1973 to mid-1980s, the expansion of ―implied power doctrine‖ 
played an important role in the mutation of community competence. In the third phase after 
1992, ―the move to majority voting Article 100a is couched as a residual measure and 
derogation from the principal measure, which requires unanimity, namely old article 
100.‖19 It is shifted to the ―‗default‘ procedure for most internal market legislation, and the 
other procedure of other articles is an exception‖.20 
But Weiler has clearly discerned that in the second phase, ―juridical-legal‖ construct has 
left out the political and social concerns intrinsic to the issue of integration. The formed 
European governance ―is – and will remain for considerable time – such that there is no 
‗government‘ to throw out‖.21 It is undeniable ―the corrupting effect … on the civic 
sensibilities of the European peoples and on the very meaning of what it means to be 
democracy‖, Weiler admits that, ―its questionable democratic quotidian praxis represents 
the invasion of a market mentality into the sphere of politics whereby citizens becomes 
consumers of political outcomes rather than active participants.‖22 Throughout the 
European integration process, the technocratic accomplishment and professionalism have 
become the legitimation and internal culture of the Commission corresponding to the 




But Weiler then asks provocatively: ―Why should Europe be democratic‖?24 Neither the 
One Nation Ideal nor the de facto experience of federal states could satisfy the European 
model. But this is the salutary experience Europeanization could provide as Sui Generis. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
international legal system.‖ Hence by using ―geology‖, Weiler argues an ―accretion‖ effect, 
in common with Kumm‘s historiography of jurisprudence, which calls for an evolutionary 
perspective. 
J.H.H Weiler (2004) ‗The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and 
Legitimacy‘, ZaoRV 64:547-562 
19
J.H.H. Weiler (1991) ‗The Transformation of Europe‘, The Yale Law Journal 100(8): 2458  
20
 Ibid. 2459 
21
 J.H.H. Weiler (2000) ‗Why should Europe be a Democracy: The Corruption of Political Culture and the 
Principle of Constitutional Tolerance‘, in Francis Snyder (ed.), The Europeanisation of Law: the Legal 
Effects of European Integration. (Oxford: Hart) 215 
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 Ibid. 216 
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Instead of answering the challenge of the idea of the constitution in either Kelsenian or 
Schmittian sense, Weiler posits the constitutional tolerance as the aim of Europeanization 
built on the ashes of World War II, in which ―alienation…became annihilation‖.25Weiler 
denies that ―democracy is the objective, the end, of European construct‖.26 The ―bitter 
experience‖ distances Europe both from ‗constitutionalization‘ and ‗integration‘, the two 
terms suggested by Grimm;
27
 it is instead to provide a constitutional form without 
intervening in member states constitutions. They would keep their distinct identity and 
retain their ―otherness‖ vis-a-vis each other. This is what tolerance means: the inclusion of 
others without transforming them into us. 
Let us assume it is possible that an ever-closer union could keep intact the nation states 
constitutions. Then it is clear for Weiler that the field and the issues of constitutional 
importance are limited and reduced to judicial conflicts to a tolerable degree, rather than 
dominate everyday life and the ―fighting democracy‖.28 For Weiler, an either-or 
conception of constitutionalism still focuses on sovereign will, community of the people, 
solidarity without pluralism and politics in exceptional and antagonistic form. This would 
mean that the EU‘s Sui generis constitution after the Second World War has not 
accomplished its break from the positivism that once infected it. 
Instead, a ―common law constitutionalism‖ is a proper paradigm to best capture the 
European experience as the interplay of concept and praxis. And this model could be 
generalized as the ―interplay of Exit and Voice‖, to borrow from Albert Hirschman‘s 
theory.
29
 ―Exit is the mechanism of organizational abandonment in the face of 
unsatisfactory performance. Voice is the mechanism of intra-organizational correction and 
recuperation … Crudely put, a stronger ‗outlet‘ for Voice reduces pressure on the Exit 
option and can lead to more sophisticated processes of self-correction.‖30  While it is 
―Exit‖, when it is related to ―Voice‖, it is no longer a politics of ―who decides?‖ but a 
proportional balance that the bad side of ―Exit‖ could be used for the good side of ―Voice‖. 
This is a ―contrapunctual law‖,31 using Miguel Maduro‘s word, namely, if all actors, while 
preserving the internal points of their legal order, will commit to some common 
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meta-methodological principles of substantive character in the protection of coherence and 
universality and broadly the promotion of political integration beyond the State. 
Weiler has to meet a number of criticisms which are diagnosed by him as a strange 
combination of theoretical trends of Kelsen and Schmitt. Criticism is Kelsenian in its 
aspiration for a European Grundnorm, which still underscores the search for the ultimate 
source of authority in the Schmittian sense. While Grimm problematizes whether a written 
constitution could invoke the patriotism for Europe, Weiler sees it as the secret attempt to 
drag Europe back to its wrongs and the trap of positivistic jurisprudence. Constitutionalism 
should not be interpreted through its exception but its quotidian practices, Weiler argues.  
It is right for him to emphasize the normative dimension of law and disconnect from 
explaining legal authority through the state of exception and sovereign will, which leads to 
the bitter lesson of positivism. But this does not justify a refutation of any ―foundational‖ 
question or any link of laws to the authority that produces them. It is one question to admit 
that the constitution is a norm rather than a political decision, but it is another question to 




It is the departure from the foundational question that makes Weiler categorize Kelsen and 
Schmitt both as his opponents. This misses the critique of Schmitt on Kelsen and his 
formulation of the nature of ―positivism‖, to borrow George Jellinek‘s term, as the 
―normative power of the factual‖.33 For Schmitt the reason for considering 
constitutionalism in the state of exception is to ward off the danger that institutional and 
orderly politics fetishes itself into positivity without normative correctness any longer in 
sight. But in his arguing against Schmitt as well as Kelsen, Weiler rather mistakes the total 
order of positivism for the foundational claim of the legal system. In this sense, his enemy 
is not positivism, but democracy and thick republicanism.  
Consequently, removing the ‗foundational‘ question chiefly serves the understanding of 
judicial indeterminacy as constitutional politics, in contrast to democratic disquiets in the 
street. Therefore, we could say, Weiler‘s chief jurisprudential contestation is to reduce the 
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extraordinary politics of constitution-making, and to redefine ―constitutionalization‖ as 
incrementalism, praxis and narratives of the Word Constitution. 
This ―Sonderweg‖ of European constitutional order developed by Weiler is influential for 
other authors in reimagining jurisprudence in its practical terms and in making use of legal 
indeterminacy to conceive democracy and upgrade authority. And in this process, 
Europeanization is hardly separated from globalization. Weiler uses the European model, 
chiefly decouples constitutionalism from democracy and disarms thick republicanism with 
a higher-constitutional value of tolerance of ―otherness‖. To include those that are not part 
of the will of the existent political community is a superior value than the integrity of the 
community. This in effect manifests a big step to regenerate constitutionalism with insights 
derived from international law.  
2. Mattias Kumm: “Constitutionalism” and “Rational 
Human Rights Paradigm” 
Mattias Kumm shares the same faith as Weiler, that Europeanization is a historical 
achievement that should not be dismissed. European integration and its reflection on ―bitter 
experiences‖, commitment to human dignity and rule of law, and ambition to build up a 
union different from the American hegemony are a brave enough attempt out of traditional 
jurisprudence.
34
 Its success in modelling a new constitution depends on whether we could 
commit to it without thick constitutional patriotism; or as Kumm puts it, re-invigorate 
republicanism without republican jurisprudence.
35
 
Confronted with the same dilemma of EU Constitutional Treaty, Kumm proposes a 
thought experiment that could make sense of EU conflictual judicial practices, which is 
named by Kumm as ―Constitutionalism‖ against Legal Monism (as reflected in Costa) or 
Democratic Statism (as in Kadi). ―Constitutionalism refers to a position according to which 
a set of universal principles central to liberal democratic constitutionalism undergird the 
authority of public law and determine which norms take precedence over others in 
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particular circumstances‖.36 ―Principles‖, ―values‖ or an ―ideal ought‖ rather than ―a text 
(the constitution)‖ or ―a source (we the people)‖ are of prime import to Kumm‘s paradigm. 
It names a judicial examination of the authority of law, which is an inverse logic of 
positivism. It tests whether from these judicial practices there is a substitute for thick 
republicanism that could be made sense. This archetypical framework and justification in 
public reason is the core of Kumm‘s ―Rational Human Rights Paradigm‖. 
Kumm argues with Robert Alexy‘s theory on rights that, if having a structural 
understanding of judicial practices, we could find that except two cases – as the ―excluded 
reasons‖ and an anti-consequentialist debate of means-ends -- most rights practices apply a 
proportionality test to decide concrete cases. In every case adjudicating rights, we start 
from a prima facto right violation and get access to court, but whether it could turn into a 
definitive violation depends on the process of balancing. Proportionality principle provides 
four prongs for a ―checklist‖ to examine the violation, which are: a legitimate aim, a 
suitable means, necessity and a balancing test (―The greater the degree of infringement, the 
greater the importance of reasons supporting the infringement must be‖37). This checklist 
provides ―an analytical structure for assessing whether limits imposed on the realization of 
a principle in a particular context are justified.‖38 
But it is not only a justification of outcomes, but also a paradigm to examine public reason. 
The ―rights reasoning‖ reflects ―the structural richness of reasoning about political 
morality‖,39 and shares ―important structural features with rational policy assessment‖.40 
Thus it is also a modelling of and a commitment to political liberalism. By asking ―what 
justifies‖ like Socrates did, Kumm reverses judicial function as an agency of interpretation 
which could only interpret laws already given. Rather than supervising outcomes of 
legislation, it is for Kumm ―a right to contest‖ as a re-elaboration of judicial function. This 
new right bridges between rights and authority as Arendt suggests in the term 
―jurisgenesis‖.41  
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With this principle-based ―Constitutionalism‖ at hand, it is also possible to act as ―a 
distinctive cosmopolitan framework for the construction of coherently principled yet 
pluralist world of public law‖.42 It bridges classical public law world with constitutional 
pluralism, and enables a cosmopolitan turn. For Kumm, this kind of pluralism is ―not deep 
and hard, but shallow and soft‖.43 This nature of soft principles makes possible a broader 
thought experiment of the cosmopolitan turn which integrates international law with 
national constitution, the small ―c‖ along with the big ―C‖ into one cognitive framework. 
As Kumm asks ―what if the real puzzles, pathologies and peculiarities are connected to the 
way national constitutional lawyers imagine constitutional law, rather than the way 
international lawyers imagine international law?‖44 
The Cosmopolitan paradigm is necessary for Kumm to make sense of four phenomena in 
today‘s global world: the interface between national and international laws, the internally 
complex governance structures within international law, the functional 
re-conceptualization of sovereignty, and basic structural features of contemporary human 
rights practices.
45
 But with closer observation, these four tasks are not equal. Rather, the 
―functional reconceptualization of sovereignty‖ is more than a description of institutional 
practices, but the thought experiment itself.  
Same as ―the proportionality test‖ for constitutionalism, in the cosmopolitan framework, 
four principles could also encompass overlapping jurisdictions and public authority. They 
are: the principle of legality, the jurisdictional principle of subsidiary, the principle of due 
process and the substantive principle of respect for human rights and reasonableness. The 
principle of legality is the first step for building up gradated authority with a shift from 
rules of conflict to rules of engagement; the principle of subsidiary replaces the language 
of sovereignty in the service of international capacity building; the principle of due process 
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But a composition of the four all starts from ―a principled framework‖47 for constitutional 
pluralism that hollows ―authority‖ out of its material existence. Principlization of ―legality‖ 
dissociates its link to positivism and provides an openness to plural norms. As Kumm 
argues, ―why should one think of legality in the somewhat schizophrenic way, sharply 
separating international from domestic legality? ... Why should the idea of legality not 
generally require that the law be taken seriously, whether it is domestic or international 
law?‖48 If Kumm‘s thought experiment aims to merge two paradigms of the international 
and the national, it is the hypothesis that sovereignty could be re-conceptualized. But 
dematerialization of conflicts about legality rather turns the hypothesis into a defect of the 
thought experiment, and a need for further gradation through equivalent principles. 
Reconceptualization of a cosmopolitan public authority alternative to state sovereignty 
hence is the hypothesis, the principle and the conclusion as well.  
The ―gradated authority‖ in effect is a paradox. It treats authority as derived from 
justification in a linear way and as a matter of degree. But if that is the case, we do not 
even need a gradated authority, even the principle of legality, because we only need rights 
and reason. For Kumm, commitment to legality is not necessary to explain, but it is 
precisely this commitment gives a forum for public reason, which itself could not be 
gradated. This commitment to the rule of law is an inheritance from European traditional 
jurisprudence
49
 which Kumm takes into his new jurisprudential thinking without 
indebtness. His paradigm seems to experiment with a reason to commit, but once we 
commit, the nature of the reason as a thought experiment falls out of sight. 
Using justification principles is crucial to reconcile the two poles of classical 
constitutionalism, as it eases the tension between the rights question and the authority 
question. Instead, Kumm formulates it as a question of right to contest authority or right to 
engage in forming authority. It is correct to say authority should be justified by public 
reason and human rights, but this justification does not enable an immediate connection 
between the two poles. Even if we admit there is a right to contest authority, it is an 
extra-legal right as it must produce the authority. In this sense, it is also distinguishable 
from other judicial rights that are subject to ―proportionality‖. As once it is put to 
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supervision of the judiciary, it is surrendered to an authority which submission suspends its 
contestation. Hence the right to contest is not able to be contained within judicial 
indeterminacy in its jurisgenetic meaning. Proportionality as a legal principle could not 
encompass the extra-legal right to contest, or to put in the other direction, the register of 




In sum, Kumm‘s paradigm is not merely a legal one supervised in the courtroom since the 
―right to contest‖ is always extra-legal in disguise and rejects given authority. The path 
dependence of legal experimentation is in contradiction with contestability of authority. 
And it is thus too early to dispose of the philosophical thinking about the structure and 
foundation of law, and replace democracy with equivalent principles of judicial 
indeterminacy. 
3. Neil Walker: the “Constitutionalism-lite”: “democratic 
deficit” relative to “sovereignty surplus” 
Neil Walker holds different views from Weiler and Kumm on the process of European 
integration. And in his diagnosis, the crisis of European constitutionalization is rather due 
to a simplified formulation of the constitutional issue at the beginning of the integration 
which now develops into a ―crisis of ideals‖. ―The founding values of peace and prosperity 
no longer have the resonance they did in the years of post-War austerity.‖51 The crisis 
rather enables the necessary change to deepen inquiry into European constitutionalization. 
The complexity of European integration embodies three levels of constitutional claims: 
output legitimacy, regime legitimacy and polity legitimacy.
52
 While the European project 
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starts from a common regulatory cause and in service of economic purposes, international 
organizations as the means to achievement of these purposes demand increasing attention. 
But the ―‗polity‘ legitimacy, was barely, if at all, registered, as this would require the 
unlikely assumption that the European Union‘s Treaty predecessors had initially sought to 
construct, or succeed in constructing, anything as grand as a ‗polity‘.‖53 
In solving this ideal-in-crisis, Walker has mapped and categorized the diverse schools and 
their projections about European constitutional future into six D‘s (Denial, Delegation, 
Demarcation, Disaggregation, Displacement, and Dualism).
54
 These disagreements 
regrettably have not found a proper container for their differences. A methodological 
innovation is needed to set up a common language about constitutionalism so as to allow 
for broader imagination to take hold. Walker does share Kumm‘s thinking on the 
transferability of constitutionalism, and he starts not from rights practices but directly from 
the conception of the genetic code of ―Verfassungsverband‖,55 to argue that ―whereas 
‗state‘ is clearly a norminal category, ‗constitution‘ is ambiguously poised between the 
norminal and the adjective‖.56 To do justice to both holistic constitutionalism and 
multi-level constitutionalism, several prejudices should be overcome. Two groups are 
delineated by Walker in accordance with their similar pitfalls, norminalist, formalist and 








 The ―Denial‖ group holds the view that nothing of much import has changed in Europe, 
while the ―Delegation‖ group argues the democratic accountability should be taken care of 
by keeping in mind the issue of delegation. ―Demarcation‖ treats the democratic deficit as 
a virtue rather than a vice. In ―Disaggregation‖ group, democracy becomes an adjective 
rather than a noun, which inspires engagement of the people with knowledge and 
motivation to put things in common. ―Displacement‖ is the inverse of denial while the 
―Dualism‖ group insists on ―a dual or multi-level democracy with each level holistic and 
demos-presupposing in its own terms. 
See Neil Walker (2007b) ―Europe at 50 -- A mid-Life Crisis? ‗Democratic Deficit‘ and 
‗Sovereignty Surplus‘: Part Three of the Constitutional Trilogy‖, (September 2007) Mario 
Einaudi Center for International Studies, Working Paper Series No. 11-07. Available at: 
http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/sites/einaudi.cornell.edu/files/publications/11-2007.pdf 5-8 
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After this categorization, Walker asks, ―(h)ow, if at all, do we move beyond this divide?‖58 
It is a balance between ―abstraction‖ and ―disaggregation‖.59 In terms of abstraction, a 
general issue must be ―acknowledged by both mind-sets‖,60 on the meta-definition of 
constitutionalism ―as referring to that species of practical reasoning which, in the name of 
some defensible locus of common interest, concerns itself with the organization and 
regulation of those spheres of collective decision-making deemed relevant to the common 
interest.‖61(my emphasis) 
The meta-constitution, namely, the ―common interest‖ indicates that for Walker we could 
possibly have a constitution which is detached from nation states. This success depends on 
an unfolding of state constitutionalism and detecting where its paradigm shift lies. So after 
balancing in ―abstraction‖, Walker starts ―a secondary inquiry‖, in terms of a 
―disaggregation‖. Constitutionalism in state practices is ―a cluster concept‖,62 as Walker 
puts, which ―synchronically and diachronically‖63 combine four layers: juridical, 
political-institutional, popular and societal layers. What is more, in the modern state 
constellation, there is a further layer as ―frame of frames‖, or ―holism of holisms‖,64 
namely a co-articulation of the four layers. This fifth layer must be different from other 
four layers, and it is adjectival rather than nominal, or else we will be trapped in the 
―epistemic‖ pitfalls as formerly mentioned. This is a crucial layer in Walker‘s theory that I 
will return to later. 
From Walker‘s disaggregation, it is clear that the material constitution immediately turns 
to be one layer of the five that regime or performance legitimacy for Walker is a shallow 
diagnosis of the debate at hand. The crisis rather concerns an ―authority‖ problem, namely, 
―the disappearance of any settled, singular grid for defining the relations between legal 
orders‖.65 It concerns the third function of constitutionalism – constitutionalism as polity 
legitimation. As Walker puts it,  
―By polity legitimation is meant the fundamental acceptance of the entity in 
question as a legitimate political community – as one possessing the authority to 
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subject matters that significantly affect the life chances of the putative 
community‘s member to collective decision making. At the same time, such 
legitimation must inspire, in a related fashion (since the authority of legal and 
political power is inseparable from its social acceptance), a sufficient sense of 
social identity or ‗we feeling‘ as to induce compliance with and thus to render 
effective the collective decisions made on its behalf and in its name. However 
modest or ambitious the threshold of common attachments may be, without it, 
there will be no polity at all, much less a legitimate one.‖66 
But different from ―polity‖, ―polity legitimation‖ intrinsically embodies the legitimate 
formation of a ―community‖, and in common with Habermas, this ―legitimation‖ in its 
epistemic sense is linked to the ―motivational‖ question of the individual, the ―we‖ 
feeling.
67
 Right at this point, Walker could debate against the group insisting on 
democratic ontology as the defining character of constitutionalism. The ―We‖ feeling for 
Walk rather puts democracy under scrutiny. ―Where constitutionalism involves the 
qualification of democracy, the terms of such qualification tend to possess a 
meta-democratic pedigree … Yet, its performative meaning is itself a form of higher order 
or meta-democracy – of a democracy about democracy (or about whatever other form of 
quotidian political organization is chosen).‖68 
Constitutionalism as polity legitimation hence implies an ―iteration of democracy‖.69 It is 
in tension with democracy, but also connects to democracy in a reconcilable manner. This 
same logic is constantly applied in Walker‘s writings, in his discussion about the ―doctrinal 
and disciplinary‖ publicness,70 and the lawness of law,71 namely, the situated law and 
uncharted law. For Walker, situated law is a combination of partly structure of legal texts, 
partly intra-systemic recursiveness of law and partly law‘s symbolically self-corroborating 
tendencies.
72
 This combination secures law‘s co-ordinates and prevents new candidates 
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from emerging, such as the New Governance.
73
 But also due to this, uncharted law, 
though has shortcomings in all the four layers as Walker has delineated, exhibits an 
―intensely reflexive legal politics of charting, which is also a politics of definition, and 
indeed a politics of inquiry into the very limits of our imagination of law as a useful form 
of practical reasoning‖.74 
Here, let me come back to the fifth layer as Walker has made, and it is clear that this layer 
for Walker is a special layer that is preserved even all the other four failed. Initially served 
as a methodological disaggregation to test the paradigm shift, the fifth layer manifests its 
singular value. Its existence alone reveals that constitutionalism is not holistic, but the 
all-embracing quality is given to ―an ‗open‘ or ‗relational‘ constitutionalism‖.75 And this 
symbolic quality will not be affected by any material failure of translation. Walker puts it 
as ―the final irony‖.76  
―It is precisely because the language of constitutionalism, considered as a 
normative technology, finds it ever more complex and difficult to address the 
problem of communal living it poses in and for a post-state world, that it becomes 
all the more important to retain the language of constitutionalism, considered as a 
symbolic legacy, as an insistent reminder of what and how much is at stake.‖77 
But then why does Walker not just insist on the symbolic value from the beginning instead 
of being involved in the futile effort of overruling material constitutions, since the 
symbolic constitutionalism is not to be affected by the material reality? Here lies the key 
objection of Nico Kirsch to what appears already as ―fit‖ or ―family resemblance‖78 in 
Walker‘s ―scheme of intelligence‖.79 Though Walker indeed notes the probably different 
environments of source and destination of the translation, his abstraction of 
―constitutionalism‖ to ―political prudence‖ eliminates its particular and historical origin in 
order to guarantee a ―fit‖. ―This already presupposes that constitutionalism‘s explanatory 
value and justificatory roots are indeed universal … As a result of this approach, Walker 
comes to define the concept in such an abstract way that the actual challenges of 
translation disappear; constitutionalism becomes a mere ‗symbolic and normative frame of 
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reference.‘‖80In Krisch‘s perspective, Walker‘s experiment does not replace the specific 
meaning of nation-state constitutionalism, but ends with a multiplication of the meaning.  
The process of searching for an equivalence though failed could be used for diagnosing the 
European case that Walker argues, ―this democratic deficit is intimately related to a rather 
less well-known phenomenon, what I call the ‗sovereignty surplus‘ of the EU.‖81 To return 
to the crisis of Europeanization, the urgent task is to insist on the symbolic value of 
―constitutionalism‖ and charted the uncharted governance structure in Europe so as to 
prove sovereignty could ―be plausibly claimed by the EU itself‖.82 A revision of the 
Westphalian system is proposed to introduce complementarity between state law and 
international law.
83
 Universalizability, by means of the cosmopolitanism of Habermas, 
―can guarantee an appropriately inclusive structure of ongoing argumentation and a 
suitable general scheme of implementation.‖84 
It is the discourse alone that sustains all the broken promises about the constitutional future, 
while at the same time, this indicates that the discourse must empty itself enough to equate 
with potential candidates, or precisely speaking, against ―finalité‖.85 But devoid of all 
institutional legitimacy, how could Walker‘s constitutionalism act as the placeholder rather 
than (as criticized by himself) ―a floating signifier‖? If Walker, against Kumm, intends to 
go ―thickly‖ into polity, community and democracy, this temporal ―incompleteness‖ 
always leads him to elide the ―thickness‖. Therefore, we could see the same turn occurs in 
him as did in Kumm, the ―authority‖ issue is always subject to ―legitimation‖ based on 
reason and discourses. And in common with Weiler, reflections on positivism lead to open 
thinking of ―authority‖ and depend on justification, praxis and complementarity between 
law and governance. Walker‘s emphasis on polity legitimacy instead of regime legitimacy 
focusing on material institutions is only half done, as the ―we‖ is also subject to 
self-reflexivity, chiefly represented by human rights jurisprudence and stakeholding 
construct through adjudication. Here, it is clear how a critical movement to restore 
constituent power comes back to the legal register. 
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4. Summary of this chapter 
In this chapter, I reviewed three authors who are inspired by the process of European 
integration and human rights jurisprudence that is expected to re-present constituent power 
in a new light. Walker sought it in a forward-looking constitutional moment, different from 
Ackerman‘s. While Ackerman‘s constitutional moment is only projected back from its 
consequences, ―the understanding of constitutional theory and praxis in particular 
advanced below nonetheless suggests good reasons not to view popular mobilisation as the 
defining property of a constitutional moment. Rather, a more expansive and 
multidimensional conceptualization of what is properly of constitutional moment is 
sought.‖86 
The philosophy of praxis is brought into the picture, and equips us to understand the 
evolutionary process of the emergence of a new perspective. Ackermann‘s projection of 
constituent power onto ‗moments‘ has functioned to displace more incremental progress 
and undermined the depth of history, as Lefort might have argued.
87
 It is time to 
re-examine how constituent power appearing in the exceptional case could be 
re-discovered in ordinary politics. 
All this gives them a critical task to distance themselves from a mere ―attribution‖ of 
constituent power to constitutional law. Without denouncing huge developments of human 
rights, a new jurisprudence stemming from a post-positivist conception of legal authority 
and democratic ontology is my focus. The effort of all three authors is to re-invest in 
democracy with lessons derived from Rule of Law. If law is democratically made, then this 
democratic quality has also to be examined by its outcomes—inclusiveness of human 
rights. 
This jurisgenerative archetypical framework also embodies justification and semantics. 
New types of rights are developed to bridge the gap formerly lying between rights and 
democracy, such as rights to contest, rights to engage, rights to self-government, rights to 
association, and rights to demand justification, etc. In all, rights to democracy. This 
optimization of democratic potential by means of human rights merely shifts the original 
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question rather than answers it.
88
 If at the beginning the question is how to secure legal 
authority when faced with flexibility and the technocratic use of human rights regime, the 
answer we get is to make good use of this fluidity. The danger of law being captured by 
sectorial interests and opportunistic flexibility becomes the reflexivity in this justification 
culture. As Ming-Sung Kuo acutely puts it, this reflexivity ―transposes democracy to the 
legal principles of proportionality, rationality, and subsidiarity, and then construes them in 
light of the notions that refer to social responsiveness such as democratic 
experimentalism.‖89 New constitutionalism, rather than accounting for democratic deficit, 
revises implications of democracy instead.
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As argued in chapter 6, the epistemic approach leaves the inertia of material institutions 
unanswered. The attempt to ease the rigidity through a ―placeholder‖ concept of 
constitutionalism as Walker proposes, gives the adjectival meaning of constitutionalism 
priority compared to the material one. But to borrow a Derridian narrative, ―(h)ow to go, 
more precisely, to this value of ‗rights‘ constructed on the analogy between what the noun 
designates (le droit, ‗right‘, das Recht) and what the adjective or adverb means (direct, 
rigid, rectilinear)?‖1 
The suspension and navigation of the institutional rigidity needs an external 
contextualization, which re-formulates the legal validity question as production of validity. 
Systems theory could provide a way to condition ―path dependence‖ and transform it to a 
―path shaping moment‖ (Bob Jessop),2 as systems theory provides a potential to discuss 
the normative question in a functional sense. This is prerequisite for re-imaginations, and it 
is the methodological departure shared by Gunther Teubner, Saskia Sassen and Bob Jessop 
in their arguments about globalization in a sociological perspective. 
In this chapter, I will start from Luhmann‘s systems theory and the merit of the 
sociological approach to constitutionalism. Secondly, I explain this intermediary approach 
exemplified in Saskia Sassen‘s observations of incipient process of globalization. In the 
third section, I am focusing on Gunther Teubner‘s ―societal constitutionalism‖ and changes 
made to the classical constitutional paradox. In the end, my main purpose is to generalize 
the sociological approach to contemporary constitutionalism and the alternative it claims to 
provide. 
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1. Luhmann’s sociology of constitutionalism: structural 
coupling of law and politics, law and economy 
Luhmann‘s sociological approach to constitutionalism and Rule of Law begins with a 
critique and problematization of traditional theories. For Luhmann, these theories are 
inconsistent in dealing with the relationship between law and politics. No matter whether it 
is Bodin‘s natural law theory, Hobbes‘s social contract or the virtue and corruption of 
government as for Hume, a ―unification‖ perspective is adopted by them in viewing law 
and politics. Therefore, in dealing with the core problem of modern state—the problem of 
resistance, Luhmann says this: ―Here lies the hidden motif of all theories built on the unity 
of politics and law. In other words, the difference between the legal system and the 
political system can be understood, under the prevailing premises, as legitimate resistance 
to the political exercise of law‖.3 
This unification is unconvincing if interprets resistance to one system as immediately 
accepted by the other system. But neither the legal system nor the political system can 
tolerate exceptions. ―Thus one demand for, or attempt at, closure opposes another. At the 
same time, crucial points of view are exposed by this confrontation.‖4 ―Closure and 
confrontation‖ hence are Luhmann‘s approach to explaining the relationship of law and 
politics, in his reading of the schema of the Rechtsstaat. The Rechsstaat is a schema 
―which makes possible to define two reverse perspectives as a unity to celebrate it as an 
achievement of civilization: the juridical shackling of political force and the political 
exploitation of law‖.5 
The legal system can do without a sovereign but does need decisions on claims, while the 
political system culminates in the sovereignty of the people, but remains sovereign even 
when it comes to the question of not deciding.
6
 Though it is hard to imagine two separate 
systems, they are indeed ―operatively closed and non-congruent‖ based on different 
internal coding.  Yet because of that, law gains its universal relevance for society and 
autonomy from the political system, so that we could talk about the ―Rule of Law‖. So 
instead of seeing the separation as a problem, it ―can be seen as the precondition for the 
increase of the interdependence … The democratization of the political system and the 
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positivization of the legal system have only been able to develop by conditioning and 
stimulating each other‖.7 The ―structural‖ coupling ―means the possibility of growing out 
of an external difference‖.8 Externality not only assures relative autonomy but also 
conditions their interdependence which also restricts their autonomy. 
The structural coupling of two autonomous systems of law and politics is based on mutual 
―irritability‖ and is used by Luhmann for arguing normativity.9 Irritation enters as 
―information‖ of the environment into the ―internal preparedness‖ of the system. In this 
sense, the social communication system depends on a structural coupling with the psychic 
system of consciousness. ―Only when consciousness is involved can society be affected by 
its environment‖.10 Without communication in consciousness, coding could not secure 
connectedness to stimuli in the environment. Hence here lies a link that is deeply 
conditioned by modern individualism as a mode of conceptualising the individual-society 
relationship. 
Modern individualism has a historical origin in economic developments, yet is not 
explained by Luhmann in purely economic terms such as a mere replacement of household 
economy by contract and property. Rather he stresses only in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, ―a structural coupling of subsystems‖11 was made possible, when 
separate economic and political systems were coupled by means of a new concept of the 
constitution that ―institutions find a form‖.12 There are two separate couplings between 
law and economy and law and politics, which I will explain further as it concerns the 
public/private law distinction as well as the constitutional as distinguished from other 
positive laws. 
Firstly, economic interests were divorced from their specific contexts and ―homogenised‖ 
by legal operations. As Luhmann puts, ―(t)he concept of interest, even more so than the 
concept of subjective rights, points to the fact that the legal system has built up a highly 
sensitive reception and transmission station for economic news‖.13 Usability of money 
further enabled to establish a self-contained autopoietic economic system. Luhmann has 
emphasized the ―constitutive‖ relation between law and economy that sociology of law 
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 Contract regulation historically underwent a shift from the law of 
property to the law of obligations, due to the change in its concepts from initial particular 
performances between the contracting parties, to the general institutionalization of freedom 
of contract and its orientation to the future. It extends to further being coupled with the 
political system in the eighteenth century, due to the concept of ―representation‖ springing 
forth from property, and the claim of ―freedom of contract‖. Through them, the structural 
coupling between economy and law ―became the medium of political power‖, as the 
political system was experimenting with how far it ―can do with intervention without 
putting the autopoiesis of the respective systems at risk, that is the self-regenerating forces 
of money and law‖.15 
Property right and contract freedom provide occasions for a branch of law called private 
law, while the ―state‖ is the carrier of the coupling of political and legal 
systems—―however only under the special condition that the state was given a constitution 
which made positive law the instrument of choice for political organization and, at the 
same time, made constitutional law a legal instrument for disciplining of politics‖.16 This 
is especially developed in North America. The Constitution adds an additional 
achievement ―of a collision rule‖ and refers to rules of interpretation. The Legal system 
hence establishes a distinction between constitution and other law internally, which brings 
about the implications of ―constitutionality‖. As Luhmann puts it,  
―Thus positive law can even perpetuate itself … The traditional legal hierarchy of 
divine law, eternal law or variable natural law, and positivistic law vanished. Its 
cosmological and religious fundamentals had dissipated anyway. Instead, the 
constitution proclaimed that the responsibility for all law lies with the legal 
system … As soon, however, as the distinction emerged between 
constitutional/unconstitutional and legal/illegal, the constitution gathered 
momentum. Now the law mustered a mechanism, which was secured by 
self-exemption, to pronounce itself illegal.‖17 
It completed the self-referential closure of legal system, and replaces the unformulable rule 
of the sovereign state -- ―invisibility of the problem and its solution, its 
incommunicability … what could be called the meta-constitutional meaning of the 
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constitution‖.18 From here, the constitution is argued through ―contingencies‖ of 
evolutionary achievements of system couplings -- the functional terms of systems theory. 
With this contingency opened to the future, variety increases while the mechanism for 
generating ‗redundancy‘ becomes a problem. It burdens the exclusion effect and the 
externalization requirement of systems. For Luhmann, it turns to be a crucial question ―on 
whether and how the apparatus of classical constitutionalism can be adapted to the 
developments of the welfare state‖.19 Decision making transforms greatly in welfare states, 
and for Luhmann, makes welfare states become ―a fast-selling item‖.20 It is manifested in 
the expectations held of a constitution that the individualist-rational use of property is 
expressed as ―in itself increased welfare‖.21 This induces ―the flip side‖22 of subjective 
rights that ignores the impossible fusion of psychological operations and social operations 
and undermines the objective validity of subjective rights. It reduces legal reflexivity to ―a 
cybernetic matching‖, and Luhmann re-orients the discussion to the guiding distinction of 
―inclusion and exclusion‖ in the world society.  
Before moving to Gunther Teubner‘s development of Luhmann‘s theory in the context of 
globalization, I want to argue for the contribution of systems theory to the heuristic 
framework of constitutional debates. Against resorting to meta-level normative theory as 
natural law or theology, Luhmann understands constitutionalism in terms of the operative 
closure and structural couplings of legal and political systems. What is normative lies in 
this coupling rather than located in either the constituent power or constitutional form or in 
any co-originality between the two. Systems theory bases ―reflexivity‖ on the coupling of 
law and politics conditioned by ―externalization‖ -- a structural distinction and 
interdependence, other than merely politicization of legal indeterminacy. This 
externalization also reveals possibilities to exit from the juridification of rights, which is 
unable to be explained by the legal approach that emphasizes access to court and 
engagement in justification. Rather, with systems theory, we are able to answer the 
question that Derrida poses as how the ―right of‖ in a juridical sense could be re-oriented to 
―right to‖ that emancipates it from institutional inertia.  
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But Luhmann‘s functionalism also releases contingent innovations. And a number of 
questions could be asked of Luhmann this time: If the State and its constitution are only 
contingently conditioned by modern individualism, the regime of property and contract, 
and the coupling between economic, legal and political systems, why could a new public 
and private law distinction not enable a new coupling appropriate to global society? Why 
could contingencies not transgress the structure rather than always maintain the structure? 
Why not think contingency about the structure more than contingency of structure? In this 
sense, it is fair to make a critique of systems theory for its historical selectivity, especially 
its correlation with modern individualism and specific concepts of property and contract 
that build a certain consistency into the idea of the structural coupling. As we have 
witnessed in today‘s world, subjective rights tuned in accordance with the economic logic 
is a real trend, which is no longer a ―normativization‖ or ―codification‖ question that the 
objectivity of law could manage  closure over. Rather it is a new phase of ―normalization‖ 
or ―regularization‖ in a Foucauldian sense.23 The economic imperative demands fast 
decision-making and an immediate translation into law, which fuses the divide between 
legal and economic systems to the extent that the closure and interdependence could not be 
maintained as before. 
This is where Gunther Teubner revises Luhmann‘s theory which I will explain in the third 
part. Teubner inherits the heuristic framework of systems theory and critically adapts it to 
new paradoxes brought about by globalization. The contingency and irritation emphasized 
by systems theory make it possible to imagine alternatives to modern individualism, 
property rights, public/private law distinction, and human rights implications for doctrine 
of law. So a paradigm shift might appear, for Teubner, when subjective rights become 
stimuli for configuration of new paradoxes. Teubner hence develops his ―societal 
constitutionalism‖ to confront globalization, which challenges the state ensemble in 
accordance with which classical constitutionalism is primarily modelled.  
2. Reconfiguration and the releasing movement of 
denationalization 
Before approaching Teubner‘s societal constitutionalism, I want to first cite Saskia Sassen, 
who contributes to examining the ―endogeneity trap‖ in the current discussion of nation 
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states and globalization. As Sassen points out, ―(a) focus on the outcome rather than the 
tipping point is typical of much of the literature on globalization; this then leads to 
comparisons of the national and the global and easily falls into the trap of assuming that if 
the global exists it is in spite of the national‖.24 
This consequentialist thinking ignores that the ―new‖ in history is rarely simply ex nihilo. 
For Sassen it is necessary to develop a more detailed and complex heuristic framework 
with three constitutive elements as capabilities, tipping points and organizing logics. And 
the three capabilities she gives relate to territory, authority and right. In this case, 
nation-state constitutionalism and its translatability is a question of re-configuration. The 
heuristic value of ―re-configuration‖ should not be underrated, as it shifts a grand argument 




For Sassen, to explore discontinuities beneath the surface of continuities or vice versa, we 
have to pay attention to the dynamics between the state and the private realm. Capitalism 
from its first formation was both national and global. Its current condensation was shaped 
by a joint effort by both private and state actors. But in the phase of political nationalism, it 
is ―a distinctive road from a decentralized polity whose legitimacy derived from ‗law‘ to a 
centralized national state that becomes the source of law. … where the state is the highest 
form of legal personality.‖26 The supreme legal personality of nation states is constructed 
by positivism and separated from the global nature of capitalism. Now, the law and 
economy movement has increasingly released ―structural tendencies that make 
international competition today function primarily as a mechanism for denationalizing 
capital.‖27Global financialization in this sense creates the chance to decode the mystery of 
legal personality supreme in nation-states. 
Bob Jessop in his writings clearly elaborates these effects due to the transformation of the 
mode of production, from Fordism to post-Fordism. In effect, globalization, more than in a 
territorial shift, is a relativization of scale and acceleration of time. ―(T)he hypermobile 
form of financial capital depends on their unique capacity to compress their 
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decision-making time, whilst continuing to extend and consolidate their global reach‖.28 It 
is put by Jessop as the conquest of space by time.
29
 
Compared to Jessop‘s welcoming of the post-national trial-and-error circle of governance 
and meta-governance,
30
 Sassen rejects scholarship ―that sees the state as merely evolving 
and adapting‖,31 as there is still a distinctive role for the nation state to play in global 
politics. Precisely speaking, denationalization instead of post-national governance is the 
description that Sassen employs in her theory about globalization. A ―critical‖ and acute 
observation on the ―constitutive‖ elements more than merely adaptive elements is 
important so as ―to wit, that one strategic locus lies deep inside the national.‖32 
Concerning the importance of local struggles and democratic participation, Sassen still 
emphasizes a subjective dimension against the scientific tone of Jessop. The advent of the 
moment of jumping track (from the national to the global) depends on all the three 
capabilities being re-configured, a condition yet to be fulfilled.
33
 The third capability 
‗rights‘ is especially so, if we observe how the global actors in international institutions 
and multinational companies travel freely, whereas the third world labour are confined in 
their territory unless they are transformed into a service.
34
   
Along with Teubner, intermediation is the distinctiveness of the sociological approach of 
Sassen. She admits that ―incipient and partial are two qualifiers I usually attach to my use 
of denationalization‖.35 Globalization is chiefly unbundling, decoding and releasing. But 
could this process deliver any normative meaning, such as regulation?  It is hardly so. If 
there are normative values, it lies in a releasing of the natural forces of global capitalism, 
and ―a reduced set of interactions between citizens and the state‖36. As Sassen puts it, 
―The state‘s power can be seen as historically coalescing into an overwhelming 
centripetal effect on a bundle of potentially disparate elements including 
spatio-temporal orders. That centripetal condition is today coming under multiple 
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centrifugal effects. Although partial, this transformation begins to make legible the 
presence of diverse spatio-temporal orders within the putative unitary time-space 
of the national.‖37 
Despite a gloomy picture of democracy at the global level, Sassen calls for a redeployment 
of citizenship empowerment, such as immigrates‘ movements in the global cities as a 
frontier zone. Sassen completes a profound mapping of the complex globalization issue 
and best manifests what ―re-configuration‖ means even in the presence of states. And due 
to this, the releasing movement from the encasement of the nation State in global 
financialization is given a positive meaning in Sassen‘s theory.  
3. Gunther Teubner’s “societal constitutionalism”: 
society’s self-regulation 
Gunther Teubner adopts the heuristic value of systems theory while distancing it from the 
analysis of the State form. As Christodoulidis puts it, ―(s)ystems theory is at its core a 
phenomenology: in inviting a re-thinking of conditions of openness and closure in the 
handling of complexity, it delimits what is thinkable institutionally against vast terrains of 
that which is not. Institutional imagination releases contingencies selectively.‖38 It 
therefore provides ―a purchase point for critique‖.39 In the global context, when the 
development of global economy has eroded the traditional public/private law distinction, 
and a new normative basis is not yet in place, ―human rights‖ plays such a role for critique. 
Luhmann has indicated such a turn, in the emergence of a new coding of ―inclusion and 
exclusion‖ in the global world, and it is developed further by Teubner. 
For Teubner, to perceive challenges of globalization to the constitutional politics demands 
a re-moulding of constitutionalism itself. The current constitutional crisis is correlated with 
social fragmentation, which is not ―caused‖ by globalization but ―aggravated‖ by it to the 
extent that the ―equilibrium‖ of the state ensemble is hardly maintained. This means that 
the normative question of globalization for Teubner is re-formulated sociologically, 
different from the pursuit of a global hierarchy of norms. Unlike the discursive approach to 
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politicizing legal sources, or searching for a global polity, globalization for Teubner is not 
one-dimensional legal or political reductionism.
40
 As he writes,  
―The normative question, then, is no longer how hitherto constitution-free social 
spheres of global society might be constitutionalized. The question is rather, how 
can nationalist‘ experiences with societal constitutionalism be transformed under 
the different condition of globality? In particular, how is the role of politics for 
transitional subconstitutions then to be formulated in the magical triangle of 
politics, law and autonomous social spheres?‖41  
Two tasks are concerned in this new constitutional mode of sociological ―re-configuration‖, 
namely, the concern ―to release the energies of political power in nation-states and, at the 
same time, to limit that power effectively, according to the rule of law‖.42 It is a double 
movement: constitutive and limitative movements, generalization and re-specification. I 
will elaborate Teubner‘s theory on globalization and constitutionalism in six points, and 
see how he transposes national experiences to the global context and the inspirations for 
contemporary constitutionalism derived from it. 
The first noticeable point is Teubner‘s sociological approach as an intermediate position 
that it avoids the ―chronic deficits‖.43 Like Sassen, Teubner is also defying these 
requirements such as the non-existence of demos, cultural homogeneity, a deliberating 
public, or political parties. These lines of thinking will lead to proposals of 
re-nationalization or re-politicization. For another thing, a compensatory 
constitutionalization is trying to build a global polity when national constitutions are 
weakened, which still sticks to the path of power and politics.
44
 For Teubner, both tracks 
are wrong and unable to perceive the trend of social fragmentation. Instead the ―societal 
constitutionalism‖ he proposes avoids this ―methodological nationalism‖, departs from the 
state-politics centrality, and relocates politics as a social sub-system. Hybridity defines the 
processing instead of a possible worldwide politicization. The non ab novo position of the 
sociological approach could induce two conclusions: firstly, it is the main task to break 
from the state-politics centrality; secondly, due to the factual asymmetry, we will not have 
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a political centre in the global sphere. In accordance with this, the proposal of societal 
constitutionalism will be a question of processing the couplings of law, politics and other 
autonomous subsystems.  
After reformulating the normative question, it is clearer to observe closely the double 
movements generated. For Teubner, ―(t)ransnational sub-constitutions do not strive 
towards a stable balance but rather follow the chaotic pattern of a ‗dynamic disequilibrium‘ 
between the contradictory developments – between the autonomization and the limitation 
of the functional logics of subsystems. Up to now, the new global constitutional orders 
have for the most part established only constitutive rules which have normatively 
supported the freeing up of various rationalities at the global level. Today, however, it has 
become clear that there is a need for re-orientation.‖45 The re-orientation and limitative 
movement is to curb the uncontrolled dynamics of fragmentation and the negative 
externalities along with their expansion, in order to perceive and respond to the urgency of 
the global financial crisis.  Teubner‘s question is: when will the limitative movement 
(rather the constitutive movement) start? 
What is distinguished in global society is that rationality of fragmented social systems is 
maximized with ―a spiral of growth‖.46 But in today‘s ‗addiction‘ society, earlier chances 
of self-correction appear to be ignored and be available only at the last minute of ―hitting 
the bottom‖. As Teubner puts it, ―(o)nly then is the understanding lucid enough, the 
suffering severe enough, the will to change strong enough, to allow a radical change of 
course.‖47 However, ―hitting the bottom‖ is not the ―constitutional moment‖ indicated by 
Teubner as he continues to write, 
―The constitutional moment refers to the imminent experience of crisis, the 
experience that an energy released in society is bringing about destructive 
consequences, the experience that can be overcome only by a process of 
self-critical reflection and a decision to engage in self-restraint. The phenomenon 
of social systems experiencing the dark side of their promise of progress is, 
ultimately, not a deviation from the ‗healthy‘ course of things; it is not an error to 
be avoided. On the contrary, this experience almost seems to be necessary 
precondition for changing their internal constitution. Ultimately, then, it is a 
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system‘s pathological tendencies that bring forth the constitutional moment, the 
moment of imminent catastrophe in which the decision is made between the 
energy‘s complete destruction and its self-restraint. ‖48  
Our contingent experiences of catastrophes might be usually regarded as ―constitutional 
moments‖, yet for Teubner it is the normal moment of self-correction and distinguished 
from another moment of ―collapse‖. The experience of the dark side of ―catastrophe‖ will 
play the role of ―precondition‖ of self–correction of the ―internal‖ constitution. This 
experience does not necessarily need to be experienced actually; a warning regarding the 
pathological ―tendencies‖ is enough to bring forth a self-restraining ―constitutional 
moment‖, which will be a moment for capillary constitutions to initiate their collective 
learning, rather than an actuality of ―hitting the bottom‖ or an experience of fundamental 
collapse. Here Teubner shares the same view as Weiler does towards the ―exception‖. But 
then as asked by Christodoulidis, ―(h)ow would we even know that tipping points have 
been reached, that destructive energies can no longer be tolerated?‖49 
Deviation from an imminent experience of constituting (from catastrophe) gives the 
constitutional question of societal constitutionalism an extension in experimentation, rather 
than a decision or a paradigm shift. This is the second point of Teubner‘s theory. What‘s 
more, there is a change in classical constitutional thinking, which Teubner names as a 
―hybrid constitutionalization‖.50  Which ―is required in the sense that in addition to state 
power, external societal forces – that is, formal legal norms and civil society‘s 
counter-power from other contexts (media, public discussion, spontaneous protest, 
intellectuals, protest movements, NGO, trade unions, professions and their organizations) – 
exert such massive pressure on the expansionist function system so that it will be 
constrained to build up internal self-limitations that actually work‖.51  It is the third point. 
This is the internal differentiation of functional systems with the interplay of a variety of 
―reflection-centers‖. This differentiation concerns the spontaneous sphere, the organized 
sphere and a self-regulatory sphere of the communicative medium. The dynamic of 
globalization opens chances to reshape the relation between the spontaneous and the 
organized spheres. Global protest movements will play the main example of ―global 
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scandalization‖ 52in the global public sphere, and push the professional-organizational 
spheres into a cognitive re-orientation. Lex Mercatoria for Teubner would be a perfect 
example for unsettling the old distinction between the public/private, and the spontaneous 
sphere/the organizational-professional sphere by means of soft norms and international 
arbitration.
53
 It is social peripheries in the shadow of politics that motivate the process of 
societal constitutionalization. Paradox, which is used for Luhmann to indicate the 
counterfactual consistency and autopoiesis of social subsystems, plays a more significant 
role in Teubner‘s theory. 
Fourthly, sheer contingency is what Teubner inherits from Luhmann‘s ―contingency‖ but 
combines with Rudolf Wietholter‘s concern of ―paradox of law‖54 and Derrida‘s 
―deconstruction as justice‖. It favours non-teleological strategies of de-paradoxification in 
particular. As Teubner puts it,  
―In a comparison with the contradiction-driven dynamics in classical social theory, 
the specific features of a paradox-driven dynamics emerge. The interplay of 
de-paradoxification -- re-paradoxification is anything but a cumulative sequence of 
negations, a ‗transcending‘ of contradiction, a progress of the spirit. It is more a 
case of the return of the same, a continual oscillation between paradox and 
structure, a dialectic without synthesis. The ebb and flow between paradox and 
difference show an experimenting, incremental, exploratory production of orders 
that have to stumble over contingencies. And worlds of meaning are continually 
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afflicted by their deconstruction, which repeatedly lets chaos break back into 
civilization.‖55 
As I asked previously, why does Luhmann‘s contingency stop at the question of 
―structure‖? Is there a line that prevents contingencies jumping out of the structural control? 
Here lies Teubner‘s critique towards Luhmann‘s systems theory for ―the exclusive site it 
reserves for the reflection of transcendence‖.56 He writes, ―what is excluded from the 
reflection of law is the boundaries of the meaning of law itself … While Luhmann asks 
about the law‘s justice to its environment, he does not ask about its justice to the world‖.57 
And it is Derrida that contributes with ―this transcendence of positivity‖58 and brings ―a 
disquieting awareness of transcendence back into the highly rationalized world of economy, 
science, politics and law.‖59 A discourse of ―a possible other of law‖60 is ―law‘s 
transcendence as a temporalization, a futurization that cannot be made present, whereby 
justice can always only mean a postponement to the future.‖61 But transcendence of law 
through time also means putting law‘s systemic specificity to question. It hence not only 
revises the meaning of structure of systems, but also the meaning of ―paradox‖. 
Thus fifthly, this thinking of ―justice‖ also transforms the style of thinking on law and 
transcends the distinction between subjective rights and objective law, individuals and 
institutions. The legal question is no longer about fundamental rights attributed to 
individual actors, but whether ―fundamental rights [can] be made effective against social 
communicative media themselves, rather than against social actors? ... Must the horizontal 
effect of fundamental rights be implemented through organization and procedures, rather 
than through subjective rights?‖62 Disposing of Luhmann‘s objective validity of subjective 
rights, Teubner deems the ―horizontality‖ of human rights is just a reiteration of the old 
language of state action. For him human rights could also adapt people to new normativity 
in the formation and against the dark side of social matrix and social process. But 
Christodoulidis asks, ―if that is the case, is it really true that there is any significant 
distinction to be drawn here between juridification and constitutionalisation?‖ Though 
starting from constitutionalization due to the distance from juridification, Teubner ends 
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with treating constitutionalization as a cognitive conclusion for the ―norm of norms‖ 
through which the legal subsystem gets its own closure for recognition, rather than a 
―politicizable‖ question of navigation of the current disorder of legal authority. 
Finally, we are reaching the conclusion of global constitutionalization as a process of 
―double fragmentation of world society‖. Teubner argues, 
―As a result of the first fragmentation, the autonomous global sectors insist 
stubbornly on their own constitutions, in competition with the constitutions of 
nation states. Moreover, unitary standards of a global constitution are rendered 
utterly illusory by the second fragmentation of the world into various regional 
cultures, each based upon social principles of organization that differ from those of 
the western world‖.63  
Teubner also brings back legal pluralism, but not in the sense of ―groups and communities‖, 
but ―discourses and communicative networks‖. The pluralism differs from Walker‘s 
universalizable particularity as ―(t)he social source of global is not the lifeworld of 
globalized personal networks, but the proto-law of specialized, organisational and 
functional networks which are forming a global, but sharply limited identity.‖64 
Different from fragmentation and discourses about the legal regime in the first approach I 
delineated, Teubner‘s constitutional sociology duplicates the fragmentation into the inquiry 
into what is law itself. But also due to this, he converges with Walker that 
constitutionalism is not only an institutional achievement, but also a symbolic 
constitutionalization with a meta-code of public interest. It will unravel and continuously 
produce paradoxes without teleology or identity presupposed. However, the six points of 
Teubner‘s theory are closely connected and form a circle. The sociological approach plays 
an intermediate role without ―hitting the bottom‖ possible in the global polity. Then we are 
in a hybrid process of constitutionalization with several reflection centres, and it is hence a 
contingent de-paradoxification – re-paradoxification process guided by global human 
rights. The sociological process of globalization hence becomes the model of societal 
constitutionalism, embracing contingency and temporalization, and hybridity turns to be 
the product more than a methodological starting point. As Christodoulidis comments, 
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―Teubner‘s suggestion is for a re-thinking of societal constitutionalism in the 
direction of a reflexive constitutionalism, one that avoids the double danger of, on 
the one hand, tying constitutionalism to a largely redundant framework of the 
nation-state, and on the other, of invoking a global constitutionalism that can claim 
neither the resources nor the institutional density to get it meaningfully off the 
ground.‖65 
However, we could trace all the points and the circularity produced to his use of 
―reflexivity‖ in the first place. It is closely related to his reduction of ―hitting the bottom‖ 
to capillary constitutions. Instead of ―hitting the bottom‖ as a political breaking point, 
internal politicization puts human rights as a contingent learning and self-correction device 
that could be re-invested in, a re-entry that is only ―nominally political‖.66 Though 
revisions are made to Luhmann‘s structural coupling in accordance with the globalization 
process, Teubner does not touch the political element itself. The perceptions of politics and 
politicality stay at the same signifier of state ―government‖. I will argue, in Chapter 9 that, 
this is the main contribution of Foucault‘s ―governmentality‖ that decomposes the 
intelligible nature of ―government‖ and re-opens discussions about ―what is politicizable‖. 
The separation between politics and constitutionalization, materiality and process, 
originates in Teubner‘s break from state-politics-centrality without possibility of 
―uploading‖ politics in the global sphere. Christodoulidis argues that the sociological 
approach surrenders the normative dimension to the functional dimension in a sense of 
instrumentality, and hence is ―reactive‖ to rather than ―reflexive‖ 67about the structure. 
The immunisation of ―structure‖ from ―operation‖ is also criticized by Marcelo Neves.68 
But without that structure and referring to it, we could not distinguish whether we are in a 
normal or pathological development, or whether the limitative movements have already 
taken place. Just as if the Lex Mercatoria could be seen as an example of societal 
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constitutionalism, we could hardly discern what the meaning of the ―societal‖ and whether 
it is a continuation of neo-liberal rationality that even rationalizes the criteria of reflexivity. 
Derrida in his theory of deconstruction and decolonization, has brought the 
―reappropriation‖ question to the fore. And he asks, ―how to do something more and other 
than overturn and (thus) reappropriate?‖69 We could ask Teubner the same question as 
―how to deparadoxify and reparadoxify‖? The temporalization of paradoxification, 
however, ignores what Luhmann defines as ―invisibilization of paradox‖, which means the 
―paradox‖ is used for rendering material conflicts invisible to the degree of being 
―counterfactual‖. So how could we make transgression at the structural level instead of 
feeding the structure with ―double pluralism‖? Luhmann definitely agrees that the legal 
system is about justice and should always orient itself toward it. However, the direct link 
between justice and law in this modern and positive law system is rather lacking.
70
 This 
reservation contrasts with Teubner‘s optimism about the narrative on ―justice‖. Teubner‘s 
sociological approach really catches the point of deconstruction through and through, but 
he temporalizes paradoxes in a non-conflictual way. Instead of unfolding the 
heterogeneous confrontation, Teubner develops it into ―theologization of paradox‖.71 But 
without considering the relationship between the material and symbolic levels, societal 




4. Summary of the sociological renovation of the 
constitutional lesson 
Discussions of the sociological approach to globalization seem to distract us from 
constitutionalism, which we traditionally perceive as a legal discipline. Rather it 
re-formulates the question, and the sociological approach undeniably contributes to paying 
attention to state theory and discussing globalization more broadly than debates on territory 
                                                          
69
 Jacques Derrida, ‗the Crisis in Teaching‘, in Derrida (2002) 103 
70
 Luhmann (2004) 
Luhmann acknowledges that ―(t)he legal system wants to be just, regardless of the facts. … the topic ‗justice‘ 
touches on the point which enables us to overcome the difference between natural law theories and positive 
law theories of the traditional kind.‖ 
71
 Teubner (2005) 59 
72
 Ming-Sung Kuo (2013) ‗Semantic Constitutionalism at the Fin De Siècle: What If Constitutional Ordering 
is Simply a Reflection of Constitutional Episteme?‘ (2013) Warwick School of Law Research Paper No. 
2013-21. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2304731  
He argues that, ―Once being disembedded from the political, discursive communities, the constitutional order 
imagined in the constitutional fragments is only the reflection of a constitutional episteme. It may be 
scientific but is not political.‖ 
 174 
 
or jurisdictional shifts. The sociological approach elevates the problematique of 
globalization challenge to a level where ―path dependence‖ itself is posed as a sociological 
question, and consequently, the institutional foundation, norms and legality could not be 
taken for granted. It opens the discussions to what social conditions will enable a possible 
and necessary jump of track in law. 
Systems theory fits in such a requirement because it provides a heuristic framework to 
discuss the formation of norms in a functional sense. The controversial meta-talk is 
replaced by structural couplings of social subsystems, especially law and politics and law 
and economy. Teubner acutely detects a ―spiral of growth‖ in the process of globalization, 
which will cause also a structural drift between politics and economy. Global 
financialization challenges the temporal dimension of political decision-making process, 
and the effectiveness of separate juridical authority. Legal fragmentation has its origin in 
this discrepancy between the politically maintained state ensemble and the incapacity of 
states to respond to crisis of regulations that have a social, global and accelerated nature. 
Hence in contrast to ―normativization‖ that is based on legal and political decisions, 
Teubner rediscovers ―human rights‖ as a meta-code for hybrid and societal 
constitutionalism that could breed positive dynamics. And he borrows from Derrida 
transcendence in a ―future to come‖, which undermines Luhmann‘s emphasis on the 
objective validity of law and the structural dimension of systemic coupling.  
The general constitutional lesson we could derive from Teubner‘s approach is that 
constitutionalism is a whole set of social arrangements than merely a ―field‖ of law. 
Realization of ―justice‖ is a successive configuration of social subsystems. The old formula 
of constitutionalism is rather a conditioned configuration based on modern individualism, 
concepts of property and contract, and political accountability of government to regulate 
by means of ―constitutionality‖. In the global world, the cluster to bind these elements is 
lacking; and what is more, the double fragmentation reveals that for the ―alter‖ of state 
constitutionalism, conceptions about these ingredients are diverse and yet to be 
re-configured. Justice instead of legality opens the door for non-legal culture in the sense 
of a ―double pluralism‖. 
Welcoming as this approach is, the ambiguous meaning of ―justice‖ is not paid adequate 
attention to by Teubner. This return to meta-talk could not account for material deviations 
that obstruct, if not mutate, the symbolic processing. It is also unclear how the double 
fragmentation could be transgressed with a reference to law whose meaning is already 
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determined. In the next chapter, Marcelo Neves will attack particularly this ―rationality‖ 





Deconstructing “Constitutionalism” and Insights 
from “Peripheral Modernity” 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to the third approach to ―contemporary constitutionalism‖ which 
views ―constitutionalism‖ as a particular good not to be made universal. The formula of 
―Rechtsstaat‖ for authors taking this approach, is based on positivization of law that 
reflects a transition from natural law to modern rationalization of law, which should not be 
seen as a proper depiction of the social orders in non-western countries. Promoting 
―constitutionalism‖ and its positivist paradigm will enslave constituent power in these 
places other than for their benefit of ―constitutionalization‖. 
Therefore, this new approach intends to decode ―constitutionalism‖ encased as such and 
seeks to decouple the Rule of Law ideal from imperialist politics. The Rule of Law ideal 
must be decoupled from the political exploitation of it. Radical pluralism and concrete 
orders especially pose challenges to classical constitutionalism and its coupling of law and 
politics. 
The first part of the chapter will apply Marcelo Neves‘s revision to systems theory to 
understand blindspot of classical constitutionalism and the sociology of law. His theory is 
complemented by Nico Krisch‘s post-national governance and Brian Tamanaha‘s 
ontological conception of ―legal pluralism‖. While their contributions to the translation 
question between the delivering and the receiving ends of ―constitutionalism‖is perceived, 
this chapter argues whether it is a paradigm shift, as Thornhill puts it, ―pluralism as 
constitutionality‖.1 
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1. Marcelo Neves: “Allopoiesis” of law and 
“Transconstitutionalism” 
As I have mentioned in the thesis introduction, both Habermas and Luhmann have written 
on the big transformation from natural law to positive law. This transition has shaped the 
threshold of studies of the ―sociology of law‖, and especially a positivist generation of law. 
Marcelo Neves, with his empirical studies of the social orders in ―peripheral modernity‖ 
has criticized the ―autopoiesis‖ of systems theory of Luhmann as having its blindspot. It is 
especially the political exploitation of law that is under Neves‘s attack. 
Neves starts with an examination of Luhmann‘s borrowing of the concept ―autopoiesis‖ 
from biology. This borrowing is also accompanied with an addition. As Neves introduces it, 
this concept ―has its origin in the biological theory of Maturana and Varela‖,2 and ―(i)n the 
first instance, it refers to the quality of a system to build itself the components of which it 
consists.‖3 In the biological term, it deals with the autonomy of life-systems, 
―characterized by closure in the production and reproduction of elements‖.4 
Luhmann borrows this concept and applies it to his sociological study, which brings a 
crucial addition -- the (psychic and social) ―meaning systems‖ that are distinguishable from 
―(organic and neurophysiological) non-meaning systems‖.5 This, while maintaining the 
autopoietic character in the system‘s self-observation, also introduces and ―enables a new 
combination of closure and environmental openness‖,6 namely social communication 
dependent upon individual cognition. This shift in theoretical backgrounds makes Neves 
question in what sense society could be characterized as ―real-necessarily closed‖. As he 
puts it, ―(a)lthough the reproduction of communications realizes itself within the society 
exclusively (self-referential closure), communications exist inevitably about the (psychic, 
organic, and chemical) environment (openness)‖.7  
Though Neves agrees with the operative closure and the functional differentiation of law 
implied by the concept ―autopoiesis‖, he disagrees with the ―paradigm‖ of differentiation, 
namely, ―the stratification principle (vertically)‖. Neves hence makes a distinction between 
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―autopoiesis of law‖ in the ideal sense and ―positivity of law‖, and contests the latter. This 
is because positivism inflates law with over-political meanings. As he puts it, 
―To the extent that the differentiation principle was based on a distinction between 
‗upper‘ and ‗under‘, only the ‗highest‘, that is, ‗the political system, had 
self-referential autonomy. Law remained overdetermined by politics and a 
political-legitimizing static moral; it did not have its own specific code difference 
between ‗yes‘ and ‗no‘ exclusively.‖8 
It is apparent that in spite of all present legal forms, Neves argues for a possible ―law‖ that 
is horizontal without the hierarchical architecture, otherwise it would be subsumed to 
political coding. For Neves, positivism impedes the cognitive openness of the legal system 
to the environment and radicalizes its closure. Without this openness, the legal system 
cannot take measures to ―de-paradoxicalize its self-reference and, therefore, ensure 
connectivity for further operations.‖9 This rigidity rather makes Luhmann‘s conception of 
the legal system blind to new values or morals so that it is not only ―unlearning‖ but also 
imposing its particular and selective values on the global world. This institutionalization of 
legality distances itself from the claim of justice. As Neves puts it, ―the moral 
neutralization of the legal system is inherent in the positivity of law, makes a theory of 
justice as exterior as well as superior criteria of positive law irrelevant for Luhmann. The 
systemic theory of law reduces the question of justice to either ―adequate complexity 
(outer justice)‖ or ―consistency of decisions (inner justice)‖,10 which if it does not 
―eliminate‖ the problems of justification of Habermas‘s theory, at least displaces it. 
Neves‘s critique of Luhmann‘s systems theory is not about the autonomy of law, but about 
this autonomy as sustained by its coupling with the political system that keeps it from 
learning from the ―alter‖ – ‗other‘ knowledges about law in other areas of the world. So 
Luhmann‘s depiction of the world society exaggerates the application of the legal science 
he observed in the society he was in, and this ―autarchy‖ impedes ―autonomy‖ of a genuine 
legal science to emerge. What‘s more, it is correlated with political hierarchy. It is in the 
intrinsic nature of positive law that the political domination inserts itself and particularly 
feeds on the paradigm of positivism.  
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In contrast to ―autopoiesis of law‖, Neves suggests the term ―allopoietic law‖ as the best 
description of the reality that ―in certain fixedly demarcated territorial spheres of validity 
the functional differentiation of a domain of legal action and experience has not adequately 
developed, and therefore, no self-referential system was built, that would be capable of 
orienting the normative expectations and of regulating the interpersonal behavioural 
contexts.‖11 In these areas, the positive law paradigm is unable to depict how norms are 
generated and function, which Neves describes as ―the very lack of operative autonomy of 
the positive law of state.‖12 The legal system in these states is not systematized in a 
positivist manner; but undeniably, it is their law. 
The attempt to interpret this lack as a ―corruption‖ at the application level of autopoiesis is 
not a good answer for Neves, as empirical studies show that the general ―social exclusion‖ 
occurs not as ―secondary exclusion‖ within subsystems but as ―primary exclusion‖ from 
them. Instead of politics or the political system, it chiefly concerns social integration, or in 
Habermas‘s terms, whether the communicative action of law has functioned well to 
integrate the whole society. In this sense, Neves‘s refutation is far from an empirical 
correction, as he poses the exclusion question to the level of ―over-integration and 
under-integration‖13 that ―is expanded and intensified resulting in the releasing and 
generalizing of destructive consequences which act against the validity of differentiating 
legal codes and against a constitution based on the rule of law and which represents the 
structural coupling of law and politics.‖14 
In this background, the concrete order has an important role to play. Neves argues that 
―concretization‖ reveals ―a de-legalizing political reality and a de-constitutionalizing legal 
practice‖.15 ―Constitutionalism‖ if confronted with its scandalous and divergent practices 
in non-western countries, rather acts as an ideological tool. But underneath this ―symbolic 
constitutionalism‖, it is rather the ―impossibility‖ of such a coupling that is the true 
reflection of the legal system in peripheral countries. In these peripheral countries, Neves 
argues, a constitutional rationality is super-imposed on what are in effect constitutional 
orders alien to it. And this ―rationality of rationalization‖ is unable to be restored through 
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Gunther Teubner‘s ―socially diffuse law‖16 or Ladeur‘s post-modern language game 
which could only bring about ―pluralisation of autopoiesis‖.17 
In Derrida‘s critique of the centrality of ―the political‖ in Schmittian theory, he questioned 
Schmitt‘s correlation of the ―concrete order‖ to a political framework.18 This framework is 
constitutively enabled by a philosophical polemic about the friendship and enmity, which 
also inversely stresses the necessity of rulership. The rationality of ―constitutionalism‖ for 
Neves does the same thing to the rule of law and inflates it with a political hierarchy. Law 
is instrumental to political rule and is dissociated from its moral values. This is especially 
the case of ―foundational constitutionalism‖ which imagines a single act of founding a 
community and makes it its common will.  
To deviate from this pitfall, Neves achieves a functional understanding of nation-state 
―constitutionalism‖ as protection of rights and limitation of power, and fixes its use as such. 
Hence he both denounces the overuse of ―constitutionalism‖ to solve all problems arising 
in the global world, while preserves certain transferrable functions of ―constitutionalism‖ 
that he could apply through his own terminology of ―transconstitutionalism‖. But then 
what would the ―transconstitutionalism‖ tackle as its object if it is not to establish an 
order? 
This reveals that ―transconstitutionalism‖ builds on a contemporary circumstance of 
already existent diverse legal orders, so that the question of founding and institutional 
establishment does not require explanation. To use Neves‘s term, it is the ―comity‖ of 
judicial orders at local, national, international, supranational and transnational levels
19
 that 
necessitates the thinking of ―transconstitutionalism‖. It is apparent that, by arguing the 
comity, Neves already intentionally suspends their ―vertical‖ implications and regards 
them as ―functional‖ comity as De Wet does. In dealing with the relations between these 
orders, Neves advocates the ―Engagement Model‖ compared to the ―Convergence Model‖ 
and the ―Resistance Model‖.20 The key difference between the three models lies in a 
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demand for presence of what he calls a transversal entanglement among these orders. The 
encounter of different orders is what is sought by the paradigm, an engagement which 
neither promises a convergence nor a pure resistance which would collapse the ―bridge of 
transition‖.21 The latter finds expression in ―Rule of Law‖ and ―Human Rights‖ which are 
preserved as a common language expected to radically revise their current particularity in 
order to properly include the ―alter‖.  
Different form Teubner‘s ―inclusion of persons‖, Neves stresses the being ―worthy of 
personality‖ as the threshold concept. As he puts it,  
―(I)nclusion as a person is what makes respect for the integrity of body and mind 
possible. As a two-sided form, the person constitutes a structural coupling between 
human being and society, serving to face the danger both that the integrity of the 
person‘s biopsychic substrate will be violated or destroyed by the expansion of 
society and that, on the contrary, the latter will be destroyed and disintegrated by 
lack of limits on human desires and drives.‖22 
The conditioned closure of social system to psychic system here is brought back with the 
question of ―recognition‖,23 and a discourse about ―non-identity and identity‖.24 Only at 
this level of ―recognition‖, countries of peripheral modernity could gain justice in the 
―discursive identity and alterity‖.25 We should applaud that Neves raises the question of 
engagement and participation to the level of identity and subject. Global justice should be 
realized on the basis of a formation of global constituent subject rather than a mere 
attribution of stakeholders. However, what concerns us here lies in whether such 
subject-formation could be registered in the constituted comity of judicial orders, as 
suggested by Neves. 
It is closely related to Neves‘ diagnosis of conflicts and overlaps of different judicial orders 
in today‘s world, which is put by him as ―normatively symmetric and cognitively 
assymetric‖.26 And the asymmetry in cognition has to be redressed for Neves through the 
common value of human rights. ―Ambivalence‖27 is suggested by Neves to indicate at one 
                                                          
21
 Neves (2013) 82 
22
 Neves (2013) 160 
23
 Neves (2013) 170 
24
 Neves (2013) 170 
25
 Neves (2001) 264 
26
 Neves (2001) 255 
27
 Marcelo Neves (2007) ‗The symbolic force of human rights‘, Philosophy Social Criticism 33: 411-444 
 182 
 
hand ―the notion of eternal, essential, ahistorical rights‖,28 while at the other hand, ―an 
accomplishment of modern society‖.29 Human right is not an ―invention‖ without ―roots‖ 
in pre-modern society, but it ―represents a substitute for the older notion of natural law‖,30 
and relates to the ―open-ended character of modern society.‖31 
This transition from natural law to positive law, and the consequence of functional 
differentiation coupled with a future orientation, are crucially recognized both in the 
writings of Luhmann and Habermas. But Neves treats it to some degree as a terminological 
change which does not influence the symbolic continuity. He describes it as a 
―transformation of unstructured complexity into structured complexity‖32 that makes 
human rights cognitively sensitive to the surplus of possibilities and risks inherent in 
modern society.  Human rights enable the ―generalized inclusion of humankind in the 
legal sphere‖,33 contingently accompanied with recognitions of ―a normative claim of 
pragmatic universality.‖34 It is in the pragmatic universality of human rights, the diverse 
legal rationalities are engaged and communicated. Though it is unclear there will be a 
correspondence between the universality and particularity, Neves argues that ―(t)he 
symbolic force of acts, texts, declarations and discourses of a normative character serves 
both to maintain the lack of rights and to mobilize people to construct and enforce rights.‖ 
Here, we see a striking convergence of ideas of Neves with Walker‘s ―final irony‖, though 
they are radically different at the threshold. The semantics that finally unites them does not 
necessarily accord with material configurations; and perhaps because of that, the symbolic 
sustains its pure motivational value. Here, the ―counterfactual‖ meaning of the ―symbolic‖ 
is replaced with purification irrespective of facticity. While for Walker, it is best 
summarized as ―cosmopolitanism‖, for Neves, it is a learning stream of ―pluralism‖. In this 
sense, transconstitutionalism is a coupling of the legal science and law (as the term 
―interface norms‖ indicates35), rather than a coupling of law and politics as in classical 
constitutionalism. 
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Neves in no way calls for an overall attack on modernity and he instead emphasizes the 
―threat of societal dedifferentiation‖.36 But in another sense, the ―symbolic‖ value in 
recognition of universalism and the ahistorical meaning of human rights enables its 
permanent move toward moralization, primarily in the transgression of the state-centred 
fundamental rights. Back to discussions on positivity, Neves treats the 
positively-maintained boundary of law in fact as contingent condensation of the symbolic 
value in its current nation-state shape. And the potential to transgress it lies in a 
concretization process of a ―right to inclusion and dissent‖.37 
It should not be said that in Luhmann‘s theory, this movement has not been predicted. The 
conversion of classical constitutionalism by ―the development of the doctrine of human 
rights‖ is explained by Luhmann as ―the unfolding of a fundamental paradox‖38 between 
individual and law. In human rights jurisprudence, this open paradox of social contract was 
substituted for ―violation and outrage‖ of human rights.39 
However, Luhmann has discerned a key distinction between the concepts of integration 
and inclusion. Human rights jurisprudence indeed has a deparadoxification effect as it 
undermines the existent legal orders, which we could borrow Teubner‘s phrase to describe 
as a ―releasing‖ process. But for Luhmann, it is a deepening of functional differentiation. 
Without integration, a rebuilding of equality and the couplings of different social systems, 
the functional differentiation is indeed severed by the medium of inclusion.  
On the contrary, Neves argues that communication over human rights is the key integrative 
force of the society. The so called polity is not integrated if fundamental rights prescribed 
by law serve as a partisan instrument for elites. This legitimate claim is hard to deny. As 
exemplified in the case of China, the facticity of over-integration and under-integration 
undoubtedly hollows out the meaning of constitutionalism. But it does not enable the 
flipside of this argument that insistence on the universal signifier of human rights could 
establish any legal system in peripheral countries. In Neves‘s writings, he does not answer 
whether in countries of peripheral modernity there is a legal system properly called, just as 
Kelsen is questioned by Schmitt on the point of real functioning instead of abstract 
function.  Between the universal signifier and the particular register for the engagement 
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model, Neves does not explain how any possible inscription could close the gap, and to 
pragmatically correspond to the universality.  
As far as the re-moralization of law in the modern society is concerned, Luhmann instead 
argues for the impossibility of bridging the two types of reflexive thinking. As he writes, 
―(I)t is worth noting that there are apparently two different reflexive theories in the 
modern legal system, namely the theory of reason and the theory of positive law, 
and the difference between them cannot be bridged. This is a difference between 
principles and sources of law … Validity and justifying reasoning cannot be 
reconciled and hence one must opt for one version or the other.‖40 
If Neves purports to transgress the fragmented legal regimes at the level of legal rationality, 
he must denounce the institutionally signified and sustained ―legality‖ at the same time. 
But then this would mean a rupture of, and withdrawl from, the ―bridge of transition‖ that 
his fundamental model of ―engagement‖ relies on. 
2. Nico Krisch: radical pluralism with a structure 
While Neves‘s critique on universal claim of constitutionalism, I proceed with Nico 
Krisch‘s ―pluralism‖ that professes to have a normative value. Krisch argues that his 
―pluralism‖ is posed at a structural level, compared with Walker‘s ―constitutional pluralism‖ 
and other compromised forms of ―institutional pluralism‖.41 ―Radical pluralism‖ as he 
insists on, is not only a resolution to conflicts of law, but also a theoretical undoing of the 
logic of ―constitutionalism‖. 
With regard to Walker‘s ―constitutionalism-lite‖, Krisch argues that there are in fact three 
ways in which constitutionalism and pluralism relate: containment, transfer or break.
42
 
Walker‘s approach for him, has stretched the meaning of ―constitutionalism‖ without a 
proper boundary. In a backward translation of constitutionalism, Krisch uncovers the 
―enlightenment‖ rationality embodied in ―constitutionalism‖ of its foundational meaning 
grounded as such.  By means of a revolutionary practice and a contingent event, the 
Pre-constitutional subject disappears from this thought. Since its inception, it replaces 
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―limitational constitutionalism‖, and through Habermas, its contemporary appeal continues 




Pluralism, though unable to provide a comprehensive framework, for Krisch, at least 
names the gap between constitutionalism and a polycentric governance in the post-national 
world before denouncing the latter too easily. So in a methodological sense, it is a more 
prudent type. But more than that, pluralism has a normative dimension itself which Krisch 
professes to explore. He states his conception of pluralism as ―a vision that takes societal 
fragmentation to the institutional level.‖44 This fragmented institutionalization contradicts 
what we usually consider to be the meaning of ―institutionalization‖ – a defragmentation. It 
also converts the meaning of ―authority‖ from institutionalized ―binding‖ to ―persuasion‖ 
and ―gradation‖. Through these, Krisch gives out three other normative appeals as great 




―Equidistance‖ is an interesting term that Krisch applies in examining the virtue of 
pluralism. As he puts it, ―if all constituencies are to have decision-making powers beyond 
merely being listened to, but shall not be able to dictate or veto a particular decision, then 
no decision can fully bind them all, and each level has to retain the rights to challenge it.‖46 
Indecision hence gains its normative importance in this non-teleological and non-dominant 
nature. Also the equal potential for all constituencies is vital for Krisch to develop his idea 
of Global Administrative Law, which I will save for later arguments. 
Krisch borrows a term from Chandran Kukathas: ―archipelago‖ of associations,47 which 
implies co-existence, tolerance and compromises between different orders. Instead of 
―empire‖, it is ―umpire‖ of associations changed with ―individual‘s allegiances‖.48 It is 
from here -- right to associations – that Krisch propels Habermas‘s co-originality between 
private autonomy and public autonomy further toward his own suggestion of ―individual 
public autonomy‖. It is a critique and moralization of Habermasian public autonomy – 
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being ―aware of their imperfection, their need to be reinterpreted in the very processes by 
which such public autonomy constitutes itself‖.49 
Yet, my arguments against Krisch are not toward the loose framing that his pluralism 
imports, but his strategy that strikingly contradicts that radical pluralism. Krisch, in the last 
three chapters of his book, intends to account for the problem of uncertainty and sees how 
productive the theory of praxis could be. 
Praxis picks up one element from the ambit of philosophical jurisprudence: the ―feedback 
effects‖.50 This paradigm is ―likely to follow a different logic than the initial creation of a 
regime: new actors may be mobilized and previous participants may see their participation 
in a new light.‖51Instead of critiques that certainty is lost in this flexibilization, Krisch 
argues that there is some degree of certainty in the ―entrapment‖52 of socialization process 
that ―if actors fail to protest against new authority claims, they may later find themselves 
entrapped in this initial (if tacit) acceptance: in a context of path-dependence, a shift of the 
argumentation framework is difficult to undo at a later stage.‖53 At this point Krisch 
compromises his radical pluralism and reduces it to degrees of hierarchy relative to 
constitutionalism. Pluralism does not mean there is no hierarchy left, but is rather 
―bracketed‖54 than ―overarching‖,55 and in a manner of ―arguing‖ rather than 
―bargaining‖.56 Finally, the effects of hierarchy and  our habit of seeing only hierarchy as 
the proper form of the legal system are undermined to the extent that ―(w)hether the 
contrast between the ‗vertical‘ and ‗horizontal‘ dimensions is ultimately useful may be 
doubted … More substantively, we may understand both vertical and horizontal conflicts 
as expressions of a competition among constituencies – as rival claims of different vertical 
societal groups that might be nested in one another, overlap, or be 
altogether ???separately‖.57 
Again, the local, national, and supranational actors are put at an equal footing as 
―competition of constituency‖. At last, even the ―conflict-of-law‖ model58 Krisch formerly 
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harnesses his pluralism to, becomes also inappropriate so that it should be replaced by the 
term ―interface norms‖.59 Conflicts management is no longer applicable; and far from 
distributing jurisdictional powers among a priori unconnected orders as the term of 
―collision‖ implies, ―enmeshment and joint engagement in a common space‖ 60as pluralist 
thinking indicates requires a reflection on terminology as well. 
But what are they competing for, if not hierarchy or a victory? If we summarize the virtue 
of pluralism, it lies in the avoidance of ―teloi‖ 61and the reduction of power effects of 
institutionalization to the minimum. What extent of minimum could enable equal chances 
and equidistance is unknown, yet it is impossible to be zero. As if it is none, the ―feedback‖ 
paradigm will also go bankrupt. The feedback paradigm must work with a preservation of 
effects which is not the totally free emergence for any constituency. 
The distance Krisch inserts between Global Administrative Law and the global 
constitution
62
 is quickly lost with this feedback practices. In lieu of seeking for the 
impossible presence of global constituent power, he converts his argument to a more 
practical and concrete question as ―who is the right constituency of global administration‖ 
or ―accountable to whom‖ practicality (emphasis added)?63 This practical reasoning for 
the positive use of a Janus-faced formula replaces doubts about the general framework and 
its current absence. It also reminds us to think about ―whether individual freedom is best 
promoted by subjection to clear rules or by participation and deliberation over the content 
of law‖. 64  
Ming-Sung Kuo is right to detect more significant jurisprudential implications of the 
Global Administrative Law hiding under this humble ―administrative‖ title--―the new 
nomos of boundary-blurring.‖65 He argues that ―what defines global administrative law as 
a new paradigm of law is a post-public legitimacy instead of its inter-pubic legality.‖66 In 
concept it ―goes beyond Hart‘s strict separation of the rule of recognition from normative 
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judgment.‖67 This excess of pluralism, however, depends also on a conceptual perception 
of ―concrete orders‖. In the next section, I will explain the philosophical implications of 
the ―concrete order‖ with Brian Tamanaha‘s ontological concept of ―legal pluralism‖. 
3. Legal Pluralism at the ontological level 
For Brian Tamanaha, a mapping of different legal pluralism shows a key difficulty facing 
this scholarship is that the stage is already occupied by legal centralism, in the sense that 
the latter decides the former.
68
 Legal pluralism in order to manifest its normative and 
paradigmatic values, must be ―left with the assertion that the legal included the non-legal, 
while unable to provide a certain standard by which we are to identify the distinctively 
legal (now in the broader legal pluralist sense) from the truly non-legal (those normative 
orders even legal pluralists would not want to call law).‖69Tamanaha hence quotes Sally 
Engle Merry‘s complaint, ―why is it so difficult to find a word for non-state laws? (S. E. 
Merry, ‗Legal Pluralism‘ (1988)‖ 
It is the requirement of ―science‖ that dooms the fate of legal pluralism, as ―legal 
centralism‖ decides not only the sources of law, but also the definition of law, thus it 
assumes an ideological function. And to counter this and claim the normative value of 
―legal pluralism‖ we must raise the question to an ontological level, as Tamanaha puts it,  
―What legal pluralists fail to see is that this refinement upon living law inserts a 
disabling equivocation into the heart of their concept of law. In taking the second 
step, legal pluralists traverse an ontological divide which separates the obvious 
question: how are concrete patterns of social ordering (first definition) related to 
the institutional identification and enforcement of norms (delimiting criterion)? 
The former refers to what people in a social group actually do, the practices and 
customs they feel obligated to and follow as a matter of ongoing social action; the 
latter refers to the coercive apparatus of that social group, to (in legal pluralist 
terms) that group‘s ‗legal‘ institution. Since these two aspects are very different, 
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and they are derived from alternative ways of viewing law, which of the two is 
‗law‘?‖ (my emphasis)70 
The disabling equivocation pointed out by Tamanaha indicates a scientific rationality that 
is implanted with the process of modernization. An objective legal order is depicted as the 
best means to protect the individual sphere from intervention that makes his ―rights‖ 
system. This, however, with anthropological findings, is proved more and more as a 
western colonization of the social orders and a transplantation of the legal system that has 
only limited applicability. 
Tamanaha hence radicalizes the deficit in the model of Ehrlich‘s ―living law‖,71 as it 
neglects that differences between state law and folk law are in effect an existential one. 
Ehrlich‘s application of the common term ―law‖ ―indicates that the distinction between the 
two is inconsequential, one of degree – a matter of form not substance.‖72 But for 
Tamanaha, there should rather be a separation between rule of conduct and norms of 
decision. The former indicates that ―the norms operate through the social force which 
recognition by a social association imparts to them, not through recognition by the 
individual members of the association.‖73 It does not need the positivist nature of decision 
and prescription. To borrow from Griffiths‘s word, ―(l)egal pluralism is the fact‖.74 
The living ―concrete order‖, if is put in genuinely scientific meaning, defies generalization 
and rationalization into a mode, a paradigm and an institution. It is only in accordance with 
the Western scientific criterion that they could not be seen as ―normative‖. Instead of 
feeling ashamed for lacking in scientific nature, legal pluralism should rather be justified in 
―why no attempt to formulate a single scientific or cross-cultural definition of law can 
succeed‖.75 
This determines Tamanaha‘s arguments in the formula of ―Rule of Law‖ and 
―Constitutionalism‖. He strongly argues against the World Bank ―Good Governance‖ 
program and declares that ―the rule of law has no blueprint, no standard structure, no 
concrete or visible manifestation, and it is not something that can be constructed on 
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demand. There is no known timetable for building the rule of law.‖76 To take his argument 
further, any building of the rule of law is rather destined to fail when the ―connectedness of 
law‖ principle77 is bypassed in the arrogance of those who provide the models. 
Fundamentally, who could claim to know the truth, and who has the ―state of 
knowledge‖?78 Between for and by or of the benefit of recipient countries and their people 
lies the unbridgeable schism of ―constitutionalism‖ between the formula and the spirit.  
The constitutional government as applied in the West only delivers enslavement in the 
periphery, which is revealing in the case study of transplanted laws. ―To what extent is 
state law really involved in maintaining societal normative ordering?‖79 Tamanaha asks. 
Similarly to how Neves used the terms over-integration and exploitation by the political 
system, Tamanaha also finds that ―the state legal system is best seen not as a mechanism 
for maintaining societal normative order, but as an instrument of power in society, 
available primarily for the elites, … In post-colonial regions which have traditionally been 
their area of special interest, state law is better understood by way of contrast with the 
lived norms of social order, not equivalence.‖80 (my emphasis) 
It is vital to point out that in this transplantation, law is hollowed out in its functions. But it 
is difficult to understand Tamanaha‘s suggestion as well as other radical pluralism 
advocates about how we might observe a contrast without the ―disabling equivocation‖ in 
the first place. And in Tamanaha‘s important descriptions of what legal pluralism should 
be, he does not tell us how to argue about law in legal pluralism. It might be the ―difficulty‖ 
that is imposed by legal centralism that Tamanaha claims to avoid, but the intention to 
―equate‖ is always also the endeavour of naming the unnamed. As in Derrida‘s 
contestation of Levi Strauss, the ―proper‖ name always marks obliteration. While legal 
pluralism argues that we must pay attention to the scientific question of ―what is law‖, it 
does not opt out of the trap of Western consciousness to give everything a name. 
Along with the logic of ―equidistance‖ of Kirsch, Tamanaha also claims that pluralism has 
an extraordinary tolerance to deliver. Paul Berman has made the comment that, ―pluralist 
processes, institutions, and practices for managing hybridity … can instantiate a social 
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space in which enemies can be turned into adversaries.‖81 Legal pluralism in Tamanaha‘s 
sense must withdraw from seeing any norms as more competent and privileged. For 
Walker, this proposal of ―non-order of orders‖ is just avoiding the criteria of success. ―For 
pluralist nonorder to prevail, in any comprehensive sense, this will depend … on the failure 
of any other candidate metaprinciple to achieve even a modicum of structural influence.‖82 
Instead of generalizing concrete orders into an institutional frame, it is pluralism that will 
accommodate both the institutional norms for decision and rules of conduct. Legal 
pluralism in this sense encompasses not only the diverse sources of law but also the 




If Pluralism gains a higher normative ground it is due to the fact that it is a more precise 
description of forms of normative life instead of a search for meta-criteria or regulatory 
effectiveness. It hence relies heavily on empirical inquisitions into the ―actual extent of 
social control activity‖.84 This is why I emphasize the important conception of ―concrete 
orders‖ in all assertions of legal pluralism. It is the bridge of how ―facticity‖ gains its 
normative meaning.  
―In any event, the important point is that scholars studying the global legal scene 
need not rehash long and ultimately fruitless debates (both in philosophy and 
anthropology) about what constitutes law and can instead take a non-essential 
position: treating as law that which people view as law. This formulation turns the 
what-is-law question into a descriptive inquiry concerning which social norms are 
recognized as authoritative sources of obligation and by whom.‖85 
But is there still a functional definition reserved for law? Instead of what Tamanaha claims 
as ―legal development‖,86 all norms have to be submitted to scientific ―positivism‖.87 It 
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surrenders itself to factual diversity. Here, even if Tamanaha strongly opposes the 
formalism and neo-formalism of Hayekian theory, he nonetheless concedes the epistemic 
side of Hayek‘s theory that law is deregulation. 
I want to emphasize that Tamanaha does raise an important opposition of the ―concrete 
orders‖ in the scientific, ontological and philosophical level. His theory fundamentally 
rejects ―constitutionalism‖, as it reveals the impossibility of this model to reflect local 
constitutional orders. The translation issue is especially sharp between the developed and 
developing countries, which turns transplantation into enslavement. In this sense, radical 
pluralism does initiate a fierce attack on constitutionalism and bring insights about the 
constituent subject and real participation. However, the key question is how the issue of 
participation is represented by differences in rationality and re-invested at the level of 
knowledge, so that the radical dimension in this pluralism is re-entered into a discourse 
about science and empirical descriptions. This is how such a radical approach finally 
resorts to a preservation of symbolic constitutionalism although, at the threshold, the 
symbol is a false placeholder. 
4. Summary of this chapter 
In this chapter, I focus on radical pluralism which puts forward pluralism in a jurisgeneric 
sense (―pluralism as constitutionality‖ in Thornhill‘s word). Anthropological research has 
established cultural equivalences to the legal profession and institutions that have 
traditionally acted as the only loci of the law. Rather, these scholars argue that the thesis of 
integration through law as modernity projects has never been completed. The definition of 
law as a monopoly of power to decide conceals the fact that folk laws that inform people‘s 
living and the rules of conduct they follow are also important. 
I fully agree on the point that there are social norms different from a law decided by 
legislatures and executed by judiciary. And minorities whose voices are repressed in the 
rationality of modernity are truly victims of a universal legal science. Law and 
Development literature makes key contributions to revealing the gap and the translation 
difficulty of constitutionalism. Local constituent powers are systematically displaced by an 
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agency constituted according to the Western ideal and serving imperialism. In this sense, 
the so-called constitution breaks with the spirit of constitutionalism. 
But what is endangered by this pluralism lies in an all-too-easy building of ―functional 
equivalences‖ without the principle of equivocation examined. Consequently, functions of 
law are seldom preserved in these equivalences. It might be a trap that legal pluralism tries 
to avoid, namely, that the existent definition of law overdetermines potential imaginations. 
But as long as law has a specified meaning against the whole social system, a battling with 
the positive law and state law should be carried on. As Luhmann has acutely pointed out, 
this is functional differentiation severed rather than overruled. It is manifested in the three 
authors that their radical claims at the level of rationality finally find reconciliation with 
the institutions that they have once claimed to share no ―property‖ with.88 Though radical 
pluralism professes a radical break, to carry through this radical change is more complex 
than simply to offer a discourse about otherness. 
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Political Constitutionalism in a Critical Perspective 
 
Introduction 
With the three approaches to contemporary constitutionalism that we have visited it is 
undeniable that constitutional thinking has been greatly enriched, whether it be 
constitutional tolerance, polity legitimation, or rights to inclusion and dissent. This chapter 
problematizes whether it is too early, nonetheless, to proclaim a paradigm shift as 
‗contemporary constitutionalism‘ indicates. Especially with regards to the lack of the 
political dimension in the three contemporary constitutional candidates, it asks whether 
classical constitutionalism still has a lesson to deliver. 
This chapter uses Foucault‘s critical theory to provide a critique. What I take from 
Foucault is his discussion on ‗politicality‘ and his critique of ‗economization of power‘. In 
today‘s crisis of constituent power, Foucault insists on the complexity of the emancipation 
thesis and observes a transposition of power into knowledge and economy of 
representation. He suggests that in contemporary society, power is organized differently 
and market mentality penetrates the logic of constitutionalization. Foucault describes how 
this transformation occurs and whether we could credibly claim to opt out. 
There are two main sections in this chapter. Section one elaborates Foucault‘s critical 
methodology to approach ‗politicality‘, and how this methodology could be applied under 
conditions of globalization. Following that, I am arguing Foucault‘s finding of the market 
mentality is a deeper inquiry of today‘s globalization phenomena compared to the 
resolution provided by pluralism. Neo-liberalism and its effects on the coupling between 
law and economics demand a deeper understanding. 
1. “The Political” in Foucault’s writings 
In his writings, Thornhill discerns that contemporary constitutionalism arises in the context 
of the vanishing point of political legitimacy – the nation states. And because of this 
vanishing, it brings about the legitimacy crisis of constitutionalism. Negri generalizes it in 
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such a radical stance that ―(i)f in the history of democracy and democratic constitutions the 
dualism between constituent power and constituted power has never produced a synthesis, 
we must focus precisely on the negativity, on this lack of synthesis, in order to try to 
understand constituent power.‖1 
This is manifested in the three approaches to contemporary constitutionalism which claim 
to provide alternatives to positivism and power-centrality – a claim of decoupling law and 
politics in constitutionalization. But in arguing this opting out of politics, the three 
approaches also confine politics in a certain register and definition. But it is questionable 
whether this is the truth; or with the critical move out of the location of power and politics 
in nation-States, the definition of power and politics also needs a renovation. In this part, I 
provide a Foucauldian critical approach to re-introducing and arguing ‗the political‘. 
Among Foucault‘s works, three2 are deemed as his political writings. They are categorized 
on the basis of the topics that have a political nature, which is, of course, a limited view. In 
this section, I will start with Foucault‘s political writing Society Must Be Defended but 
suggest that it is a broader question of ‗politicality‘ that captures Foucault‘s concern. From 
here, I will explain what constitutional lessons we could benefit from Foucault‘s inquiry. 
1.1. Power and discourse 
The book Society Must Be Defended is considered as showing Foucault‘s concentration on 
sovereignty and repression, in contestation with Schmitt.
3
 But in the ―Course Summary‖, 
Foucault addresses a broader concern beyond the critique of ‗sovereignty‘. He argues that 
these studies were not only carried in a historical sense of how ‗the political‘ is 
institutionalized from ‗the social‘ field, but more importantly, aimed to explore ―how has 
war (and its different aspects: invasions, battles, conquests, relations between victors and 
vanquished, pillage and appropriation, uprisings) been used as an analyzer of history and, 
more generally, social relations?‖4 (my emphasis) 
This ―analyzer‖ should be noted, as it leads to the focus of Foucault‘s later writings. Two 
discourses are discerned following and corresponding to the course of history. On the one 
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hand, there is obviously an evolution that happened from Middle Ages onward, and since 
then the right to wage war was taken less as indicating individual or group relationships 
but more as increasingly monopolized by the State. This change is described by Foucault 
as, ―a society completely permeated by warlike relations was gradually replaced by a State 
endowed with military institutions.‖5War becomes ―the cipher of peace‖,6 and ―continues 
to rage within the mechanisms of power‖.7 
A permanent divide hence is drawn in the entire social body that ―it puts all of us on one 
side or the other‖.8 War divides victors and losers, while power claims to mediate from a 
neutral standpoint. The institutional power is constructed as the opposite to war, and claims 
legitimacy for its monopoly of violence. To base the power mechanism on constantly 
reactivating potentials of war only enables the particular (the victor) to proclaim it as 
universal and neutral. The peace and institutional order is always a peace by war and from 
war, than the philosophically perpetual peace. As Foucault contests, 
―It is a matter of establishing a right that is stamped with dissymmetry and that 
functions as a privilege that has to be either maintained or established; it is a 
matter of establishing a truth that functions as a weapon. For a subject, speaking 
such a discourse, the universal truth and general right are illusions or traps‖.9 
Here, Foucault not only pays his attention to the materialized power and war, but also 
semantic effects produced by this institutional establishment. So to speak, 
institutionalization of power with a discourse on war and peace embodies a dissymmetry in 
justification of truth claims -- the ―strategic selectivity‖ of state theory,10 as Jessop 
observes. Instead of universality, it is always a certain fashion of ‗socialization‘ in service 
of race, gender or capital accumulation. Foucault names this discourse the first 
historical-political discourse. It enables a separation of the political from the social. 
But there is a second discourse, Foucault soon finds, which precisely challenges the first 
and the ―traditional values of intelligibility‖. It is ―an explanation from below … The 
elliptical and dark god of battles must explain the long days of order, work, and peace. 
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Fury must explain harmonies.‖11 Foucault finds this discourse as ―entirely‖ historical and 
―(i)t takes as its field of reference the never-ending movement of history‖.12 Though this 
reaction is in opposition to the first historical discourse, ―(i)t is also possible for it to look 
for support to traditional mythical forms … a discourse that is darkly critical and at the 
same time intensely mythical.‖13 
This myth is preserved as the divide between the victor and the loser is undone. Reading 
the two discourses, whether as historical or counter-historical, Foucault argues that both 
build themselves on an unqualified philosophical and universal claim of truth about power, 
yet both are based on a victory that is partial and draws distinctions in the society. It thus 
implies a disagreement between the material history and semantic interpretations of that 
history. This finding of an independent discursive power shifts Foucault‘s political writings 
to broader concerns. 
1.2. Discursive power: intelligibility 
This power-discourse relationship formulates our truth regime: when power implements a 
partisan victory, the discourse justifies its universality. For Foucault, the truth discourse 
dematerialized from the real history will have a more profound and lasting effect, even an 
―inversion‖ consequence, as he analyses with reference to domains as diverse as 
criminality, madness or sexuality. While sex is historically repressed by power, 
psychoanalysis releases discourses on sex and accumulates their variety around the 
pan-sexual term of ―sexuality‖ – a permanent investigation of the science of sex. It is in 
rebuting criticisms toward his idea as ―sexuality without sex‖14 that Foucault declares his 
shift from ―discourses‖ based on ―retro-version‖ of power, to ―knowledge‖ and 
―intelligibility‖ being ―contemporary‖ with power.15 This shapes his new map of 
investigation into ―what is political‖, namely, the question of politicality. 
In his response, Foucault defends his purpose to study ―sexuality‖ is not to deny the 
materiality of sex, but poses the least question that ―as for sex, is it not the ‗other‘ with 
respect to power, while being the centre around which sexuality distributes its effects?‖16 
While sexuality as an anchorage point for emancipation from sexual repression, this 
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unification effect is rather doubtful for Foucault. He argues that, in the psychiatrization of 
perversions, sex was given a ―‗meaning‘, that is its finality‖.17 By playing with the 
discourse of ―interplay of presence and absence, the visible and the hidden‖,18 ―sex‖ was 
caught up ―between a law of reality and an economy of pleasure which was attempting to 
circumvent the law‖.19 Though it is the inverse of forbidding pleasure by law, it becomes a 
fetishism of discourse that is quasi-scientific. Finally, the notion of sex undergoes a 
fundamental turn that it becomes the most internal element of deployment of sexuality 
organized by power. It is not merely power radiates discourses, but a different power 
producing intelligibility internal to discourses, which is the discursive power. As a 
consequence, we witness an epistemic change in ―what is political and non-political‖, 
namely, a definition and appropriation of ―politicality‖. 
The ―inversion‖ thesis is important in many of Foucault‘s writings. After a long period of 
repression, we are under a new imperative of speaking, confessing and investigating the 
truth. Truth and science, for Foucault, not only play the role of enlightenment, but are also 
a means of subjugation. The investigation into madness instead of removing the distinction 
between the mad and the reasonable has the effects of utilizing madness for the purpose of 
psychiatric normalization. But the enjoyment of psychiatric treatment of madness is at the 
same time keeping intact the distinction. It does not constitute a transgression but instead 
transposes itself to a benevolent discourse entitling the mad certain ‗rights‘. For this reason, 
Foucault emphasizes that we must pay attention to the economy of representation and 
intelligibility into which power transforms itself. Only with such a purpose, Foucault 
develops his ―micropower‖ thesis that power is not a thing and an object, but a relationship 
of subjugation. Knowledge and subject are also political issues, as Foucault writes, ―(t)o 
sustain a scientific discourse is not something that is connected from above or to the side of 
history: it is part of history as much as a battle or the invention of the steam engine or an 
epidemic.‖20 Accordingly, Foucault distinguishes himself from the Marxist ―power of 
economy‖, to explore instead the ―economy of power‖,21 namely how power is 
economized into its contemporary forms. 
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This signifier and ‗meaning‘ building is important for Foucault and also separates him 
from Luhmann. For Luhmann, history ―never can reach the plentitude of non being.‖22 
Foucault endorses this in his critique of the counter-historical discourse. But on the other 
hand, a transgression in and through history could only be initiated by making possible the 
heterogeneity of history first, which concern shapes the methodology Foucault names as 
―logic of strategy‖. 
―A logic of strategy does not stress contradictory terms within a homogeneity that 
promises their resolution in a unity. The function of strategic logic is to establish 
the possible connections between disparate terms which remain disparate. The 
logic of strategy is the logic of connections between the heterogeneous and not the 
logic of the homogeneization of the contradictory.‖23 
This highlights the ―how‖ politics of Foucault, a politicizing of connection instead of 
politics of ―what‖. As Foucault‘s micropolitical methodology shows, it concerns historical 
discontinuity which is made as a natural evolution with a medium. And in examining the 
globalization discourses with this ―how‖ politics, Foucault claims, ―(s)o let‘s reject the 
logic of the dialectic and try to see – this is what I will try to show in these lectures – the 
connections which succeeded in holding together and conjoining the fundamental 
axiomatic of the rights of man and the utilitarian calculus of the independence of the 
governed.‖24 
1.3. Foucault on governmentality and the turn of 
constitutionalism – seeking the intrinsic reasons 
For Foucault, globalization as a complex phenomenon does not enable a straightforward 
answer. Rather it is a phenomenon that implies a historical transformation of ―liberalism‖. 
Liberal raison d‟Etat is founded on the three pillars of mercantilism, police state and 
European balance.
25
 It is apparent that globalization changes them all to another three 
pillars: ―veridiction of the market, limitation by the calculation of government utility, and 
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now the position of Europe as a region of unlimited economic development in relation to a 
world market.‖26  This ―successor‖ of liberalism is named by Foucault as naturalism. 
But how could this happen? Contrasting the two trends, it is impossible for Foucault to 
consider the transition from the one to the other as a natural process. Rather what appears 
natural is naturalized by a medium that Foucault finds to be ―political economy‖. Political 
economy, as an independent discipline, brings two important shifts to liberalism: one is the 
notion of ―nature‖; the other is the possibility of self-limitation.27   
At this point, Foucault‘s view is similar to Polanyi‘s writings on the ―self-regulating 
market‖. Political economy separates the market from other fields and investigates its 
unique rules accordingly. ―Inasmuch as prices are determined in accordance with the 
natural mechanisms of the market they constitute a standard of truth which enables us to 
discern which governmental practices are correct or erroneous‖.28 This separation and 
independence of the ―economic sphere‖ from the ―political sphere‖ consequently 
transforms the governmental reason to ―success or failure, rather than legitimacy or 
illegitimacy‖.29 Market henceforth turns from ―a site of jurisdiction‖ to ―a site of 
veridiction‖,30 as when truth is by nature revealed in and by market, it could not be 
regulated by jurisdiction, but instead respected and let alone. From ―fields‖ to ―reasons‖, 
market mechanism shows its excess to spread from a particular mechanism to an 
organizational rule of the whole society. 
This deeply affects the relationship between market and law, and the intrinsic structure of 
law, as Foucault puts it, 
―If there is political economy, what is its corresponding public law? Or again: 
what bases can be found for the law that will structure the exercise of power by 
public authorities when there is at least one region, but no doubt others too, where 
government non-intervention is absolutely necessary, not for legal, but for factual 
reasons, or rather, for reasons of truth?‖31  
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Market and economic fields that are exempted from jurisdiction transform the legal system 
and structure, which corresponds to Polanyi‘s thesis on the institutional separation of the 
political system from the economic system. But differently, Foucault emphasizes a link 
that must be made explicit – the intelligibility of ―political economy‖. This truth claim by 
political economy functions equivalently to law so that enables immunity from law and 
legal regulations.  
As a result, it effectuates a competition between ―two ways of constituting the regulation 
of public authorities, two conceptions of law, and two conceptions of freedom‖.32 The two 
have co-existed in the nineteenth and twentieth century European liberalism. One is the 
revolutionary approach based on natural rights, and the other is the radical approach, which 
does not start from law but from governmental practices and analyse the de facto limits 
that could be set to this governmentality. Political economy apparently enabled the latter, 
and with it, the revolutionary approach gradually receded and the utilitarian approach 
became the more powerful one, in which public reason is explained in the principle of 
utility. ―Governmental reason … is a reason that functions in terms of interest … interest is 
now interests, a complex interplay between individual and collective interests, between 
social utility and economic profit, between equilibrium of the market and the regime of 
public authorities, between basic rights and the independence of the governed.‖33 Foucault 
calls it ―the phenomenal republic of interests‖.34 Here lies what Foucault takes the 
essential reason for explaining structural changes to the legal system, and the spread of 
exemption to other spheres. 
Liberalism came to its turning point. It has to sacrifice individual‘s freedom of random 
action to obey security of economic interests. And globalization becomes an imperative 
that Europe finds itself ―in a state of permanent and collective enrichment through its own 
competition, on condition that the entire world becomes its market‖.35So the boundary 
expansion as the phenomenon of globalization is derived from the shifting relationship 
between market and law. Market exemption changes the structure of law and conception of 
rights, and renders the closure and framework of law redundant. 
For Foucault, this type of politics could no longer be named as ‗politics of discipline‘, but 
the advent of ‗bio-politics‘. As he argues,  
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―What the physiocrats deduce from their discovery is that the government must 
know these mechanisms in their innermost and complex nature. Once it knows 
these mechanisms, it must, of course, undertake to respect them. But this does not 
mean that it provides itself with a juridical framework respecting individual 
freedom and the basic rights of individuals. It means, simply, that it arms its 
politics with a precise, continuous, clear and distinct knowledge of what is taking 
place in society, in the market, and in the economic circuits, so that the limitation 
of its power is not given by respect for the freedom of individuals, but simply by 
the evidence of economic analysis which it knows has to be respected. It is limited 
by evidence, not by the freedom of individuals‖.36 
Unlike Polanyi, who deems once the economic field is rooted out of social solidarity and 
compassion, the conceding of positive law to political economy is inevitable; Foucault 
argues that economism must work along with scienticism of the political economy to 
appropriate the fields of politics and law. Pure economicism in pursuit of interests could 
not unify itself.
37
 It is the discipline of political economy that provides an independent 
locus for economicism whose truth value must be exempted from governmental reasons. 
Political economy, which professes to study a unique truth of the marketplace, is a crucial 
addition to complete the market self-regulation. 
To emphasize how political economy is exchanged for governmental reasons is important 
to preserve a political moment independent from this economy-society penetration. While 
Polanyi is right to describe how a separation of the economic sphere from society initiates 
great transformations, the autonomy of legal and political fields is marginal to his 
diagnosis, as if they were derived spontaneously from an attempt to respond to the market 
transformation, or to regulations of the fictitious goods. But 
―(t)he economic bond plays a very strange role within civil society, where it finds 
a place, since while it brings individuals together through the spontaneous 
convergence of interests, it is also a principle of dissociation at the same time … In 
other words, the economic bond arises within civil society, is only possible 
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through civil society, and in a way strengthens it, but in another way it undoes 
it.‖38 
The interest conception of rights and accumulation of these interests could not organize 
themselves into a framework as the closure would be fatal for this conception. This decides 
why regime of truth and discursive power occupies a more important role in Foucault‘s 
diagnosis of globalization, which is usually defined as an economic expansion separated 
from shifts of authority. In this narrative, the law and market are still treated as two fields, 
and economy could be re-subjected to legal regulation. But for Foucault, there is an 
epistemic link between the collapse of the old legal framework and economics, as the latter 
has higher truth values than any humanly made laws. This marks the economic 
displacement of legal rationality.  
In the next section, I will use this link of market mentality back to review contemporary 
constitutionalism. I am questioning how contemporary constitutionalism could claim to 
reclaim constituent power by means of ‗pluralism‘.  
2. Pluralism or political economy: re-presence of 
constituent power 
In the last part, I compared Foucault‘s diagnosis of globalization with contemporary 
constitutionalism and reached the conclusion that Foucault emphasizes a market mentality 
that continuously transconfigures the legal framework into a regime of interests For 
Foucault, this is the essential reason to interpret the phenomenon of globalization rather 
than internationalization. 
But there is another narrative about the same phenomena of loss of the legal sovereignty, 
especially for developing countries. And this narrative is based on an imperialist meaning 
of neo-liberalism. In criticizing the World Bank ―Good Governance‖ program and its 
hegemony, the attack on neoliberalism is concentrated on Hayek‘s formulation of the 
―Rule of Law‖. This formula has the pitfall of making law a tool of imperialism, and in this 
sense could not reflect constituent power in local and peripheral places. This diagnosis is 
for sure accompanied by a juxtaposition of formalism with pluralism, and the resolution of 
multiplying applications of the legal institutions. But this, I will argue with a Foucauldian 
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critique, is a shallow diagnosis and ignores that pluralism is the other face of Hayekian 
formalism. Neo-liberalism and its influences should not only be understood with respect to 
formalism, but also the market mentality as Foucault emphasizes. 
2.1. Formalism in Hayek’s theory 
Hayek‘s legal formalism, as the target of anti-globalization theorising, is correctly 
recognized. Hayek does suggest a ―Rule of Law‖ formula. In his book The Road To 
Serfdom, Hayek indeed gives the definition as such, 
―It is Rule of Law, in the sense of the rule of formal law, the absence of legal 
privileges of particular people designated by authority, which safeguards that 
equality before law which is the opposite of arbitrary government.‖39 
In this definition, ―formal law‖ has its standard that it must guarantee a quality of ―equality 
before law‖ that is opposite to ―arbitrary government‖. For Hayek, democratic control by 
―its mere existence‖ could not prevent power from being arbitrary. It is not the ―source‖ 
but the ―limitation‖ of power that prevents arbitrary government. ―The Rule of Law thus 
implies limits to the scope of legislation: it restricts it to the kind of general rules known as 
formal law, and excludes legislation either directly aimed at particular people, or enabling 
anybody to use the coercive power of the state for the purpose of such discrimination.‖40 
Hayek thus makes a distinction between ―formal law‖ and ―legislation‖, which is also a 
separation between law and the ―democratic‖ making of law. Hayek compares ―the welfare 
of a people‖ to ―the happiness of a man‖, whose needs could not be expressed as a single 
end, or a ―rank in an order of values which must be complete enough to make it possible to 
decide between all the different courses between which the planner has to choose‖, but 
there is no such a complete ethical code possible. ―Common welfare‖ only ―conceals the 
absence of real agreement on the ends of planning‖,41 and extends beyond the limited 
fields of voluntary agreement. A comprehensive system of delegated legislation is to 
burden the democratic assembly with a task they are unable to fulfil and to cause 
dissatisfaction with the democratic institutions. 
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Hayek in fact acts as the defender of democracy against the advocates of comprehensive 
planning who are ―so impatient with the impotence of democracy‖. His resolution is to 
make democratic directions approximate to ―true agreement‖, while others are ―left to 
chance‖.42 With such an intervention of ―true agreement‖, any claims to substance of 
democracy must be suspended, as ―(a)greement will in fact exist only on the mechanism to 
be used‖,43 not in any particular ends. With such a step, Hayek disconnects Rule of Law 
with its legislative mechanism, as legislation still is a planning, even not in an economic 
sense. Formal law is not positive legislation, and its generality stems not from a democratic 
will, but a ―law‖ of science. 
Criticisms toward Hayek‘s formalism have missed the point of this intervention by 
scienticism, though they are right to point out the depoliticization in Hayek‘s theory. The 
―formal‖ and ―general‖ requirements of Hayek‘s theory not only make economic planning 
impossible, but also legislation impossible, in which sense Hayek indeed clarifies the value 
of ―Rule of Law‖ as the opposite of political intervention. But he accomplishes it via 
science as an intermediate inserted between law and its political authorship. In fact Hayek 
could perfectly agree that legislation according to the World Bank proposal in the 
developing countries is a distortion of the genuine laws, and is ignorant of local conditions. 
He never explicitly implies ―formal law‖ should be importation of the Western legal norms. 
This hence concerns whether the overwhelming effects of Hayek‘s theory are merely 
simplified in this accusation of ―formalism‖. 
2.2. The epistemological shift of Hayek’s theory: scientism 
To consider why science is the crucial intervention inserted by Hayek in decoupling law 
and democracy, let me first return to how Hayek makes sense of science. In his writings on 
science, Hayek makes a clear distinction between physical sciences and social sciences, as 
social sciences have to deal with structures of essential complexity and large number of 
variables. The functioning of social organism is better served by Darwin‘s theory of 
evolution of natural selection, as ―(t)he basic conception of the theory is exceedingly 
simple and it is only in its application to the concrete circumstances that its extraordinary 
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fertility and the range of phenomena for which it can account manifests itself.‖44(my 
emphasis) Theory of evolution satisfies exactly the ―true agreement‖ standard. 
The other important feature of this theory for Hayek lies in its self-scrutiny: a falsifibility 
of an initial proposition, namely that, with the process of evolution one organism could 
shift into another organism. This falsifiability enables the evolutionary biology to be 
named as an ideal science or meta-science. It is both a science and representing 
scientificity of science. Modelling on this theory, Hayek redefines science not as 
―prediction and control‖, but ―pattern prediction‖,45 namely,  
―the prediction that a pattern of a certain kind will appear in defined circumstances 
is a falsifiable (and therefore empirical) statement … The circumstances or 
conditions in which the pattern described by the theory will appear are defined by 
the range of values which may be inserted for the variables of the formula.‖46 
It is an ―algebraic‖ theory,47 an ―if‖ plus variables. Particular facts are not overruling the 
hypothetical science, but internal to the ―falsifibility‖ as the very definition of science. In 
this sense, science for sure could also plead ignorance, as Hayek claims that ―(i)t is high 
time, however, that we take our ignorance more seriously‖.48 Scientific validity is only 
challenged when there is empirical refutation, which but is productive for scientific 
self-reflexivity. In this sense, a falsifiable event could never appear as the rupture of 
science. It is just a negative feedback referring back to scientificity. 
With the ‗pattern prediction‘, the scientific epistemology of ‗law‘ transcends its positive 
definition, with a mission to explore the truth claims of law. Formalism hence enables its 
inverse as pluralism. As Hayek writes,  
―It would seem, therefore, that the conception of law in the usual sense has little 
application to the theory of complex phenomena, … This would entirely not be a 
very useful conception of a ‗law‘, and the only generally valid statement about the 
regularities of the structure in question is the whole set of simultaneous equations 
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from which, if the values of the parameters are continuously variable, an infinite 
number of particular laws, showing the dependence of one variable upon another, 
could be derived.‖49   
Hence, in the field of complex phenomena, the term ‗law‘ is deprived of their institutional 
meanings, but becomes a pattern of reflexivity. To say Hayek only advocates a certain 
form of law hence is inaccurate and understates where the true influences of his theory lie. 
Toward the conception of law, Hayek is rather a pluralist, and argues that the usual 
conception of law should be replaced with a new level of ―spontaneous ordering forces‖. 
Here, in the Rule of Law as particularization lies the reason for receptivity of his concept 
of ―Rule of Law‖ in developing countries than any form of explicit imperialism. 
2.3. The scientific linkage to market order 
Though we could understand how Hayek disconnects law from politics and re-connects it 
to science, there seems no reason to connect it with the market mechanism, unless we take 
on board a statement added by Hayek that, ―(i)n the field of social phenomena only 
economics and linguistics seem to have succeeded in building up a coherent body of 
theory‖(my emphasis).50 The magic ―if‖ is the crucial analogy between law and scientific 
approximation, and also science and economic maximization.
51
 But to re-specify a 
meta-science within a specific science, does it not mean that a privilege is brought back 
which will contradict the generality of science? This contradiction forces Hayek to further 
a distinction between economy and market order, as he clarifies, 
―The confusion that prevails here can be ascribed above all to the false idea that 
the order which the market brings about can be regarded as an economy in the 
strict sense of the word, … It can be said, indeed, that all socialism has no other 
aim than to transform catallaxy (as I am pleased to call market order, to avoid 
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using the expression ―economy‖) into a true economy in which a uniform scale of 
values determines which needs are satisfied and which are not.‖52 
In this shift, Hayek distinguishes economy as a ―field‖ from competition as ―a procedure‖. 
He is no longer pursuing any individual macro-economy but stressing ―methodological 
individualism‖ instead. It is essentially a de-institutionalization in service of a preservation 
of the semantic value of market ordering that separates ordo-liberalism from neo-liberalism. 
And the semantic value is an eternal source for neo-liberalism to expand irrespective of 
institutional confinements and boundaries. 
In the end, Hayek has to surrender ―equilibrium‖ to competition, as equilibrium 
presupposes a ranking and a particular configuration rather than infinite variations. Hayek 
argues that calling the order brought about by competition ―equilibrium‖ is ―a 
none-too-felicitous expression‖,53 ―since a true equilibrium presupposes that the relevant 
facts have already been discovered and that the process of competition has thus come to an 
end.‖54 But this is not in agreement with the changing order. Equilibrium has to be finally 
surrendered to a continuous process, economy to price mechanism, and economics as a 
discipline to an economic thinking as the ideal science. This is why neo-liberalism is 




Henceforth we get a full picture of neo-liberal depoliticization starting from formalism of 
―Rule of Law‖. The Rule of Law formula requires a formal law to regulate privileges, 
which also constrains the government and legislative policy from preferences of certain 
interests. It hence obeys a law of making law, and a social science of ‗pattern prediction‘. 
Pattern prediction transforms substantive values into a particularization of variables. In this 
case, ‗equilibrium‘ will be co-existent with ‗maximum‘, which combination is best 
exemplified by the price mechanism. Only with the intermediary of science, law is 
disconnected from the political will, and re-connected with experimentation of the truth 
value. And in this sense, law made in accordance with ‗global justice‘ could be produced 
without authorship of a global polity, as we could discover ‗law‘ in the process of a 
particular case – the magic ‗if‘.  
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This is pointed out precisely by Foucault as an ―inversion of the relationships of the social 
to the economic‖56 made possible by scientism of political economy. Though the 
economic tone of globalization is well acknowledged, its expansive nature, to the degree of 
deciding law and politics, is not made clear other than terminology of imposition, 
hegemony or imperialism. Instead of explicit means of exploitation, Foucault argues an 
internal bridge for this inversion. Social sciences firstly separate themselves from 
‗politicality‘ with the insertion of truth values, and then in economics find the ideal. 
Freedom from any predeterminations until the moment of particularization is modelled 
according to price fluctuation. As Polanyi puts it well, political economy of utilitarianism 
turns ―human‖ laws to ―natural‖ laws,57 or more precisely speaking, re-naturalized laws 
according to the ideal rationality of economics. 
In the second-generation program of the World Bank, ―more social, more human‖ purposes 
are put in addition to pure economic focuses. But by arguing so, it rather means these 
social and human values are fields left out from the first-generation, which now could be 
re-used as new constituencies. This variables is nothing new to Hayekian neo-liberalism. 
Pluralism, working on the level of variables does not reflect on the structural limits, and 
the acceptability of these institutions in the first-generation program. It does not examine 
whether the social and human fields have already been homologized by this total ordering 
of neoliberalism, as Foucault‘s ‗displacement‘ implies. For Foucault, complexity of 
transgression of the total order of neo-liberalism lies in clarifying the function played by 
political economy in surrendering law to market mentality, rather than holding the belief in 
a human face of the political economy. 
3. Summary of this chapter 
This chapter answers for the eclipse of ‗the political‘ in contemporary constitutionalism 
with a Foucauldian ‗how‘ politics. I argued how ‗the political‘ could be explored by means 
of critique. With Foucault‘s problematization of naturalism of the historical change from 
State sovereignty to globalization, Foucault argued this naturalism was accompanied by a 
transfiguration of power relations. It is especially the intervention of discursive power and 
power of knowledge that provides a link between sovereign power and the economization 
of power as non-power and as the opposite of power. From it, market decoupling from 
politics, instead of law coupling with politics dominates the ideal rationality of law. 
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Contemporary constitutionalism while acutely observing many shifts of legal forms and 
authority, does not go deeper enough to the changes in the nature and substance of law. It 
is not merely a ‗deregulation‘ of law of the economic sphere, but ‗displacement‘ of law by 
economic and market mentality, which is a more severe crisis of constitutionalism. The 
―displacement‖ thesis of Foucault explains why neoliberal economic policies spread to 
other social subsystems, and becomes the whole norm of the society. This ―excess‖ links 
the market with its theoretical significance for constitutionalism, and explains why 
re-constitutionalization could not be reduced to merely reaction to or re-regulation of the 
market. In the next chapter I will use this critique to argue why China‘s second round 
social programs only compensates rather than constitutes, as in the latter, market mentality 




Back to China’s Constitutionalization 
 
Introduction 
Following the debate between classical constitutionalism and contemporary 
constitutionalism, this chapter returns to China‘s constitutional question. But differently 
from Part I and II, this conclusion is to re-read it in terms of the complexities that the 
constitutional theories visited have thrown up.  
In this final chapter, there will be three parts. In the first part, I will answer why 
contemporary constitutionalism arising in the European constitutional tradition has not 
provided the proper justification for China‘s constitutional re-imaginations. Although 
contemporary constitutionalism contests the form of democracy and constituent power, as 
a self-critique of classical constitutionalism, contemporary constitutionalism has not 
overruled the coupling between law and democracy in their modern form, nor has it 
confirmed immediately a type of constitutionalism identifiable as Chinese. The gap 
between the critique of the West and the justification of the Western ―otherness‖ – 
constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics -- should be recognized. 
Instead I argue that we should retain from contemporary constitutionalism its critical 
attitude in diagnosing China‘s own problem and complex circumstances. Henceforth, I 
return, in part two, to the material question left in the first part of my thesis, namely, the 
‗democratization of rights protection‘, and review what has intervened in China‘s great 
transformation.  
In part three, I argue what the intervention is and how this intervention should be 
understood. ―Market mentality‖ criticized by Foucault best describes the combination 
between market as a place and market‘s effect on constitutional thinking. Instead of 
proclaiming that China provides a better regulatory model for controlling the perils of 
marketization, it is crucial to ask why market performance is important for China‘s New 
Left as well as China‘s Neo-liberals, why marketization is essential to governmentality, 
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and consequently to the constitutional question in China. Market economy has structurally 
transformed the legal and constitutional frame. Using China‘s labour law reform to 
distinguish ‗constitute‘ from ‗compensate‘, I insist that market mentality still haunts 
China‘s paradigm of constitutionalization. 
This comprises my two engagements with the application of contemporary 
constitutionalism in China. The first engagement tackles the mismatch whereby the 
institutional deficit in China is taken as coincident with institutional indeterminacy. The 
second insists that there is much to be learnt from the new constitutional trends, with 
regard to the complexities of democracy and its dangerous displacement in contemporary 
society. To summarize, throughout this thesis, I have argued that ‗democracy‘ as the 
constitutional basis is a complex issue that interplays with many relevant concerns, ranging 
from forms of representation, economic and social justice, identity politics to 
fragmentation. With attention to all these complexities, democratization still is the 
achievement of modern constitutionalism and in contemporary society as well as for the 
case of China, it not only has not been overruled, but demands tireless critique for its 
defence. 
1. The first engagement with constitutional 
re-imaginations in China: claims of constitutional 
pluralism 
When discussing ―constitutional pluralism‖, Thornhill critically observes its substance of 
―pluralism as constitutionality‖.1 In this phraseology, Thornhill defines the claim as an 
attempt of equivocation instead of overruling. In this releasing of potentialities of 
equivalences, ‗constitutionalism‘ risks being auto-constituently inflated, Thornhill warns. 
This warning corresponds to Chapter 4, where I have raised many propositions of China‘s 
second-generation constitutional discourses. They are arguing, whether China is a 
constitutional state or how China‘s hybrid social order is interpreted also depends on 
politics of definition about ‗what is constitutional‘. Contemporary constitutionalism has 
been receptive to this attempt of extension of constitutionalism beyond its Euro-centralism 
acknowledging challenges from peripheral countries against the monologue of 
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constitutionalism. Three main approaches were delineated in chapter 5 and unpacked in 
chapter 6-8 of my thesis. Here allow me a short review. 
For Neil Walker, the synthesis of constituent power and constitutional form in classical 
constitutionalism was projected backwards by Ackerman. But as manifested in European 
constitutionalization, it should be noticed that constituent power is not a final end, as every 
‗will‘ of it must be presupposed with an identity of ‗we‘, which is precisely lacking in the 
context of European enlargement. The right to be included as part of the ‗we‘ hence 
constitutes a qualification of democratization in European integration. It tests the 
democratic performance with regard to how integrated we are in the will and what justifies 
exclusion of someone from this will.  
The co-originality of rights and democracy as the ‗polity legitimation‘ for Walker, is 
formulated as a right to contest authority for Kumm. In a sense of paradigm, human rights 
turns to be a claim of being worthy of legalization and could be directly invested into 
democratic legislation. It is hence ‗a cybernetic system‘ in Luhmann‘s word, in which 
subjective rights immediately have an objective meaning.  
Despite such a symbolic common language, this paradigm if workable, still implies this 
gradation of the polity through human rights jurisprudence, as indicated by Kumm‘s 
―commitment‖ to political liberalism. But if we return to the problematic discerned in the 
first chapter of this thesis, it is the ―legality‖ and the ―legal nature‖ of China‘s 1982 
Constitution that is central to the dispute. This lack of the judicial channel or commitment 
to political liberalism hence questions whether ―new constitutionalism‖ could be applied in 
China, and whether the constitutional language is as ―thin‖ as purely symbolic. The 
expression of polity or identity as ‗we‘ for Walker in fact could not be separated from the 
democratic means itself, or else this ―gradation‖ thesis could not be justified. In China‘s 
Confucianism, this focus on the cultural basis of patriotism albeit its incompatibility with 
modern liberal democracy or its perception of the constitutional identity in a 
pre-democratic sense would be a problematic test for Habermasian ‗co-originality‘ thesis.  
For Teubner, constitutionalization should retain its meaning at the level of ‗socialization‘. 
The political system which is situated as a social subsystem could not be singularized and 
assumed as a ‗will‘ to determine this sociological process. In such a sense, what is 
‗democratic‘ and ‗constitutional‘ is proportionate to the configuration and couplings 
between social subsystems. The configuration approach is similar to the ‗articulation‘ 
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approach of Peerenboom which focuses on the particular articulation in the particular 
context. It could be varied from the Party as the integrative force of China‘s society, to the 
Eastern Asian model of authoritarianism. Certainly, it would not be intended by Teubner, 
but in this allowing for re-configuration, a new criterion has not yet been put forward to 
distinguish what is a constitutional configuration from an unconstitutional configuration, if 
for Teubner, the ‗constitutional‘ language is subject to societal self-understanding and 
evolution. The same would be applied to Zhu‘s ―indegenization of law‖ which has not yet 
provided social ordering other than effectiveness. 
Teubner‘s theory indeed surmounts the dilemma of confining democracy to a political field 
separated from ‗the social‘, and rebuilds the societal relevance of ‗democracy‘ and 
‗constitutionalism‘. The social configuration is not subject to political decisions and could 
only be ‗irritated‘. But if this claim is taken seriously, Neves argues, then Teubner could no 
longer maintain the autopoietic law. This diagnosis of the ‗inflation‘ of constitutionalism, 
however, does not return Neves to classical constitutionalism, but pushes him further to 
criticize the political exploitation of ‗Rule of Law‘ which task Teubner has not finished, he 
argues. For Neves, preservation of the mystery of ‗constitutionalism‘ is a remnant of 
conceiving the legal system as a hierarchical order. Hence in dealing with the coupling of 
law and democracy in Luhmann‘s theory, Neves takes democracy not as a foundation but a 
series of disagreements in law-making. The right to be included and dissent scrutinizes 
whether constitutionalism descends to an elite instrument and lacks the integrative capacity 
of the political community. 
If the right to dissent is fundamental then the institutional guarantee to pronounce 
dissensus must be effective. The exercise of dissensus rejects essentialization of a polity or 
identity, as the ‗Chinese characteristics‘ implies. To claim a constitution with Chinese 
characteristics without allowing contestation of these characteristics betrays the spirit of 
radical pluralism and in effect relies on pluralism to justify substantive homogeneity. 
Albeit new constitutional trends open up the gate of potentialities, might they too not have 
their own limits, such as the effectuation of ‗human rights jurisprudence‘ in the core of 
their propositions? For Luhmann, the autonomy of the legal system is conditioned by a 
coupling with the political system that makes law ‗law‘ and allows no exception. The 
sovereign must refrain from deciding in legal cases so as to guarantee the Rule of Law. 
This is hence not a decoupling but indeed a coupling with politics. So the relative 
autonomy of the legal system, which contemporary constitutionalism uses for a register, 
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has already been implicated with this political condition. In this sense, contemporary 
constitutionalism is advancing on the basis of classical constitutionalism, not replacing it.  
Therefore, this self-critique of contemporary constitutionalism still keeps a distance from 
confirming automatically the ―otherness‖ of classical constitutionalism, such as 
‗constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics‘. 
2. The problematic of China’s constitutionalization: 
democratization of rights protection 
Instead of translating a justification of an ―identity constitutionalism‖2 of China, let us 
perceive the analytical tool from contemporary critical theories and return to the beginning 
of this dissertation. I started with an argument that is often made about China‘s Rule of 
Law, namely, the lack of ‗judicial autonomy‘. This lack problematizes whether China has a 
modern legal system and is a constitutional state. It is usually addressed by many proposals 
on what kinds of mechanisms China could apply to strengthen it, toward which I have no 
objections. This thesis, however, has tried to provide reasons for the unsuccessful building 
of the modern legal system in China at a deeper and sociological level. 
In chapter 1, by analysing the ‗strategy‘ of rights protection in China, I have discerned that 
the unique controversy in China‘s constitutionalism in fact concerns the legal nature of the 
1982 Constitution, namely, whether it could be applied as a law. In the practices of rights 
adjudication, constitutional rights in China could not have legal effects without firstly 
being concretized through legislation. The principle of ―democratic centralism‖ questions 
whether human rights jurisprudence could go as far as ―judicialization of the constitution‖ 
explicitly forbidden in the constitutional text. A ―Marbury v. Madison‖ moment aspired for 
by legal constitutionalists in China in this perspective has projected too much on China‘s 
constitutional future, as the emergent new schools protest.  
But even if it were not necessary to establish a constitutional court other than the current 
legislative review in China, in the practices of rights adjudication in China insufficient 
concretization leaves many constitutional rights without remedy. And it is unclear who 
could decide which constitutional rights should be protected through legal concretization. 
The demand for a channel to respond to the remedy-deficit of rights could be termed 
                                                          
2
 I give this name to a turn in China‘s constitutional discourses from legal formalism to legal 
instrumentalism in service of a cultural identity of ―Chinese‖. This turn has also been observed by Tamanaha 
and Trubek in the ―Law and Development‖ movement. See Tamanaha (2011), Trubek (2004) 
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China‘s ‗democratization of rights protection‘ – aiming to redress a revealing asymmetry 
existing between private law rights and political and social rights in this entitlement. 
It is in this sense, I argued, that this failure in establishing the modern Rule of Law should 
not be analysed merely in practical terms, but also related to China‘s great transformation 
of social orders, and put in constitutional theories and sociology. Instead of observing that 
there are more laws, we should penetrate this phenomenon and inquire into whether these 
laws could function as laws.  
Hence in chapter 3, I devoted myself to making a description of complex institutional 
transformations in China‘s Reform period. The concrete form of socialist ―democracy‖ 
with all the social, economic and political functions integrated by people‘s communes and 
work units is dissolved with the adoption of contracts since 1980s. Freedom of contract 
entitled people to flexibility from the rigid social control, yet it lost its essence as ‗freedom‘ 
in the context of China‘s transformation. There is no freedom of not entering into a 
contract, and only by means of this enforced contract without free will, the equality of 
legal status is recognized. Thus in this process of ‗from status to contract‘, only ‗flexibility‘ 
and market freedom are derived in China. Contractualization of legal personality coupled 
with marketization did not bring about democratization as a natural result, nor such liberty 
in a constitutional sense as assumed in this famous phrase of Henry Maine. 
This is why I call forth a re-consideration of the market intervention of China‘s 
constitutional changes. This intervention could be observed in the accumulation of laws 
without the Rule of Law being founded; the asymmetry between the explosion of private 
law rights and the under-protected social and political rights; and the technical use of law 
while leaving behind the structural coupling between positivization of law and 
democratization of politics. But we should be clearer about in what sense this market 
‗intervention‘ is perceived in the constitutional thinking. It is far from a market 
encroachment of the constitutional field, but implies that market leads the rationality of 
constitutional changes. Just as Supiot makes a distinction between contract as an economic 
tool and contractualization as a culture,
3
 I also emphasize that precisely speaking it is the 
market ‗mentality‘ that bridges marketization of a material sense and of a symbolic sense, 
and its economic implications and constitutional implications. Law and economics should 
no longer be taken as two separate fields. By examining what ‗market mentality‘ means to 
                                                          
3
 See Supiot (2007) chapter 3 and Supiot (2000) 
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constitutional theory in general, I also apply it back to examine whether the 
second-generation economic constitutionalism in China has transcended its (first 
generation) haunting by market mentality. This is my second engagement with 
constitutional re-imaginations in China. 
3. The second engagement with constitutional 
re-imaginations in China: market mentality 
I explored the market mentality with Foucault‘s critical theories in the Part III of my thesis. 
This is because Foucault provides an inquiry into the relationship between law and market 
that is different from a quantitative question of ‗more or less‘ regulation. In tracing the 
discrepancies between the universal ideal and the particular appearance, Foucault found 
that the independence of discourses gives ‗the universal‘ a meaning and finality prior to its 
materialization. ‗Absence and presence‘ changes the manner of talking about the ‗universal‘ 
and implants a ‗scarcity‘ and ‗economy‘ of representation in this phraseology. It makes the 
structural lack of ‗the universal‘ turn to be a process of evolution and experimentation, a 
revelation of the truth, and a contingent particularization of ‗the universal‘. With this 
knowledge value, it is exempted from the power imbalance that pervades material 
institutions and history. 
As the metaphor of the ‗marketplace of ideas‘ shows, the uncertainty of human knowledge 
now flirts with an imagery of market: de facto diversity is hard to be regulated by any 
human attempt and should be left alone. From here, the market derives a truth claim -- its 
approximation to nature -- as it is least intervened by governmental intentions. Henceforth, 
an inverse movement takes off that human laws have to surrender themselves to natural 
rules, and the market order becomes the law of law and the legal ideal. 
Though in liberalism the market was constructed as ―a delegation of sovereignty‖,4 it was 
still subject to jurisdiction as a material institution.
5
 Yet the market mentality is different: 
it is dematerialized and more extensive. The market mentality not only collapses one 
particular legal framework, but collapses the entity and positivism of law in the sense of 
leaving only the ―skeletal‖ universal commitment to the protection of expectations.6 So 
                                                          
4
 Rittich, Kerry (2004) 199-243 
5
 Foucault (2008) 32 
6
 Professor Christodoulidis has suggested this correction to my unclear formulation of the effects of 
marketization on positivism. He has pointed out this ―skeletal‖ commitment that I formerly ignored. 
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that it is more than an interplay of the universal and the particular, as pluralism predicts. 
Market ordering is a catallaxy, as Hayek argues, which even denounces ‗economy‘ as a 
proper terminology to capture its implications. This is the reason that ordo-liberalism could 
scarcely close the door to neo-liberalism, Europeanization to globalization, and the 
constitution to constitutionalization. In Hayek‘s theory, it is merely a minimum mechanism, 
exemplified as the price, which serves as a procedure of finding what nature dictates. The 
less content it contains, the more prevalently it will be applied. 
To say the market ordering penetrates constitutionalization does not merely mean all 
constitutional laws are private laws, but indicates that constitutionalization could not 
exclude what market inserts, as market becomes the chief mechanism to explore the truth 
that was once confined and concealed by politics. When Weiler reviews how market 
mentality encroaches on democratic sensitivities in the European tradition, he nonetheless 
concedes ‗inclusion‘ is a higher value, no matter how it is related to consumerism. Through 
the imperative of ‗inclusion‘, consumerism steps out of economic field and gains its excess 
in political theories as ‗constituencies‘. Here we see clearly the meaning of market 
ordering – market orders what law should be and should reflect. Without clarifying the 
market mentality in the sense of constitutional rationality, contemporary constitutionalism 
and its reflexivity on multiplicity only stays ―reactive‖ as Christodoulidis distinguishes;7 
while this permanent impossibility of a synthesis of constituent power and constitutional 
law examined by Negri has not been properly scrutinized as a ‗displacement‘ of 
constitution by market ordering. 
This unpacking of what the intervention of ―market mentality‖ is reveals that the 
constitutional reorientation to marketization is not merely a spatial extension from one 
field to the other, but also embodies a change to the historicity of constitutionalism.
8
 The 
                                                          
7
 Christodoulidis (2013b) 646 
8
 Jacques Ranciere has commented in his book The names of history: on the poetics of 
knowledge on the emergence of a ―scholarly history‖ (p16) manifested in modern 
historians‘ readings of the event of French Revolution. ―The Revolution as an unseen event 
is provoked by the ‗vacancy of power,‘ it ‗takes over an empty space‘ beginning with an 
initial disappearance: ‗From 1987, the kingdom of France is a society without a State.‘ [...] 
This obligation to occupy an empty space consequently institutes a replacement by ‗the 
reign of democratic rhetoric and domination of societies in the name of the ‗people‘‖(p37). 
Ranciere calls this ―the republican death of the king‖ (p66), which re-investment of 
meaning is to map the historical narrative to the advantage of the poor that were repressed 
into silence in history. This ―geographical‖ approach ―establishes the first condition of 
historical science: that no spoken word is left without a place‖ (p66). Now history becomes 
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universal truth regime about constitutionalism, such as the values of democracy and rights 
protection, now defies its sociological origin in a modern and positivistic state frame, 
against Grimm‘s insistence on distinguishing the primary from the secondary values of 
constitutionalism.
9
 The eternal truth about constitutional justice discriminates against 
every incompetent constitution materially condensed and confined. Politicization, instead 
of a channel, is an obstacle for the truth to present itself; constituent power, instead of the 
moment of the people‘s presence, is the closure to ‗inclusion of constituencies‘. On the 
contrary, marketization that least intervenes is most approximate to this demand for the 
natural truth devoid of human activities and positive laws to unfold itself. 
In Sassen‘s analysis of the restoration of the global nature of capitalism from the 
encasement of political nationalism, the new historical narrative has already been predicted. 
This scientific and descriptive hermeneutics has already demystified the capacity of the 
constitution to regulate. In China‘s New Left‘s borrowing from Polanyi‘s theory, the 
process of constitutionalization was depicted at the same time as an involuntary 
constitution of labour forces in China. Polanyi‘s analysis of labour is used as a guide to 
decode China‘s legal reforms as in effect being exploited by global capitalism. As a result, 
this narrative goes, the written constitution and institutionalization are impeding China‘s 
self-constitution. Just as Mao once used imperialism to contest Bourgeois republican 
democracy, the global economy and capitalism inversely endow China‘s economic 
sovereignty with democratic implications. The political economy with Chinese 
characteristics obtains an excess of constitutional significance in the sense of 
self-determination, which is linked to a defence mechanism against global capitalism. As 
                                                                                                                                                                                
―historiography‖ (p41) and the king‘s death is re-written ―in the equilibrium of narrative 
and science‖ (p41). 
Through this example, Ranciere warns of ―a strange paradox that the history of mentalities 
ceases to be interested in the feeling of time precisely when time goes mad, where the 
future becomes an essential dimension of individual and collective action; that it ceases to 
be interested in belief when the latter enters into the immanence of political and social 
action, while there is a disruption of the relations between the present and the nonpresent, 
the visible and nonvisible, which mark the perceptible indicators of its territory‖ (p102).  
This is why when Foucault emphasizes ―the political‖, the ―in and through history‖ 
(Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, p526) could not be stressed enough. 
The territorialisation of the visibility renders the historical changes submerged in a sense of 
‗mentality‘, and consequently dependent upon scientific findings. It is distanced from 
collective ―actions‖, immanent politicality and human interventions. With this ―mentality‖, 
the ―event‖ of history is rendered as ―nonevent‖, and finally becomes an ―evolution‖ of 
history. The eclipse of the ―political‖ meaning of the historical changes, compared to the 
―natural‖ meaning, is closely connected to today‘s post-positivism constitutionalism. 
9
 See Grimm (2010) 3-22 
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in Cui Zhiyuan‘s propositions, the All-China Social Fund is to co-exist with market and to 
use market for appreciating public property. Market has not been removed from China‘s 
constitutional changes, it instead gains its sovereign significance for China to constitute 
itself against the rest of the world. 
We should admit, applying Polanyi‘s theory in China makes some sense in a certain way. 
Without a pre-labour-contract equal status, the labour contract in China is an enforced 
contract and a contract without freedom. Polanyi‘s theory has rightly discerned the 
transformation of labour from its social embeddedness into a fictitious good in the 
economic field. But it is wrong to argue this process is a-political and the political field is 
an outcome that only follows such a separation. 
We should recognize that in fact fragmentation of modern society is a better term to depict 
Polanyi‘s concern of the uprooting and degradation of society, rather than the neo-liberal 
re-appropriation of the public and private spheres in our context. Also, in this already 
fragmented society, it is the politicality of defragmentation that matters instead of an 
idealised invocation of a non-fragmented China. From here, we could see clearly how 
ironic the borrowing is of Polanyi‘s theory by China‘s New Left to justify a public 
compensation program to the 1990s privatization, or to imagine a Chinese typology of the 
configuration of labour and capital could escape the trap of commodification that Polanyi 
depicts. 
I argue instead that China‘s legal reform is a test case rather than a supporting instance for 
Polanyi‘s theory. It is initiated from fragmented laws on property or labour, but it is 
expected that the harder issues of constitutionalization would follow. However, in my 
examination of China‘s labour law and property law legislation, these fragmented laws 
increasingly manifest incompetence to resolve issues of a constitutional nature, such as the 
redistribution problem. And conflicts internal to the fragmented law between labour sectors, 
or between private owners of the working class and the bureaucratic capitalists, are 
intensifying. Separate regulations are increasingly unable to maintain equilibrium of the 
legal reform. Actually, fragmented legal reforms only leave a more divided society that 
makes improbable the double movement of the social and the people‘s re-emergence as 
predicted in Polanyi‘s writings. Using Polanyi‘s theory, though is beneficial to diagnose 
the severe privatization of social welfare, has not examined the effects of the notion of 
―interests‖ on liquidating the collective nature of ―the social‖. 
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The constitutional inequality beneath equality prescribed by labour law or property law in 
China begins to reveal the division between the legal form and substance -- the use of law 
by the Party and the government to resist democratization in China‘s socialist 
transformation,
10
 which disables law‘s function of empowerment and law‘s collective 
nature. The second-generation discourse on the ―social‖ treats the ―social interests‖ or right 
to development as a competitor with ―economic interests‖ and right to property11, so that 
the whole constitutional process is no more than an interplay of public and private interests. 
But ―the social‖ in this sense has no more significance than ―the economic‖. It is not the 
collective basis of ―constituent power‖, but a partisan component of many ―constituencies‖. 
This is why I argue that the second-generation constitutional discourse on the social 
constituency has not overruled the market effects on constitutional thinking. As the fate of 
China‘s Labour Contract Law indicates, the right to association is given inferior protection 
to the right to wage. It exemplifies that in China ‗to compensate‘ is privileged over ‗to 
constitute‘. This second-generation turn to the social is at best a use of law for the society, 
instead of by the society in the democratic meaning. 
Hence in this ―responsive government‖, which is put forth as a contestation against and an 
alternative to ―representative government‖, we should not focus merely on their critical 
attention paid to ‗economic democracy‘ that seems to have slipped from the domain of 
representative government; but also the notion of ―responsiveness‖ they have added to 
constitutional thinking. In Schmitt‘s political-theological attempt to restore the meaning of 
―representation‖ from its entanglement with economic thinking, at least he is right at one 
point. As he says, ―(o)ne cannot represent oneself to automatons and machines, anymore 
than they can represent or be represented.‖12 ―Representation invests the representative 
person with a special dignity‖, while ―(e)conomic thinking knows only one type of form, 
namely technical precision[…which] requires the actual presence of things.‖13 To respond 
immediately to interests without a complexion oppositorium
14
 -- namely, the unity of the 
plurality of interests and parties – will inevitably collapse into the economic thinking of 
constitutionalism, no matter how social these interests are. The immediacy of 
responsiveness will privilege scientific and technical calculability compared to the political 
                                                          
10
 Balme and Dowdle (2009) ‗Introduction‘, 5 
11
 As Potter‘s account of ―a legitimacy claim about the tension between property rights and rights to 
development‖, see Potter (2011), 61 
12
 Carl Schmitt (1996b), Roman Catholicism and Political Form, (Westport, Connecticut·London: 
Greenwood Press), 21 
13
 Schmitt (1996b), 20 
14
 Schmitt (1996b), 26 
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mechanism that is always prone to incompetence and negligence. ―Responsive government‖ 
instead of invoking the political, renders political constitutionalism redundant. 
While Foucault and Luhmann both paid attention to a coupling movement between law 
and economy, and between two conceptions of rights, they also argued for a distinction 
between the two to the effect that law itself is not an economic good. In Grimm‘s reading, 
it is what makes law law, not the transposition of law‘s products to paradigms. In 
critiquing contemporary constitutionalism, I want to emphasize that despite their critical 
values, they are dependent on classical constitutionalism that has founded European 
jurisprudence and the institutional basis of constitutionalization. And they have not yet 
replaced classical constitutionalism as a paradigm. China, lacking in basic equality and 
political rights, should not give up democratization as its mission.  
Secondly, confronted with the dilemmas emergent in China‘s fragmented law reforms – 
especially the building of the private law regime, we should also re-stress the importance 
of political constitutionalism, but in a new form. This is because instead of leading to 
constitutionalization as a result of a demand for systematization of these laws, legalization 
deteriorates into a technical tool to postpone the democratic and constitutional moment to 
advent. If we become constituencies only through these fragmented laws, and their special 
endowment of legal personality, then the structural asymmetry inside the fragmentation 
would be lost from sight in our reviewing of China‘s constitutionalization. 
Defragmentation and demolition of asymmetry of rights protection is political 
constitutionalism in the new epoch and in more complex circumstances. To criticize the 
market displacement of the democratic nature of constitutionalism hence was my attempt 
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